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“ORANGE REVOLUTION” IN UKRAINE: TRANSITOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION

A widespread interpretation of events in Ukraine in November-December 2004 is reflected upon in this article. The author uses the category of revolution to offer an alternative explanation of the events applying transitology that, in the author's opinion, gives an opportunity to more correctly define the essence of these events as a stage of democratic transit.

“The Orange Revolution” in the Ukrainian Public Political Discourse

A sharp rise in the political participation of Ukraine citizens in the last period of presidential election campaign in 2004, confrontation between the authorities and the opposition supported by hundreds of thousands of citizens with the epicenter of events in Independence Square in Kiev, the recognition by the Supreme Court of Ukraine of the second round of presidential elections void, the setting of the repeat voting and the victory of the oppositional candidate V. Yushchenko have already firmly established themselves in the consciousness of the majority of Ukrainians as “the Orange Revolution”. The term itself appeared during the last week of November in 2004 in mass-media as a brief characteristic of the above mentioned events, as a symbol of social expectations and as visual perception, of the domination of orange symbolics of V. Yushchenko's supporters, first of all, in Independence Square. The sensation of revolutionism was made even more tangible by the fact that the unequal struggle for power was won by an opposition candidate. Then the term acquired one more meaning that is of the symbol of the opposition victory in presidential elections in 2004 in Ukraine. This perception of “the Orange Revolution” was not unique. Just one year before the

opposition came to power in Georgia as a result of “the Rose Revolution”. The first “revolution with an adjective”, should, probably, be considered “the Velvet revolution” in 1989 in Czechia when the opposition led by V. Havel managed to remove communists from power in non-violent fashion and become free from the Kremlin influence.

It is not surprising, that the term “the Orange Revolution” obtained a great symbolic value. For this reason it managed to so easily penetrate our daily reference and everyone who has heard or used the term, adds his/her own sense to it.

A rather wide range of meanings of the word “revolution” also promoted the distribution of this particular word-combination. TV commercials are overflowed by messages about “revolutionary technologies”, beginning with the means of communications and transport and finishing with the means of personal hygiene. Changes of public views or modes of production are also widely described with the help of the adjective “revolutionary”.

That is the origin of the discourse of revolution that became the predominant element of political lexicon in Ukraine during the period from the end of 2004 till the middle of 2006. It shall be mentioned that the lines of split of Ukrainian society introduced by the presidential election campaign were accompanied by one more line that divided the population of Ukraine into supporters and opponents of revolution. Public consciousness of one part of Ukrainian society that associated itself with “Orange” supporters considered revolution to be a synonym of progress and was perceived only positively. However, for “white-dark blue” supporters revolution raised negative associations that found their expression in such words as “distemper”, “sabbath”, “sedition”, “decline”, etc. The dynamics of a quantitative ratio of these two groups can be well traced by the results of presidential elections and the level of public support of V. Jushchenko and V. Janukovich during 2005-2007. If at the beginning of 2005 the level of trust in president V. Jushchenko was about 60 %, then by May 2007 it fell down to 10-13 %. At the same time the support of V. Janukovich increased approximately from 7-10 % at the beginning of 2005 up to 24 % by May 2007. Shall one consider the falling of the President’s support level the consequence of disappointment of the population of Ukraine in “the Orange Revolution”? Partially it is so; however, in our opinion here we can see disappointment caused by the actions of “Orange” politicians rather than the reassessment of the importance of «the Orange Revolution” for the life of the country and society.

“The Orange Revolution” in the Scientific Publicist Discourse

In this research I am not trying to answer the question why and how “the Orange Revolution” happened as this topic has already been discussed in different studies of Ukrainian and foreign scientists. I am more eager to learn whether it is possible to classify the events of November-December 2004 as a revolution in the meaning used for this concept in social, and, in particular, political studies. If this is not possible then how can one define the essence of the specified events from a politological point of view?

I shall begin with the review of publications of Ukrainian and foreign critics and researchers devoted to the event interpretation of “the Orange Revolution”. As the term “Orange Revolution” was offered by journalists, the majority of publications in the Ukrainian printed and electronic mass-media describe the events in November-December 2004 specifically as a revolution without any serious analysis. It is not surprising, that the first attempts to explain “the Orange Revolution” were carried out by political observers working for electronic and printed mass-media. For instance, Ukrainian political journalist Mykola Kolodjzjny, using to a certain extent an eclectic list of revolution components, such as preconditions, purposes, moving forces, a revolutionary situation, an impulse to revolution, its course, results and character, states that “the Orange Revolution” can really be called revolution. He believes that as for its type or character the revolution was a bourgeois one on the ground that “it frees society from those remnants and remains which prevent the market economy from its normal development” [1].

The assistant to the editor of the magazine “Suchasnist” (“Modernity”) Sergiy Grabovs’ky in a short publication in the Internet edition “Ukrainskaja Pravda” (“Ukrainian Truth”) claims that “the Orange Revolution” in 2004 as well as “the Revolution on Granite” in 1990 just like actions “Ukraine without Kuchma” or “Rise, Ukraine!” and the acceptance of the Constitution of Ukraine of 1996, are components of a longer and more scaled process. This process should be called “the newest Ukrainian revolution” [2].

The editor-in-chief of the independent culturological magazine “I” Taras Voznyak speaks from the point of view of wider historiosophic understanding of changes, emphasizing the need for “the second wave of the Ukrainian revolution”. He believes that the first wave was “the velvet revolution” of 1991 [3].

A similar idea is also expressed by the British political scientist of Ukrainian origin Taras Kuzio who claims that “the Orange Revolution” is the second and last phase of the Ukrainian revolution which began at the end of the Soviet epoch. “In 1991 a national revolution took place in Ukraine, and in 2004 the country went through a democratic revolution. Therefore, the revolution of 1991 was not finished until 2004” [4]. Besides T. Kuzio believes that the orange revolution united three revolutions in one: national, democratic and anticorruptional. It is obvious, that T. Kuzio uses the concept “revolution” in a rather wide sense, as a denominator of changes in important spheres of social development.

Sociologist Jury Saenko, analyzing the events that took place between the two rounds of elections, cautiously stresses that “... Right now it is practically impossible to fully evaluate and explain what has happened”, however, he insists that “it is true, a revolution took place in public consciousness but only in intentions to introduce changes. It is still far from any revolution in social structure” [5].

Historian Stepan Kulchytsky in the newspaper “Den” (“Day”) published two extensive articles devoted to the analysis of the events that preceded “the Orange Revolution” in 2004. The analysis in the first publication is an attempt to evaluate the preconditions of November events of 2004. Using the depth and speed of changes as criteria the author calls them a revolution [6].

In his next publication devoted to the reconstruction of L. Kuchma’s plans to remain in power, S. Kulchytsky notes, that “The Orange Revolution is only an episode, let it be even the most important in a 200-day marathon of presidential elections in 2004. The opinion about the revolution should be formed during the analysis of these elections” [7].

Political scientist Anatoly Galchynsky expressed his opinion about the dramatic events at the end of 2004 on the pages of the newspaper “Den” (“Day”). Referring to the work of P. Sorokin “Revolution and Sociology” in which the maestro of sociology singles out three phases of revolution, namely, emotional, destructive and constructive, A. Galchynsky emphasizes, that “it is very important for “the crowd” of the Orange Revolution to realize the specificity of logic conformity and for the period of leaving the revolutionary condition and penetrating of society into a constructive phase to come as soon as possible” [8].

The thesis that Ukraine has really gone through a revolution, was developed by A. Galchynsky in the book “Pomarancheva revolutsija i nova vlada” (“Orange Revolution and New Power”. Using the division of revolutions borrowed from the Soviet social science into political and social ones, the scientist claims that November events in 2004 in Ukraine were the beginning of a social revolution, and inherently make the second, democratic stage of public transformations [9]. The first stage lasted from 1991 up to 2004 and consisted of the dismantling of the command system basic attributes and formation of institutional bases of a new political regime in the country. Such a statement, however, raises a question: whether it is correct to speak about revolution as a stage or a phase of transformation? One shall admit that certain researchers, naming the overthrow of authoritarian regimes “velvet revolutions” positively answer this question. But at the same time they depart from the explanation of the revolution essence as a public phenomenon.

A thorough analysis of “the Orange Revolution” against the background of preceding and subsequent events in Serbia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan was carried out by Kharkiv researcher Anatoly Romanjuk. The author carefully studies preconditions and dynamics of political transformations in four countries, however does not go deep enough into the problem of revolution as a political phenomenon.

On the basis of a “non-violent” change of power in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan O. Romanjuk considers it appropriate to classify the given processes as “a special, post-communist type of revolutions” [10]. Similar arguments create a methodological problem of the frame of the “revolution” concept application, using it in a too wide sense. Besides one shall keep in mind that the change of power in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan was accompanied actually not by armed but by political violence. Capture of the governmental buildings took place in Georgia, while in Kyrgyzstan along with this there were mass collisions of Protestants with militia groups. That is why, in my opinion, it is not quite correct to identify the events in these countries as non-violent or “velvet” revolutions.

A serious attempt to prove that it actually was a revolution in Ukraine was undertaken by two well-known academic political scientists Antonina Kolody and Valentin Jakushik. Independently of one another these scientists claim that at the end of 2004 a political revolution took place in Ukraine. Unlike a violent social revolution which is a characteris-

tic attribute of the modernity epoch, a political revolution is a feature of the present and is possible without any violence [11].

An alternative view of the events in November-December 2004 in Ukraine is presented in the collection of texts of Ukrainian and foreign critics under the title “The Orange Revolution. The Ukrainian version”. The collection was edited by M. Pogrebynsky – a Ukrainian political technologist serving ruling parties and politicians supporting L. Kuchma. The authors of this collection are adherent to the idea expressed by Ukrainian political commentator Vladimir Malenkovich who believes that the main purpose of the opposition was a revenge, i.e. coming to power instead of system changes in society. In his opinion it is not worth talking about the revolution without these changes [12].

Other Western Ukrainian studies specialists who devoted their works to the issue of “the Orange Revolution” besides the above mentioned T. Kuzio include Andrew Wilson, Dominic Arel, Anders Aslund and Michael Mcfall.

In general, it is necessary to admit that out of a great number of publications of western researchers dealing with the analysis of “the Orange Revolution” I did not manage to find a single one in which the question “Was “the Orange Revolution» a revolution?” was regarded to be of paramount importance. In spite of the fact that each of the above mentioned scientists presented his/her interpretation of events in Ukraine, none of them used the “revolution” concept taking into account fundamental political changes.

For instance, well-known Ukrainian studies specialist from Britain E. Wilson in the book “The Ukrainian Orange Revolution” published in 2005 cautiously warns that all his conclusions have a preliminary character and at present it is not clear whether the Orange Revolution will turn into a real social revolution, that is according to the classical definition by T. Scocpol, “fast and fundamental transformation of class and institutional structures of society ... accompanied and partly carried out by a class revolt from below”.

Though Wilson admits that “the Orange Revolution” shall be treated as a truly revolutionary event, he gives in to his temptation to give it the name of his own choice. He contends that in a comparative prospect the Ukrainian revolution was absolutely innovative in style and methods. «It is possible that it was the first «situationist revolution» [13].

In general, in my opinion the meta-idea of the book by E. Wilson represented an attempt to give a general picture of the condition of the Ukrainian society against the background of dramatic events at the end of 2004 – beginning of 2005. His attention is concentrated on macrophenomena and processes such as regional distinctions of political cultures, problems of federalization of Ukraine, use of electoral technologies and actions of political elites. E. Wilson believes that the events of “the Orange Revolution” even though not a central one but still are a reference point for the development of these plots».

Head of Toronto university department of Ukrainian studies D. Arel looks at the events of “the Orange Revolution” from the point of view of regional distinctions, national identity and nationalism [14]. To him the essence of “the Orange Revolution” was the birth of Ukrainian political nation and civil society. Arel does not simply repeat a well-known

thesis about the incomplete character of the Ukrainian political nation (which, meanwhile, does not go beyond the borders of Western and Central Ukraine). He goes further claiming that non-acceptance of ideas of “the Orange Revolution” in the East and the South of Ukraine is based on the fear of exclusion from the national project. Here it seems necessary to agree with Arel that the greatest challenge for Ukraine in the next few years will be the overcoming of regional distinctions and expansion of the political nation in the East and the South of Ukraine.

Finally, there was an attempt made to present the opinions of Western, Ukrainian and Russian experts on the events of “the Orange Revolution” in the book edited by famous economist Anders Aslund and by professor of Political Science department of Stanford University Michael McFaul “Revolution in Orange: The Origin of Ukraine’s Democratic Break-through”[15]. The collection was published by Carnegie’s Fund in Washington and, probably, was intended to maintain a positive image of “the Orange Revolution” among western readers.

Judging by the subtitle of the collection and the last chapter content in which M. McFaul compares the events in Ukraine with the events in Serbia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan “color revolutions” are electoral or democratic breakthroughs which clear the road for democratization in the countries of the former communist bloc.

As it is seen from the presented review of publications of most authoritarian western scientists none of them uses the concept of revolution in a literal sense.

There is a clarification given by an American political scientist that is typical of western researchers who use the word «revolution» in their texts. “The use of the word “revolution” is not meant to imply any long term consequences of these events [in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan], but rather only to identify that the pro-democracy movement in each case was in fact successful in overthrowing the current regime” [16].

The offered brief review of publications does not cover everything that has been written about “the Orange Revolution”. Here I have presented the reception of revolution discourse by a scientific community taking into accounts points of view of representatives of different public disciplines. As we see, the majority of Ukrainian scientists to this or that degree tend to accept the idea that the events in November-December 2004 in Ukraine give a good reason to consider them a revolution while western researchers prefer to use the term “revolution” as a synonym of mass actions of political protest contributing to the overthrowing of the current regime.

Intrinsic Characteristics of Revolution

In my opinion, the majority of domestic scientists who tried to define the essence of the events of the end of 2004 in Ukraine by using a comparison with “classical” revolutions or even with newest “revolutions” of the 80s of the XXth century went the wrong way. The matter is that there is no “ideal type” revolution with which one could compare

all others. It is also incorrect to say that revolutions take place during elections. Finally, none of the authors who believed that a revolution took place in Ukraine could explain the course of events proceeding from any theory of revolution. The unwillingness or inability to place the Ukrainian events in a wider theoretical context, on the one hand, can testify to an insufficient “methodological equipment” of the majority of Ukrainian researchers, while, on the other hand, it shows that the Ukrainian events do not keep within the methodology of revolution theories. Difficulties of most authors who define the dramatic events of the end of 2004 in Ukraine through the category of revolution have to do with these particular circumstances. With the purpose of a more thorough examination of the essence and features of revolutions below I am giving various definitions taken from several authoritative editions.

“Political revolution is a social movement and a coup d’état the purpose of which is to eliminate the old regime though the gain of political authority by force and to make fundamental changes in the political life of society” [17].

“Political revolution is a violent fundamental qualitative change of the political system of society as a result of coming to power of new sociopolitical forces and a radical change of the course of sociopolitical development of the country in their interests”[18].

“Revolution is a fast, fundamental and violent internal change of dominating values and myths of society, its political institutions, social structure, administration, and also of political activity of the government”[19].

It is clear that the offered definitions do not enumerate all features of revolution. However, all of them emphasize essential characteristics of the given phenomenon:

1. violent character;
2. deep, fundamental changes of the existing regime and social structure of society;
3. radical change of political institutions and the whole political system.

Authoritarian American researcher of revolution problematics Jack Goldstone identifies three key aspects of revolution – **collapse of the state (!)**, struggle between candidates for central power and formation of new institutions [20].

If we also add that revolutions are long processes taking from several months up to several years thus representing macroevents which make active all layers of society, especially the least provided ones, first of all peasants, then it becomes obvious that to call the events of the end of 2004 in Ukraine a revolution is extremely problematic.

Some critics can object to it on the ground that the offered definitions do not take into account such characteristics of revolution as mass political mobilization, change of the ruling elite or political regime which probably were present in the Ukrainian revolution.

Other researchers can expand the concept of revolution itself. This is what O. Romanjuk, T. Kuzio or American philosopher Bruce Ackerman do. The latter believes that revolution represents “successful efforts depending on collective and conscious mobilization the purpose of which is to change the dominating principles and practices concerning the main sphere of life” [21]. Such a flexible definition enables this author to call the

events in 1989 in Eastern Europe revolutions. He considers the given type of revolutions to be “liberal” on the ground that they were not accompanied by any violence, and their purpose was not a total change of all spheres of life.

Similar ideas were also expressed by some other Ukrainian politicians and scientists, calling the events of the end of the 80s in the countries of Eastern Europe, Ukraine and Georgia “postmodern”, “post-communist revolutions” or “non-violent revolutions”. These intellectual exercises, certainly, represent an interesting attempt to interpret the dramatic marks of the historical process; however, I have significant doubts whether they will improve the understanding of the essence of the events in Ukraine and other post-Soviet republics in 2003 – 2005.

With the purpose of a more detailed examination of the revolution essence as an analytical category I offer a brief review of the most influential theories of the revolution offered mainly by western researchers in the XXth century.

Theoretical Explanations of Revolution

J. Goldstone claims that in the XXth century there were three generations of researchers engaged in the studying of the revolution phenomenon. The first theoretical explanations of revolution belong to representatives of “natural history of revolution” who in the 20–30s formulated an exhaustive list of revolution features. Analyzing revolutionary events using the materials accessible to them, early researchers of revolution phenomenon could rather precisely reconstruct the sequence of a revolutionary process [22].

The typical sequence of revolutionary events looks as follows:

- increase of the role of “intellectuals” who refuse to support the existing regime;
- before the revolution the government tries to carry out essential reforms;
- the overthrow of the regime begins with a sharp political crisis caused by the inability of the government to deal not so much with the actions of the opposition but with many political, military, economic or other internal problems;
- the rise of conflicts among revolutionaries after the revolution victory. There appear radicals, conservatives and people with moderate views;
- the first ones who manage to come to power after the revolution victory are the moderate revolutionaries;
- using moderate reforms they try to reestablish authority, in the meantime radicals organize mass mobilization;
- the change of the social order and dominating ideology does not come when the old regime falls but when radicals are supported by masses and change “the moderated”;
- order is enforced. As a rule, this is the beginning of the revolutionary “terror”;
- the struggle between “the radicals” and “the moderated” and also between the supporters of revolution and external enemies leads to the coming to power of militarists (G. Washington, O. Cromwell, Napoleon, K.Atatjurk, Mao Zedong, J.B. Tito);

– the radical phase of revolution comes to an end with the repeated coming to power of the pragmatic “moderated” who promote the establishment of order in new conditions (attention is concentrated on economic problems, instead of on political ones).

Next generations of researchers include representatives of theories of political violence who wrote their works in the 60s and 70s of the XXth century as well as representatives of the newest “pluralistic” interpretations of revolution whose works appeared at the end of the 70s and in the 80s of the XXth century [23].

An influential theory of the 60-70s of the XXth century was the psychological theory of violent forms of social activity offered by American researcher James Davis [24]. He used two concepts to explain violent actions, namely revolution and revolt though he did not offer precise definitions of these concepts. The only difference between the two is that revolution “covers a greater segment of the population than revolt” (rebellion).

When analyzing some classical revolutions, coming to power of fascists in Germany in 1933 and also Negro and students’ revolts in the 60s in the XXth century in the USA, J. Davis offered an interesting hypothesis to explain the reasons for a revolution. According to J. Davis, revolution is most probable when a long period of growth of expectations and real satisfaction of needs are replaced with a short period of sharp disappointment during which the difference between expectations and real opportunities to satisfy the needs increases and becomes intolerable. If dissatisfaction (frustration) is caused by actions of the government it can express itself in violent actions in the form of a riot. If dissatisfaction runs to limits and spreads to the whole society then it acquires the features of a revolution.

For an illustration of his thesis J. Davis used the scheme in which the difference between the expected pleasure and real opportunities to satisfy the needs reminds the turned English letter J. Due to the characteristic bend of this letter, J. Davis’s hypothesis became known as “curve J”. J. Davis’s thesis became an empirically proved alternative to “natural” explanations of revolutions. The scientist stressed that the probability of social explosion is the greatest not when the situation for broad masses of the population continually worsens (that could be observed in Ukraine for a long time) but only when during a long period their situation improved and then unexpectedly was interrupted by a period of sharp deterioration. This observation shows that the population demands decrease as the situation worsens.

J. Davis’s hypothesis well explains the fact that in Ukraine during the whole period of independence there were no significant protest actions, however, it does not give an opportunity to explain mass, non-forced mobilization of a significant part of the population of Ukraine at the end of 2004.

An alternative explanation of political violence was offered by sociologists. So N. Smelser asserted that instead of studying mass displeasure scientists should study social institutions. N. Smelser insisted that when different subsystems of society change at similar speed, management remains stable. However, when one of subsystems starts to change irrespective of others, certain disequilibrium is created pushing the population to change

the system of values. When disequilibrium between regular changes of separate subsystems becomes acute radical ideologies begin to spread undermining the legitimacy of the current regime. During such aggravations a war, a governmental crisis or famine can lead to the overthrow of the government [25].

S. Huntington made an attempt to combine psychological and sociological explanations of revolution using the widespread in the 70s of the XXth century theory of modernization.

S. Huntington claimed that the key aspect of modernization is an increase in demand for mass political participation. Revolutions, from the point of view of Huntington, do not happen in traditional societies. Similarly, they do not happen in developed modern societies. Revolutions have their greatest chance to happen in those societies which have passed a certain stage of social and economic development, however, their political development and modernization lag behind the process of social and economic transformations. The political essence of revolution is fast growth of political consciousness and fast mobilization of new groups to make them participants of political actions with the speed that will not allow existing institutions to satisfy their needs. Huntington identifies two conditions of revolution. First of all, political institutes are unable to provide for the participation of new social groups in politics and of new political elites in authority. The second condition is the desire of social groups excluded from politics to participate in politics with the goal to gain certain material or other benefits. One group that feels its estrangement from power can become the reason for revolution, riot or revolt, however, only the unification of unsatisfied groups can lead to revolution. The possibility of a revolution in a country in modernization depends on: a) the level of estrangement of the city middle class, e.g., intellectuals, professionals, bourgeoisie; b) the level of estrangement of peasants from the political life and c) the level of unification of the city middle class and peasants not only in the struggle against their common enemy, but also for the victory of nationalism [26].

Psychological and system theories of revolution tried to explain why there is dissatisfaction and under what circumstances it can lead to the violent overthrow of the regime. British sociologist Charles Tilly criticized this approach.

C. Tilly did not accept the modernization explanation of revolution and offered a theory of resource mobilization. The scientist paid attention to the fact that dissatisfaction cannot lead to a revolution if unsatisfied population remains unorganized and has no necessary resources. Asserting that dissatisfaction and conflict are integral components of politics he emphasized that political violence is possible only when unsatisfied groups have necessary resources in their possession and are sufficiently organized to pursue their goals. From this point of view, modernization can cause dissatisfaction; however, it will not necessarily lead to a revolution.

General theories of revolution were always based on psychological explanations of relative deprivation and frustration with the account of non-uniformity of institutional changes and mobilization of resources by counterelites. The above mentioned scientists

analyzed not only individual dissatisfaction, but also changes in existing institutions and activity of oppositional groups in their works.

However, as D. Goldstone says, all general theories of revolution had certain problems, explaining how and where revolutions happen [27].

Firstly, general theories looked at revolution as a directed movement of the opposition with the purpose to gain power in the state. Theories explained revolutions studying the rise of opposition and its resources for collective actions. However, as practice has shown, often revolutions began not due to some activity of a powerful opposition but due to the internal collapse of state bodies which were unable to execute their own functions. General theories did not give any answer why the disintegration of a state happens and how it is connected with the revolution rise.

Secondly, when discussing the problem of modernization, in due course western scientists understood that modernization is not a general process. It has its own features in each separate country. Whether modernization leads to revolution and what type of revolution can occur as a result of modernization actually depend on mutual relations between land owners and peasants, between urban and rural population and even on the growth rate of the population.

The given problems encourage researchers to study the features of political, economic and social structure of the state and to define the influence of different factors on the stability of states.

This is how the structural theory of revolution offered by Theda Skocpol and Ellen Trimberger appeared [28]. The structural theory of revolution asserts that states have different structures and consequently they are subject to various influences which can lead to the disintegration of the state. This theory claims that revolutions begin with a combination of different factors, first of all, because of the conflict between the state and elites, display of civil dissatisfaction and competition between the states on an international arena. T. Skocpol stressed that states with backward economy feel significant pressure of the international environment resulting in disintegration of state institutions and revolution. Vivid examples include Russia during the First World War, France in the XVIII century which lost to economically developed England, and also Japan, China and Turkey which fought with powerful western states in the XIXth and XXth centuries.

T. Skocpol and E. Trimberger believe that states can break up even without a defeat in war. The possibility of internal disintegration depends on mutual relations of the state and dominating political elites. If the state, trying to reduce external pressure, goes to restrict the traditional sources of income for elites or their political status, the conflict between the state and influential political forces is inevitable. If the latter have enough resources to paralyze the activity of the state, then the state disintegration becomes more probable. If political elites make a decision not to support the state in case of the threat of growing external pressure, they can come to power as a result of "elite revolution" named so by E. Trimberger, or, in other words, as a result of state coup. Upon coming to power new administration can resort to radical actions in order to stabilize the crisis. Examples of such

actions include Meiji revolution in 1886 in Japan, K. Atatürk's coming to power in 1923 in Turkey and revolution in 1952 in Egypt carried out by A. Nasser.

Some states which can be named neopatrimonial function on the basis of patronage-clientele relations. In such states the head of executive power can separate bureaucrats and militarists, weaken them both and encourage corruption to put civil servants into dependence on their own will. Such states according to T. Scocpol, deeply feel external economic and military influence. Periods of economic stability enable to construct a network of patronage relations; however, the times of economic recession can deprive the head of executive power of opportunities to control the environment. If during the given period there is even some insignificant social resistance and corruption among militarists and state employees then it can limit the ability of state authorities to enforce order. The power can then be taken by the counterelite which purpose is to overthrow the previous elite, instead of changing the system of government. T. Scocpol believes that such events belong to revolutions of a special type like revolutions in Mexico, Cuba and Nicaragua. At the same time it shall be underlined that in literature such events can be named coups d'état.

Anyhow, the paralysis of the state is only one component of a revolution. A full-scale revolution occurs only when the displeasure of elites is amplified by mass movements of city workers and peasants.

Events of November-December 2004 in Ukraine had some attributes of revolutionism (a political crisis which lasted from the announcement of the results of the second round of elections before the decision-making by the Supreme court about the recognition of the results of this round void and the setting of repeated voting, political mobilization of a significant amount of citizens, confrontation between the power and the opposition, political polarization in society). However, it does not give any reasons to name these events revolution because:

1. Despite of the political crisis in December 2004 and the governmental crisis in September 2005, there was no collapse in the functioning of the key institutions responsible for the support of autonomous safety in the state. I understand autonomous safety as an ability of the state to solve its own problems peacefully, without any external or military presence.

Institutions responsible for the maintenance of autonomous safety include the following:

- A) Effective police/militia and system of corrective institutions;
- B) Effective bureaucratic machinery or public service;
- C) Independent judicial system;
- D) Professional armed forces staying under civil control [29].

The above specified institutions have never been and will not be any time soon completely independent in Ukraine that is independent of political parties, clans, and also of political elites. However, they were never under complete control of the given groups.

Hence, there were none and there are still no reasons to claim that at the end of 2004 the dissolution of the state took place in Ukraine.

2. Change of authority was carried in non-violent fashion;

3. Events of the end of 2004 in Ukraine even though they were extraordinary with the repeated voting in the second round of elections, were never beyond the frame of the legal field;

4. During the two years after the change of authority there weren't any deep changes either in the system of authority, or in the social structure of society testifying in general to the preservation of the current regime in the state.

5. At the beginning of 2006 a political reform that changed parities of powers in the functions of the political system main institutions in favor of parliament and the cabinet of ministers was started. There were also certain changes in some social and political institutions. Though these changes are not carried out systematically and are accompanied by the strengthening of political confrontation and crises, they are a consequence of the political compromise reached December 8th, 2004. Thus, the political crisis was overcome by peaceful means by 2004.

Events in Ukraine could not be called a putsch, a revolt or a coup d'état. However, it leads to the question how one shall define them? I suggest that we look at the specified events through the prism of "transitology". In this sphere of political research the main attention is given to the mechanics of the process of political regime transformation. Transitology identifies certain types of political transformation: reform, revolution, coup d'état and transition. If revolution is a violent change of operating institutions then transition (transit) is a type of political transformation characterized by the change of institutions without the infringement of legal norms. Reform and coup d'état do not satisfy the given requirements either.

Transition is considered to be a long process that consists of several stages [30]. Changes begin with the liberalization of the old regime characterized by the attempts of authorities to preserve the rest of legitimacy by expanding political competition. Next stage is characterized by the deepening of democratic opposition demands and by the attempt of authorities to constrain the democratic movement through advances, threats, concessions, negotiations and compromises with the opposition.

If a democratic opposition comes to power then there are reasons to speak about the beginning of the deciding third stage of public transformations with such features as changes in political, economic, legal and other subsystems of society.

Reform progressive character and inevitability give a chance to move to the last, fourth stage of transformations which should end with the strengthening of democratic institutions, formation of civil type political culture and market economy. Movement from the consolidated authoritarianism to the consolidated democracy can last from 9-10 up to 30 and more years [31]. Such duration of transition can be explained by a number of factors which in some countries can accelerate, and in other countries slow down the processes of changes.

It is better to explain the events in Ukraine through the prism of transit which, in my opinion, began at the end of the 80s of the XXth century continuing for another 5-15 years. Transition in Ukraine is not similar to other well-known examples of democratic transformations. In Ukraine there was a nonviolent rotation of imperious elites with mass participation of the population during presidential election campaign. However, the change of the elites in authority did not lead to the change of the political regime^{*}.

The political regime formed in Ukraine from 1994 till 2004 was a symbiosis of neo-patrimonial authoritarian rule of President L. Kuchma and domination of clan oligarchy. The political cycle that lasted 13 years, came to an end. At the beginning of 2005 we returned to the initial point of 1991, though on a totally different level.

The political process in Ukraine never went beyond the limits of the legal field though was very close to it. Elections ended, both extraordinary and legitimate at the same time. The political crisis caused by infringements of electoral law and mass protest actions, was also solved with a compromise.

Institutions in Ukraine started to change at the beginning of 2005. These changes may include: struggle against corruption which has got a systematic character in Ukraine and is considered to be an institute typical of authoritarian and transitive societies [32]; realization of the political reform which provides for changes in powers of the main branches of power; preparation of an administrative-territorial reform. These reforms, provided they are successfully implemented, all together, may affect the change of the whole political system.

Hence, presidential elections, accompanied by mass participation of citizens in political protest actions lay the foundation for the beginning of the third stage of transition.

It shall be pointed out that for two years after the events of “the Orange Revolution” democratic changes in Ukraine did not acquire an irreversible character. As the study of consequences of presidential elections in 2004 is not the task of the given publication, I shall deal only with the list of authors who substantiate such cautions with more detail [33].

Ukrainian Transition in a Comparative Context

Collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe at the end of the 80s of the XXth century was non-violent due to the rise of mass political strikes and protest actions which became the consequence of the communist regimes system crisis. Peculiar features of crisis include the inability of the governments to effectively cooperate with the opposition, economic decline and loss of communist regime legitimacy.

Collapse of authoritarian regimes in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary occurred in each country in its own way in the presence of internal or external catalysts, namely, a sharp economic crisis, interference in internal affairs from the outside, etc.

* This thesis will be studied in more detail in a separate research paper.

As for Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan their elections and to be exact the forged results of elections, became the catalyst of mass protest actions [34]. In the post-Soviet republics the beginning of transition or liberalization of authoritarian communist regimes was not accompanied by any increase of democratic potential in society unlike in Eastern European states. It is already obvious that we can speak about the second wave of democratic transformations that came along with the collapse of modern authoritarian-oligarchic regimes. Let us hope that the public of these countries, especially of the three post-Soviet ones will find in itself enough strength to maintain its democratic impulse and will not allow the return of authoritarianism. Whether the coming to power of the opposition in the latter group of the countries will give the reason to speak about the success of democratic transit, will depend on the skill of the latter to overcome internal crises, to dispose of national trust and consistently carry out democratic transformations.

Unfortunately, after parliamentary elections in 2006 in Ukraine the opposition that came to power did not manage to use effectively a significant credit of national trust, got caught in internal conflicts and as a result lost its position. In case of failure of the Ukrainian opposition at prescheduled parliamentary elections in autumn 2007 perspectives of the Euroatlantic integration of Ukraine and end of the transition process will again be delayed for an uncertain period of time.

In Eastern European countries authority used different methods of opposition restraint such as selective repressions (arrest of V. Havel in Czechoslovakia, Z. Bujak and other leaders of opposition in Poland) and cooperation with the opposition (holding “round tables” in Poland and organizing negotiations about conditions of power transfer in Hungary).

Transitology distinguishes two types of transition including radical and moderated. Radical transition was carried out in those countries where the old elite had completely lost legitimacy. Regime was changed either through abdication (refusal of authority) the way it happened in 1989 in Czechoslovakia and GDR, and in 1993 in Georgia, or due to the use of force. The latter was observed in Romania in 1989 and in Kyrgyzstan in 2005.

Moderate type of transition means the opposition victory at the elections with the opposition negotiating with the old elite for ways and methods to carry out reforms, or allowing the old elite representatives to be present in power structures. The latter mentioned way is the longest. Besides, when preserving imperious positions of the old elite there might be deviations and breaks of democratization processes. This is how the events in Ukraine and the majority of the post-Soviet countries after 1991 developed. It is obvious now that this is what is happening after 2004.

Chronologically, however, with some reserve, transition in Ukraine can be described as follows:

I. The beginning of regime liberalization – the end of the 80s – 1991.

II. Coexistence (partially cooperation, partially hidden and even open struggle) of old and new elites – 1991–2004.

III. Democratic break at the end of 2004. Since 2005 Ukraine has been facing new challenges connected, first of all, with the overcoming of political instability. Depending on the relations between authority and opposition and which political groups can regain stronger power, the duration of this stage can stretch from 5 up to 15 years. Logically the transition should end with the consolidation of democracy that means irreversibility of democratic changes.

Liberalization in all spheres of life began in the USSR in 1985 with M. Gorbachyov's coming to power. However, the weakening of the authoritarian regime became felt only by the end of the 80s proved by the spread of a network of civil organizations and rise of first political parties.

Final disintegration of the USSR caused by an unsuccessful attempt of coup d'état in August 1991 made all former USSR republics independent. The authority in new states came into the hands of the former Soviet nomenclature which under the influence of democratic transformations managed to change its political “make-up”. Ability of the old Communist party and Komsomol nomenclature to remain in power by modifying its image serves as an example of the post-Soviet political mimicry. Retention of positions of the old nomenclature in Ukraine made it possible to form a complex symbiosis of family authority and clan oligarchy during ten years of L. Kuchma's presidency.

Processes of democratization started to be limited in Ukraine in the middle of the 90s. At that time a pseudo-democratic regime began to be formed. Transitology calls such regimes hybrid. They use some institutions of democracy, such as elections and opposition while retaining authoritarian methods of power execution [35].

Transformation processes in Ukraine shall not be viewed parochially. In my opinion, it would be more correct to speak about a zigzag character of political transformations. In this connection it is possible to consider two different processes. The first one has to do with the changes of political institutions in the direction of democratization. The second process deals with the movement in the opposite direction, that is, preservation and development of authoritarian institutions. In other words, evolution of the political regime in Ukraine during the period of 1991–2004 shall be looked at through the prism of democratization and oligarchization.

From 1991 up till 2004 we were witnesses of a unique variant of public transformations in Ukraine, namely, the formation of the newest post-Soviet version of authoritarianism which has grown behind the facade of poorly developed democratic institutions. The transition process in the majority of the post-Soviet republics that began at the end of the 80s has not been completed yet from the point of view of a traditional transformation model. Moreover, some Central Asian republics show their return to traditional (authoritarian) regimes while Russia and Belarus create modern “police” states. Therefore, the transition model should be supplemented with the experience of the post-Soviet countries. Two existing indicators (an institutional radical turn and legal continuity in Ukraine) are not sufficient for the increase of the explanatory potential of the model. There should be at least one more. This indicator is connected with the change of elites. In

Ukraine like in other post-Soviet states with the exception of the Baltic States acquisition of independence was not accompanied by the change of elites. It was the penetration of the former Soviet nomenclature into power structures that led to the formation of the newest post-Soviet authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet republics.

Now we shall return to the events of November-December 2004. We will also try to define the features of the newest stage of the Ukrainian transit. In my opinion, the Ukrainian variant of transition does not belong to either of the two known types. Old authority in Ukraine was completely deprived of legitimacy but it did not take any risk to use force after the beginning of mass protest actions and it did not refuse to execute its power.

The first and especially the second round of elections took place with mass falsifications of results in favor of the pro-imperious candidate. Political research refers to such actions of authority as “the stolen elections” [36].

Another peculiar feature is that the change of authority in Ukraine marked the beginning of a new stage of political transformations. The first stage lasted from the end of the 80s of the XXth century up to 1991. The second went on from 1991 up to the end of 2004. During this period the Soviet nomenclature authoritarianism in Ukraine was transformed into the newest clan-oligarch version of authoritarianism.

Election of the oppositional candidate as the president of the country can be considered the beginning of the third stage of transition in Ukraine. The defining feature of this stage is the struggle of elites. In spite of V. Jushchenko’s election there was no change of political elites in Ukraine. Ineffective actions of country leaders and struggle of competing political-industrial groups for power were the reasons of several political crises in 2005–2007 in Ukraine. They also necessitated the carrying out of extraordinary parliamentary elections in September 2007.

Nevertheless, the oppositional candidate victory at the presidential elections in 2004 in Ukraine became possible only due to mass participation of citizens in a political strike, political support of western states and international organizations and an independent position of the Supreme Rada and the Constitutional Court. The decisive factor of the opposition’s victory was citizens’ direct participation in non-violent protest actions. Without cooperation of different layers of Ukrainian society and demonstration of civic courage, the opposition’s victory would have been impossible even if everybody knew that the election results had been falsified.

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2B-MODEL OF THE BORDERLAND

...And not enemies you fight but yourself...
The Jataka Tales

Negative Discourses of the Borderland Theory

The problem of the Borderland was raised in 2003 at the CASE seminar [1] for possible measurement and research of social space of the Eastern Europe region localized by Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. The concept of the Borderland [2] was offered to researchers as a zero mark, an empty content point that would allow to identify new objects without any restrictions and to interpret them as widely as possible within the limits of the transdisciplinary research of new humanistics.

It is clear that attempts to describe the countries located in this region as a social monolith are artificial [3] even if in some projects they look like a uniform region. Eastern Europe is not any integrity that can be described with the help of one or even several parameters and variables. It cannot be made uniform even by the political authority that unites this space and allows to some extent to ignore a real variety. First of all, Eastern Europe is perceived as a conglomerate of states which do not form precise interstate unions between themselves. Moreover, Eastern Europe consists not only of national states, but also of various corporations. The opening of Eastern Europe as the space of subject variety as well as the process of actualization of the value of the autonomous subject and intricately differentiated space is the main thing that has happened in this region since 1989. Therefore, any attempt to study Eastern Europe demands an adequate toolkit and methods of analysis and description and should take into account the condition of this space defined by the

level of development of coordination mechanisms of cultural, political, civilization, corporate and personal borders. The borderland is the term that defines the condition of social and political space created through the interaction of borders of different nature. It is obvious that in such a context the term "Borderland" cannot possess only a geographical meaning.

The parameters defining the content of the Borderland concept have been defined by us as follows:

- multiborderness arising as the effect of social differentiation, a permanent feature of the Borderland;

- interaction of borders of different nature in one social space;

- subjectivity of Eastern Europe defined by presentations and representations of elements of its social space that act in the form of communicative strategies, articulates and artefacts;

- intelligibility of the Borderland spaces, providing an opportunity for a significant interaction with its elements, structures and borders.

At the same time the identified parameters specify the presence of negative discourses of the Borderland research and interpretation of its phenomena as well as possible negative models of Eastern Europe development. We underline the necessity of overcoming the following discourses interfering with the adequate analysis of the Borderland:

- Domination of geographical metaphors in this research with this domination impeding the perception of the Borderland as spaces formed by the interaction of borders of different nature within the limits of one social space;

- Politization of social relations and substantial representations about social space that make the structural analysis of processes occurring in the Borderland impossible;

- Subjectlessness of social processes that breaks off communication between the subject and the artefact and also between the subject and its representation;

- Non-intelligible character of social tendencies that leads processes occurring in the Borderland to normative deregulation.

Metaphor of the Map

The first tool guaranteeing the domination of geographical metaphors is the map. Social space is perceived through a complex system of metaphors, the key one is probably topography. More than 5000 years have passed since the moment of the first map emergence. Since then not only the techniques of cartography but also and that is more important to us the functions of the map have changed. For a long time the map has legitimized the proprietor of the local farm or was a guidebook for a merchant, a soldier, a traveler. In the New time the map changes the functions: from showing the route and possession to reflecting social space as such.

The map as the route plan is based on coordinates and marks the meanings of which are exhausted only by the indication of the goal; the map as a possession scheme concerns only one aspect of the social, namely, properties, being limited to the indication of the proprietor. The map as a space metaphor is based on the borders acting as configurators of social space in all its aspects.

Topography expands the space of the traveler, the scheme of possession legitimizes the belonging of the space, specifying its proprietor, and the border makes the configuration of social space without dealing with the subject.

The map of the traveler is the map of the observer who crosses space and does not stay in it for long. The map of the owner establishes him as the subject of social space and represents the procedure of his recognition as such. Modern political maps, in essence, are subjectless, i.e. they do not indicate the subject but the borders of imperious orders. Thus, the map may provoke a situation in which the subject is replaced with its metaphor.

The third kind of maps, namely metaphors of social space, is studied by schoolboys and it is the image of world perception by the majority of people living at present. When we use statements: "Ukraine has decided", "Belarus has accepted", "Poland has participated", we address such geographical metaphors. We have it clear in our mind that behind the metaphor there is a subject defined by the political border. However, geographical metaphors frequently become self-sufficient and consequently cease to represent a complex social reality. The truth is that behind the metaphor of the map there is no subject at all because the map is a metaphor of not the subject but space.

The Border and the Boundary

It is necessary to differentiate two notions if we want to overcome the designated negative discourse. These concepts are "border" and "boundary".

In the English language the notion "border" means, first of all, a really existing political border specially created, equipped with a corresponding infrastructure to control, to let through, to register, etc. The border can be crossed as it is material and is not an accessory of a certain subject. Border crossing does not lead to the change of the subject. Simultaneously every public status can be viewed as a border. It is also specially designed and is the expression of a social need of this or that social function. The status can be changed without the change of the subject. So, for instance, the head of price department when leaving his office after work crosses the border of his status becoming simply Alexander Borisovich. The visitor of the department who needs to discuss some private affairs should cross the border of the status of Alexander Borisovich so that Alexander Borisovich as the department head could solve the visitor's problem. The border organizes a special kind of space. It represents a set of public statuses configured within the limits of the border. In our work we call this kind of space the border-space. For this space to obtain its social value, border situations should arise continually. These situations are formed

as a result of interaction of the border and frontiers of a different nature which we call boundaries, i.e. borders understood as the zone of exhaustion of the subject influence, a mythical line created by the subject itself, in fact, inseparable from it. It is a mental line that objectively fixes the existing division between subjects. Its crossing is possible only with change of the subject. The boundary indicates the existence of the subject participating in social processes, but not determined by the border or, in other words, by its status. The example of such a boundary is the really existing distinction between confessional, historical, economic, ethnic, cultural communities. The boundary also appears as the effect of society differentiation and the coming into being of the subjects possessing public status [4], while preserving their other identities; the border forms space, the boundary does not have such an influence on social space as it is always the result of the formation of the subject of this space, it is not the reason but the consequence of the subject existence and its joining of social space [5]. As a matter of fact, subjectness is set only by a boundary situation which the subject should enter if s/he wants to confirm both personal and social existence.

The Borderland formation does not occur automatically. It has been proved by modernism history that often demonstrates the loss of the subject and, consequently, the loss of the social. A. Renault in “Era individualizma” describes the modern opposition of the subject and the individual. A. Renault claims that the subject possesses autonomy while the individual possesses independence:

“While the concept of autonomy has been allowing the submission to a law or a norm since they were accepted on a free basis (the contractual scheme accurately expresses this submission to the law given by oneself to himself), the ideal of independence does not accept this restriction of “I”, and, on the contrary, strives to set “I” as an essential value. Then the place of autonomy based on its own normativeness is occupied by a simple “care of itself”. Accordingly, the public relation and the consensus concerning the divided norms change into the disunity of the public and the private with the priority of personal happiness and corresponding alienation from public space” [6].

In the Borderland theory the models of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova societies are viewed by us not only within the framework of the interaction of borders, but, mainly, within the framework of the interaction, on the one hand, of the borders and boundaries, and, on the other hand, of the boundaries among themselves. The map of Eastern Europe gives us an idea about the border which has no place for the boundary. However, the Borderland research requires both the border and the boundary as we have to deal with the problem of existence of borders of different nature and also with the problem of subjectness in the processes taking place in the Borderland.

Models of Interaction of the Border and the Boundary

Using the offered differentiation of notions the construction of several models of interaction of borders and boundaries becomes possible.

The first model represents the variant when the border and the boundary coincide. Primordial society with no division into political, religious and economic spheres can serve as a good example. This model has been studied in detail by sociology since the times of Durkheim. It seems attractive to the community that regresses in its social structure as well as to totalitarian societies which take separate subjects beyond the borders of the social structure, but at the same time they try to extremely simplify their social structure, having achieved concurrence of political, economic and cultural borders between themselves. The achievement of such homogenization is inevitably connected with violence as it suppresses the practices of the subjects based on their freedom and boundaries built by them.

The second variant of the border and boundary interaction is possible when the border forms space, relying on certain boundaries, making cultural, religious and other kinds of expansion. That is how modern national states in England, the Netherlands, France, and Germany were forming. Similar processes are accompanied by acculturation, assimilation, provincilization of space experiencing such expansion.

The third is the model in which the subject that has created the boundary is divided between several border spaces. The sacred Roman empire of the German nation can be used as an example of this model. At present studies of the European integration processes and processes occurring in border areas are carried out within the framework of this model (border-studies [8]). However, frequently the problematics of the border area research substitutes the problems of the Borderland [9].

The fourth model can be named a 2B-model. It assumes the coexistence of the border-space generated by the border and the boundaries interacting with the border-space. In fact, it is the Borderland model. Within its framework it becomes possible to resolve a number of questions:

- a) formation of the border and border-space;
- b) formation of the presentation strategy of the subjects creating boundaries in the border-space;
- c) legitimation of the independent status of the subjects creating boundaries;
- d) institutionalization of the subjects creating boundaries;
- e) creation of the interaction mechanism of normative systems of the border-space and the subjects creating boundaries.

The specified mechanisms shall be distinguished from the identification process as they function during the joining of the public sphere by the subject with an already available precise system of identity. Identity is one of the basic conditions and bases of the boundary construction. But the designated mechanisms do not represent socialization mechanisms as their purpose is not the inclusion of the subject into a certain social struc-

ture, but the existence of the social structure as such, on the one hand, and the subject as such on the other hand.

Actorship

Five afore identified parameters of the 2B-model concept shall be united with the help of the notion “subject-ability” (actorship) for further operationalization of the Borderland concept. Actorship acts as an ability of the subject to produce presentations in the public sphere and is a condition for the participation of the subject in public relations. Therefore, here we shall call the subject such a form of existence which simultaneously complies with all five specified conditions: it can display its representations in the public sphere with these representations receiving the legitimation that allows the subject to institutionalize the practices, compelling it to provide for the convergence of its normative system with other normative systems. The fifth key condition, independent of the subject actions, is the presence of environment for the occurrence of such processes, i.e. actually the border-space.

Actorship acts as a necessary precondition for the opportunity to raise a question about the criteria and conditions of the subject’s belonging to social space. What makes a person a member of a family, a nation, a corporation, Church, a state? Obviously, it is not only the desire based on the subject’s own interests or the will and interests of the community (without aspirations of the subject). An individual enters into social space in the sphere of his own limit admitting his existence within the limits of other subjects and institutions. At the same time social space reaches the individual only in the sphere of its own limit. Therefore, it is possible to make a conclusion that any communication and interaction assume the contact of the limits of subjects and spaces. The limit allows to put a question about the subject and its borders and also about special border situations providing for the existence of a complex reality: an individual with a free will, an independent status and complete social space [10]. In fact, it is also the problematics most actual for Eastern Europe.

It is evident that the Borderland is a situation and at the same time a condition typical of most different social levels. The Borderland space can be both wide and narrow as it is determined by the limits of construction of self-similar spaces: they can represent greater communities or can be limited “by two or three” subjects. At all levels of this space there are similar structures, therefore, each of the levels can be considered as quite independent and autonomous. When S.Weil wrote about the need of the person for roots, she specified the rootedness of social practices in the structures of the individual’s inner world [11]. Apparently, this is a natural order of perception of the social world: internal practices define the social order. As a rule, a healthy community cannot grow on the basis of vile individual nature and vice versa. Actorship allows to pave the way for communication between the personal and the social and to detect their interdependence.

Actorship and Legal Personality

The notion “actorship” shall be distinguished from the notion “legal personality”, one of the key concepts in the theory of law. It is the basis of the theory of social organization (the theory of legal relations, the theory of law and order). The notion “legal capacity” refers to the subject already placed in the legal environment which is always primary in relation to legal personality. Therefore, “legal personality” is a concept which allows to analyze stable legal phenomena and established legal systems. However, the question about the communication existing between the subject and its status as well as about the genesis of the legal capacity phenomenon, i.e. that the problem which we identify as “actorship” remains unsolved.

If the theory of law concentrates on the procedures of legal personality acquisition it in no way connects this process with the nature of the subject. Conditions of legal personality acquisition provide for only some restrictions based on 1) the psychological condition of the subject (extending only to its capability), 2) its position in the legal environment (when its activity gets an obvious antilegal character). Therefore, G. Kelzen does not study the question about the procedures of legal personality acquisition, specifying the fictitious character of “legal personality” concept because, in his opinion, individuals do not create legal environment. In “Chistoje uchenije o prave” Kelzen insists that “personifying concepts “legal subject” and “legal body” are not so necessary for the description of law. These are simply auxiliary concepts, which... facilitate the description. Their use is admissible only if their special character is realized” [12].

As a consequence of this approach prevalence, the traditional concept of the legal subject is dominated by the idea of some legal essence independent of law and order, i.e. of some legal subjectivity which law finds readymade, whether it is in the individual or in some generality and which it only needs to recognize and to recognize with the necessity if it does not want to lose its “legal” character [13]. However, in the second half of the XX century there was a gradual disclosing of communicative functions of law [14] that also entailed a change in the understanding of the subject and its status, while also bringing the attention of researchers to the problem of law preconditions and existence of extralegal normative systems and their interaction with the legal system. This process began within the framework of anthropology of law that, firstly, studied the exotic legal systems of Africa and Oceania [15], but then became interested in the national legal systems of the West [16]. On the whole, this tendency can be identified as the concept of law personification.

The statement about the transcendence of the law subject in relation to the objective right was used to protect the idea that subjective law is an institute setting an insuperable limit to the content formation of law and order. The notion of actorship destroys such an approach and specifies that while studying a legal relation and, for example, the process of the status formation, we deal with an interaction of several normative orders in relation to which the subject does not possess the quality of absolute transcendence. Such an

approach allows to see the subject as autonomous in relation to the so-called “objective law”, i.e. as free, but not voluntary and unscrupulous. In this case it is necessary to admit that the subject possesses discourse qualities unlike a monad. The discursiveness of the subject frees it from total subordination and conditionality by organization structures. The concept of the subject becomes even more important, when law and order are created by means of a democratic procedure and discourse practices seemingly devoid of the general plan and logic. Consequently, the ideology of legal personality relies on ethical values of individual freedom and an autonomous person. From this point of view law and order not recognizing personal freedoms, cannot be considered law and order at all.

In this case “actorship” acts as a concept necessary to define conditions and preconditions of the occurrence of legal personality as the basis of the interaction of the subject and its status, the subject and the social order. The given concept means the system of the subject discourse practices aimed at the establishment of social relations. These practices do not depend on the presence or absence of the legal personality of the given subject, but form a discourse provoking a reaction of the legal and social system. This mechanism possesses a universal character not depending on time and circumstances. Thus, preconditions of legal personality lie in actorship. Actorship itself does not become institutionalized, but it is a source and basis of any personal social action of the subject that, actually, creates a phenomenon [17].

In other words, actorship sets such characteristics of the Borderland which allow to view it as a zone of self-reflection, representation and institutionalization of the subject, defining the model of social space. In such a model subject senses and representation practices affect not only the subject itself, but also a different subject and social institutions. The concept “actorship” allows to consider the subject in its subject-subject relations [18] in border practices, including intrasubject relations connected with the coordination of roles and statuses [19]. Such an approach makes it possible to overcome the vision of the Borderland only as spheres of interstate relations and also to reject the definition of subjects of border relations as such whose “external institutional communications exceed communications of internal structures” [20]; this presents the Borderland as a social system that is in crisis broken apart by external forces without seriously influencing the processes going on in it. Thus, the Borderland emergence cannot be connected only with the achievement by a social or political system of some external limit because even in this case, first of all, it meets itself (the limit carries out the function of a mirror, specifying the subject properties which do not allow the subject to develop further). Only then the subject meets Another. Therefore, we state, that the Borderland, firstly, creates internal borders formed by subject practices which define the character of external interaction. Consequently, we can say that we receive a tool for the analysis of processes taking place in social space, allowing to consider subject practices and to view Eastern Europe social space through the representation of its subjects.

The concept “actorship” allows to avoid at once two negative discourses of the Borderland research: 1) politization of the social space analysis with all social interactions

considered from the position of the border influence, i.e. a certain objective imperious order; 2) subjectlessness of social processes arising due to the substitution of the subject by its status.

Depolitization of Research

Depolitization of the analysis of social space of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova allows to view these subjects as intricately differentiated communities with the account of internationally recognized borders and numerous boundaries formed, first of all, by non-political subjects as factors of their coming into being and further existence. This specific method encourages the revealing of real actors forming this region in social relations, as well as institutions and their representation mechanisms.

In Eastern Europe societies the problem of subjectlessness is posed by both post-modernist criticism of the subject [21] and the theory of transit placing emphasis on institutional changes in the countries of transition. For example, P. Bourdieu claims, that social space is “the field of forces which necessity is imposed on the agents involved in the given sphere; it is also the field of struggle inside of which the agents resist each other using their own means and purposes differing in accordance with their position in the structure of the force field, thus participating in the preservation or transformation of the structure of these positions”. However, the statement about the existence of social space and some of its properties does not resolve the problem of studying Eastern Europe and the Borderland. It does not liberate such space from anonymity. It is not only the problem of creation of bases for the subject acquisition of its status, but it is also the realization of the necessity to overcome the full replacement of the status by the subject in the analysis of social relations; it is also the problem of typologization of relations between the subject and its status.

	Status	Not-status
Subject	Real actorship	Potential actorship
Not-subject	Fictitious actorship	Not-actorship

The given table represents the typology of subject-status relations forming the Borderland. Subjects can participate in the realization of the 2B-model, which really or potentially have their actorship, forming boundaries (the system of representations) and relying on their own normative modus. However, the process of space formation of Eastern Europe presupposes the participation of fictitious subjects (created from the outside due to an administrative order; they do not have their own existence resources operating only by way of manipulation), and also the participation of pseudo-subjects which possess neither the status, nor the properties of the subject (masses, “population”, atomized individuals, countries, peoples, etc.). Fictitious subjects do not rely on their own norma-

tive modus and, consequently, are not capable of forming boundaries in the border-space. Pseudo-subjects are excluded from public space which in this case is defined only by the border factor.

Typologization of subject-status relations allows to create a number of models of the organization of Eastern Europe space.

	Status	Not-status
Subject	Real actorship Legitimized boundary, Borderland	Potential actorship Not legitimized boundary, Borderland
Not-subject	Fictitious actorship Domination of border-space, pseudo-boundary, not-Borderland	Not-actorship Total border-space, not-Borderland

Thus, Eastern Europe can develop either as the Borderland or as the Not-Borderland. The Borderland is a positive model of the structure of a complex differentiated community, acting as the form within the limits of which there are subject practices in social and public space. Absence of the Borderland is organic for primordial society and unnatural, in the context of the independent subject logic, for complex-differentiated communities which include Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. Intricately differentiated communities which do not build the Borderland are compelled to resort to irrational practices for society mobilization and maintenance of its integrity; they are also compelled to use violence.

In this case the context of the Borderland research is defined by actorship providing for the ability to understand social space thus taking beyond the limits of this research primary non-intelligible situations which presume the absence of the subject of social action. The understanding of social space becomes the main condition of its actual existence for the subject. The statement about the understanding of social space is a boundary statement (the limit statement). M. Mamardashvili writes that “Besides the imperious need to be, take place or exist as philosophers say, an individual still has a need to understand. Basically, an individual cannot live in the world which is not clear to him. But the principle of this understanding is always combined with the fundamental attitude of the human being to himself and in the sense of the need to identify himself and in the ability to respect oneself”[23].

Intelligibility

The presence in the table of the Not-Borderland zone shows rather terrifying alternatives of Eastern Europe development, relying on not-subject practices forming in the not-normative [24] and irrational environment. These alternatives become so terrifying only because Eastern Europe communities are intricately differentiated presented by a set of subjects possessing actorship. For them the development in the direction of these alternatives means social regress and fragmentation of their own life space. First of all, this regress is connected with the coming into being of non-intelligible space which H. Arendt described as follows:

“What kind of fundamental experience from the sphere of public life of people forms the spirit of the totalitarian regime the essence of which is terror while the principle of action is the logicity of ideological thinking? This experience has two points of support, namely, loneliness and falsely consistent logic. It is not that kind of loneliness that, in fact, is fruitful solitude that supports the internal dialogue of our “I” with itself when we are guaranteed the recognition of our individuality in the community of people. I refer to that kind of loneliness that has attributes of the loss of “I” when a person “loses both trust in oneself as an internal interlocutor, and that elementary trust in the world without which any experience becomes impossible”. “I” and the world, abilities to think and perceive experience are lost simultaneously” [25].

Live experience of the participation in a human community is replaced by the violent self-evidence of logic reasoning, by relationships of cause and effect, general determination or tabooing. In this case the necessity to have an effort of thought and decision-making is lost. All forces are directed only towards the achievement of the result, and any result appears acceptable. “Domination of clichés of logic reasonings in the conditions of mass loneliness” became the formula of totalitarian experience found by H. Arendt [26]. Z. Bauman in “Individualizirovannoe obshchestvo” speaks about the presence of this experience outside of totalitarianism”[27.] H. Arendt called the situation of non-intelligibility “languageness” in which there cannot be an individual but a madman.

In essence, this main difference of the two models, the Borderland and Not-borderland is based on the assumption of difference between an individual and his status. Here an individual becomes a being in the process of formation “doomed” to interaction with borders which he builds and others build. The Borderland cannot be created without individual efforts. The Borderland is the effect of this constant creation process; therefore, it cannot exist without actions and outside of the actions of the subjects. The Borderland is the condition needed to address subject practices allowing to create intelligible situations. It is obvious, that there are only two conditions of practicability of these practices.

The first concerns the human being and human communities and consists in the recognition of their changeability. Neither the person, nor the community are given, they are only set. It is necessary to pass a certain road if one is to reach the individual and the community. Only a human being and no one else can do this. Accordingly, any social engineering creating social space without the participation of the subject is doomed to degeneration turning into the regime that uses terror and limits the responsibility of the individual.

The second condition concerns the quality of public space. It should be opened for a person because is a habitat for his thoughts and actions. There is simply no other environment. It is a certain circle of life and communication, namely a circle of traditions and mutual obligations, having not ideological, but direct character. Actions of the subject in this space are determined by the subject's own logic based on the subject's status and nature. There are no obligations and mutual duties, however, as well as guarantees beyond the borders of public space [28]. Only in the context of the border and border-space the subject is capable of acquiring a certain status by means of which the subject can carry out social interactions. Such space calls for cooperation of people.

Relations between the subject and its status in public space assume, that there should be a sphere of sense and, consequently, internal experience of the subject becomes verified only in some certain adequate space. But this place also cannot be found outside of some action of the subject. There is no specially prepared sphere of sense. At the same time there is a whole number of places prepared for absurdity. In the XX century absurdity has been studied quite thoroughly, both theoretically and practically. It has been defined by a set of metaphors: nausea, plague, process, lock... All of them are used to identify the situation of the initially set world behind the looking glass and the twistedness of both the subject and social space when absolutely everything becomes impossible: from the respect of the subject towards himself up to the understanding of the world. Both the subject and the world in the world behind the looking-glass are just imitations of themselves, thus, no categories can be applied to them. They are absurd. It is impossible to comprehend absurdity, it is possible to leave it only to create a different space, because "... There take place some first actions or acts of world compatibility (absolutes) related to Kant intelligibilities and Descartes cogito sum. It is specifically inside them that - at the level of development - an individual can place the world and himself as its part reproduced by the same world as the subject of human requirements, expectations, moral and cognitive criteria, etc... I.e. the whole thinking process is not enough for a thought, even for one accidental thought. Other things which I called additional or life acts, life conditions which have their ontologic or existence conditions of the possibility are also necessary. These conditions may be destroyed" [29].

There is no alternative for such first acts or preconditions of sense. There is also no alternative between intelligible and non intelligible. The latter means the termination of internal experience translation or the death of the subject (in our case it is social death); the subject refusing sense in social relations, loses the value of an independent social

subject. Death is not an alternative of life. Intelligible space is absolutely necessary for the existence of both the social and the subject which are the only essences able to create such space.

This is the base of the subject institutionalization if the foundation for a personal action relying on the subject's values and norms is allocated in it. This sense is absolutely deprived of a speculative value. Sense appears only in border situations which bring to attention the question about the very bases of the subject and the possibility of its continuation in the interaction with Another. This sense as it appears on the borders is reality immanent, it is not realized, but this is what moves life, due to it some things in life become possible and other become impossible[30]. This sense cannot be received from the outside, it is revealed only in personal dynamics of an individual. This dynamic existence cannot be stopped without the destruction of the subject; it cannot be replaced by a metaphor, a card, a picture, an ideology, an idea... It is always real and never has any ready answers. Each answer in this case is personal and cannot be prompted or replaced by someone else's.

But it means that there are no true and intelligent realities, that the borderland is the essence of social life. That "... For a human it is necessary (again and again) to transform something into a situation that can be intelligently evaluated and solved, for example, in terms of personal dignity, i.e. into the situation of freedom or rejection of it as one of its opportunities".

Personalism and the condition of intelligibility of the social as a feature of the Borderland mean the de-objectivization of those things which seem indissoluble, for example, morals, rights, etc. These objective things "placed into the Borderland environment demand preconditions. For instance, morality is not a celebration of certain morals (we shall say, "good society", "a fine institution", "an ideal person"), compared to something opposite but creation and ability to reproduce the situation, to which it is possible to apply terms of morals and to use them (and only them) as the basis for a unique and complete description" [31]. In other words, the situation of the Borderland allows to correct the main thesis of transitology concerned about major questions of existence of Eastern Europe societies, specifically, the main problem lies in the institutions or in the actualization of preconditions on the basis of which these institutions can exist.

Intelligibility of social space and its institutions also demands the Borderland mechanisms organized in a special way and needed to provide for the subject an opportunity to find sense and maintain structures of social space, not deduced from personal efforts. Outside of such space internal experience is deformed and cannot be broadcast, while the subject cannot be adequately interpreted. For instance, certain values in Europe demanded the creation of semantic structures operating beyond the limits of local orders and logics, being turned directly to an individual, also outside of the context, formed by the position regarding local orders and their normative systems. Concepts of the Empire, Sacred Rus', Rzeczpospolita, Europe, a state, a people, a nation, a federation serve as examples of such schemes; all of them are not substantial, do not specify any certain

subject and even any certain order, but represent mechanisms of the Borderland, identify the principles of social interaction providing the understanding of the social world. They are necessary because they rely on subject values not adequate to norms and institutions which are their contemporaries.

On the other hand, the Borderland mechanisms can be viewed as social frames. Situation intelligibility in this case is determined by an opportunity to form a frame significant for social place by the subject. The construction of such a frame becomes an indicator of actorship realization [32]. The social frame is the scheme of interpretation, the background understanding of the events the participants of which include will, expediency and rationality, in other words, a life activity of the subject [33]. The frame is an alive and developing form of the subject.

The given typology is a methodological basis used to overcome the fourth negative discourse of the Borderland research that includes non intelligible social processes as an object.

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Notes

- ¹ Regional seminar "Social Transformations in the Borderland (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova)" (2004-2006).
- ² Bobkov, I., Tereshkovich, P. Vmesto predislovija // Perekrjostki. Zhurnal issledovanij vostochnoevropskogo pogranichija. 2004. # 1-2.
- ³ It does not matter what reasons were selected for this purpose: Slavdom, Orthodoxy, Catholicism, general history, etc. All of them serve only to construct a utopian picture of Eastern Europe as a social monolith united politically and ideologically. Such an approach neutralizes almost completely the problem of the border condition of these societies, i.e. valid reasons for their sameness.
- ⁴ State formation, nation building, and mass politics in Europe: The theory of Stein Rokkan / Peter Flora ed. Oxford, 1999.
- ⁵ it is essential to remember that the formation of the subject can happen only publicly. Even if such a subject is a hermit, his activity has a public measurement and a public effect. Every intellectual and cultural fulfillment is public as it presupposes the presence of the spectator who knows the difference between either beauty, or sense, or suffering. If there is no such break to publicity, then life fades. In Russian literature melancholy of such life isolated from public space was remarkably shown by Vasily Shukshin in his stories about provincial social reformers, who all their life wrote "for the suitcase", about inventors of planes and bicycles, about graphomaniacs. Everything that they have invented, have written or have thought up is equally good, because nobody needs it and not because these strange people "were ahead of their time" but because they simply had not entered and did not enter that time. They were closed in their own world that did not have (it was not their fault, obviously) any entry into public space.
- ⁶ Reno A. Era individa. K istorii subjektivnosti / per. s frants. S.B. Ryndina; pod red. E.A. Samarskoj; statija. B.V. Markova. SPb.: Vladimir Dal, 2002. S. 70.

- ⁷ Compare: “As a result of the collapse of two multinational states - Russia and Austria-Hungary new population groups appeared made by the new logic of history the first collective victims. They were non-state nationalities and minority. They did not simply lose some social rights, they lost the rights which were thought of and even defined as inalienable, namely human rights. One shocking fact was disclosed: the idea of human rights», not recorded in a specific national-civil form, is only declared, but actually it is empty and lifeless fiction. Non-state people and minorities understood very well that the loss of national rights meant the loss of human rights. The protective reaction of group consciousness found its expression in the demand to guarantee rights of Poles, Jews or Germans. «All organizations, formed for the protection of human rights, all attempts to achieve the acceptance of the new bill about the rights were supported by marginal figures, e.g., by a few international lawyers without any political experience or by professional philanthropists moved by uncertain feelings of inveterate idealists» / Arendt H. / Quoted: Oznobkina E. *Nachalo svershilos, chelovek sotvorjon byl*. Novy mir. 1997. # 5.
- ⁸ See the review of this research problematics: <http://www.ollusa.edu/border/LINKS.html>. We shall not go into detail describing the differentiation of the subject of the Borderland theory and border-studies due to their obvious difference. However, the Borderland theory can be viewed as meta-theory in relation to the research of frontier and cross-boundary interaction, having, as a rule, an applied character.
- ⁹ Compare: “Inhabitants of the Borderland constantly walk from one culture to another, and it turns out that it is not so important to them to belong to this or that culture; that is why a special frontier culture with the ambivalence of identities is created...” (Brednikova O. *Interpretiruja prigranichije: metafory “okna”, “zerkala” i “vitriiny” // Posle imperii: issledovanija vostochnoevropskogo Pogranichija*. Vilnius: EHU-International, 2005. S. 20).
- ¹⁰ During last decades the setting by structuralists of the problem of a different understanding of an individual gave cause for a boisterous debate about the parity of «an individual» and «society» or «an action» and «a structure». Earlier these different directions coexisted in parallel, now the question about their interaction is raised more and more often. When applying the above used metaphors it becomes possible to make a conclusion that modern sociology has almost stopped viewing society as a structured «park» or as “an unruffled surface of the sea with ships floating on it”. Pictures were appreciably imposed one upon another, and studying of society turns into studying of the model of “boats on park avenues”. This is the title of P. Monson’s famous research “Boat on Park Avenues” [Electronic resource] / <http://www.politnauka.org/files/monson.rar>.
- ¹¹ Weil Simone. *The need for roots. Prelude to a Declaration of Duties Toward Mankind*. NY. 1992.
- ¹² Kelzen G. *Chistoe uchenije o prave*. T. 2., 1988. S. 37.
- ¹³ Kelzen G. *Ibid*. S. 38.
- ¹⁴ See: Habermas J. *Vovlechenie drugogo. Ocherki politicheskoy teorii*. SPb.: Nauka. 2001.
- ¹⁵ “... Legal anthropology, using together with evolutionism a historical-normative approach moved to law in its most «obvious» displays, later due to functionalism and procedural analysis began to study the behavior of people more than codes. Sometime later, having recognized pluralism, it discovered the existence alongside with state law of a set of legal systems” (Rulan Norber. *Yuridicheskaja antropologija*. M.: Norm, ²⁰⁰⁰ S. 50).
- ¹⁶ See the concept of extralegal bases of law of R. Dworkin (Dworkin R. *Taking Rights Seriously*. Harvard University Press, 1977).

- ¹⁷ Kant states that pure reason “is present and remains identical in all actions of a human being during all time circumstances, but it did not exist in time and does not acquire, for example, a new condition in which it has not been earlier, it defines the condition, but is not defined by it” (Kant I. Sochinenija. T. 6. S. 541).
- ¹⁸ The whole complex of philosophy of the New times, from Descartes up to Husserl is based on the idea of methodological solipsism, on the model of a subject-object relation putting aside the belonging of the subject to certain society. Philosophy of the XX century, first of all in the form of “a linguistic turn”, made an attempt to withdraw from such understanding... A similar process can be observed in the theory of law. J. Habermas wrote: “Not only the knowledge and use of the objective nature is the phenomenon to be explained, it is also intersubjectivity of possible understanding... Thus, the focus of research is moved from cognitive-instrumental to communicative rationality. For it paradigmatic is not the attitude of the isolated subject towards something in the objective world that can be imagined (presented) and manipulated, but intersubjective communication established by the subjects possessing language competence and competence of action, agreeing about something with each other” (Nazarchuk A.V. *Yazyk v transtsententalnoj pragmatike* K. Apelja. [Electronic resource] / <http://i-e.ru/biblio/archive/nasarchukja>).
- ¹⁹ Simona Cherutti in the work about the formation of modern judicial institutions writes: “The problem of the parity between practice and status (a special case of which is the problem of the parity between personal rights and property law) penetrated societies... It concerned all social layers. When facing important changes made in those times, it was vital to define, what social identification should be based on. Is the status appropriated by authority (through a title, a rank or a post) or is it the result of certain actions? If somebody is engaged in trade, does he turn into a businessman (this is the basis of disputes about derogeance)! Is a nobleman the one who lives like a nobleman? Or is it the one who can decorate himself with the title appropriated to him? Is a citizen someone who lives in the city or the one who possesses a patent for belonging to petty bourgeoisie (lettered-borghesia)? The society studied by us has been immersed into alternative systems of values and systems of legitimacy. It is impossible to say that one of versions corresponds to the national and the other to the elite view. Both have received its scientific statement. During different times both versions were used by merchants and handicraftsmen, lawyers and attorneys” (Cherutti Simona. *Skoryj sud // Neprikosnovenny zapas*. 2005. # 5).
- ²⁰ See: *Posle imperii: issledovanija vostochnoevropejskogo Pogranichija*. Vilnius, EHU-International, 2005.
- ²¹ Shparaga O. *O neobhodimosti subjektivatsii Pogranichija / Posle imperii: issledovanija vostochnoevropejskogo Pogranichija / pod red. I.Bobkova, S.Naumovoj, P. Tereshkovicha*. Vilnius: EHU-International, 2005.
- ²² Quoted: Shmatko N.A. “Sotsialnoje prostranstvo” Pierre Bourdieu / Bourdieu P. *Sotsialnoje prostranstvo: polya i praktiki*. SPb.: Aleteja. 2005. S. 560.
- ²³ Mamardashvili M. “Kak ja ponimaju filosofiju”. M.: Izdatelskaja gruppa “Progress”, 1992. S. 168.
- ²⁴ Such communities are more likely inclined to resort not to the norm but to the taboo (See: Geertz *Wiedza okalna. Dalsze eseje z zakresu antropologii interpretatywnej*. Krakow: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego, 2004).
- ²⁵ Arendt, Hanna. *Istoki totalitarisma / per. s anglijskogo* I. Borisovoj, J. Kimeleva, A. Kovaleva, L. Sedova, J. Mishkenene. M.: TsentrKom, 1996.

- ²⁶ Quoted: Oznobkina E. Nachalo sovershilos, chelovek sotvorjon byl... // *Novy mir* 1997. # 5.
- ²⁷ Bauman 3. Individualizirovannoje soobshchestvo. M., 2005.
- ²⁸ Hence is the value of any public space. Consequently, there is a problem with the sizes of this space, whether it is wide enough for everybody. There is rationality somewhere, but the question is whether it is accessible to everybody.
- ²⁹ Mamardashvili M. Mysl' v kulture // *Kak ja ponimaj filosofiju*. M.: Izdatelskaja gruppa "Progress", 1992. S. 144.
- ³⁰ "Unfortunately, in our ordinary thinking, including social thinking, we always make a fatal mistake. What actually connects the fields of our efforts we place into the world in the form of a perfect image and a walking ideal that we search for in the world. For instance, we say: show us a fair concrete law and then we shall live obeying this law. But was there anytime and anywhere such a law the application of which always led to the triumph of justice? Give us an example of ideal or perfect society. When we cannot show it (and to show it is impossible as it is not present) nihilism triumphs. Due to the misunderstanding of ourselves and our morals. First of all, nihilism is the requirement for «sublime» to exist. The second step is the discovery that truly there was never anything sublime: well, show me a truly honest person! Everybody has a drawback, some self-interest. The third step is the confirmation that everything that is sublime is a continuous pretence, hypocrisy, a lofty covering of vile things. And then the well-known phrase: "All is legal since there is no God"" (Mamardashvili M. *Filosofija – eto soznaniye vsluh* // *Kak ja ponimaj filosofiju*. M.: Izdatelskaja gruppa "Progress", 1992. S. 61.
- ³¹ Mamardashvili M. *Soznaniye i tsivilizatsiya* // *Kak ja ponimaj filosofiju*. M.: Izdatelskaja gruppa "Progress", 1992. S. 111.
- ³² "Though, unfortunately, a human being cannot rule the time that loosens any orders; however, that consciousness I have been speaking about exists in a special mode and allows to correct this inevitable shaking or declination. In a stream of time we all decline. For example, we are declined by our passions, etc. It happens to us contrary to consciousness. I emphasize that alongside with it there is also a possibility to straighten the declination. Moreover, it should occur constantly and in each place it should renew again and again for the world in which we as conscious and feeling beings with desires could live to exist. But if consciousness is the straightening of declination, hence, something else should be borne together with me as the possible in this world. It means that declination is some straight segment restored from my soul which I cannot but walk on. Nobody has the right to force me to descend from this straight line" (Mamardashvili M. *Problema soznaniya i filosofskoe prizvaniye* // *Kak ja ponimaj filosofiju*. M.: Izdatelskaja gruppa "Progress", 1992. S. 56).
- ³³ Hoffmann I. *Analiz freimov. Esse ob organizatsii povsednevnogo opyta* / pod red. G.S. Batygina, L.A. Kozlovoj. M.: Institut sotsiologii RAN, 2003. S. 5.

EUROPEAN IDENTITY AS THE HORIZON OF BELARUSIAN IMAGINATION

How does one picture “Belarus” in the context of contemporary reflections on Europe? The answer to the given question is not that simple. A lot has been said today about the European way of development of Belarus but little was made clear about what it actually means in the context of Belarusian identity. Belarus always tried to be a part of the European space and began its history as a European culture, but at the same time due to various historical reasons it was constantly pulled out of this space. The given tendency of separation from Europe is deliberately supported by present Belarusian authority. As a result, in my opinion, there has formed a paradoxical situation: Belarusians need to quickly pass certain stages which Europe has already gone through if they want to apply for European identity. In this sense everything that has been said about processes and prospects of European identity, is essential to Belarus as well. But, on the other hand, we shall probably emphasize another important point. Each country becomes a European country reading through the European text in its own unique way. It means that while remaining true to oneself one shall be understood by others. Right now Belarus is probably going in the opposite direction and consequently ... it becomes more and more unclear to itself.

Attempts to understand the processes occurring in our country beyond the tendencies characteristic of the modern world are doomed to failure. Certainly, it is impossible to unequivocally evaluate the events happening in the world. Therefore, a modern social theory offers the most diverse conceptual models to solve the given problem. One of the most radical ones is, for example, J. Baudrillard’s social theory. It is impossible to agree with all its positions. But it is specifically its radicalism of conclusions and evaluations that induces us to seriously reflect on real problems. Thus, it becomes necessary

to understand: what the French philosopher writes about, occurs not only “somewhere there”, but somehow it affects Belarus, whether one likes it or not.

It is important to understand, what today’s widespread judgments about “the end of history”, including Baudrillard’s interpretation mean. His words are quite interesting: “The only thing which we try to imagine is how to get rid of our history which is too heavy and, besides, starts over and over again. And we are constantly dreaming of any event that would come from the outside, from a different history. It is imagination, a secret formula of the millennium which could change all around. Something is inevitable, we feel it”¹. These words concerned the end of the millennium. But for Belarus the millennium is not over yet: the fear of future stimulates attempts to freeze time. That explains the aspiration to find a miracle formula of change, a certain secret of national history, irrespective of political connotations connected with it. Is there such a secret? Or if it is a secret, then is it we ourselves and the character of our action?

Baudrillard believes that these tendencies are the result of globalization. In connection with this we shall raise a question: whether the present position of Belarus, its inability to make a choice by displaying its fear of history, is a reflection of inability to adequately answer the challenges of globalization? Whether in this situation does the attempt “to leave history”, to detain the past and by that to prevent the future start? In this case the remark by Baudrillard stirs up a lot of interest: “The more the future avoids us the more the search for the return to sources, the return to the primary stage (both individual, and collective) becomes our obsession. As a consequence, we try to collect proofs: proofs of time of the past, of human evolution”².

This search was most visible in the constructing of national identities and in the attempts to formulate the so-called “national idea”, carrying out the function of separating one’s own national identity from others. It is exactly during the formulation of similar ideas that the connection of interpretations of history or the construction of one’s own past, with political views and practices of “constructor” is shown clearly. A. Kazakevich successfully uncovers this problem using the example of the construction of knowledge about the Great Duchy of Lithuania³. The author identifies and thoroughly analyzes three principles of the historical knowledge construction: genealogy, national presence and role of power. It seems possible to analyze any process of construction of historical sources of specific identity on the basis of these principles. In this particular case we can talk about understanding one’s place in the world, i.e., understanding the uniqueness and naturalness of the state existence irrespective of on what it is based.

A vivid example of such an approach is the concept of “Russian idea” of V.I. Solovyov⁴. It is obvious, that the search for “the Belarusian idea” started under the influence of this conceptual structure. In connection with this it will be fruitful to remind of I. Abdiralovich’s concept⁵. Abdiralovich believes that in real life the form often subordinates the content to itself, not allowing it to develop freely, though any and all forms are created by people. In fact, this idea was formulated by Hegel and Marx in the form of the concept of alienation. Following Heraclitus Abdiralovich finds it necessary to have a “flowing”,

changeable form which would meet the needs of a changing life. At the same time, as it follows from the text by Abdiralovich, “blurriness of forms” makes Belarusian identity indeterminate. The problem is to find its stable form (“the Belarusian form of life”) that actually contradicts the concept of the flowing form: as soon as Belarusians return to their original eternal path, the form should acquire stability and invariability. But for this purpose a high spiritual level of people is required as people tend to subordinate their life to external forms due to their low level of spiritual development: “The darker the soul, the more undivided is the domination of the formula”.

When criticizing European forms, Abdiralovich actually follows the criticism of the European narrow-mindedness, fashion, discipline, “office”, traditional for the Russian thought, relying on the idea of “reassessment of all values” of F. Nietzsche. Hence is the conclusion: “Not dead forms, but the individual himself is the master of his life. He creates all forms of life; they depend on the individual who should not remain under the dead authority of the rotted forms: religion, morals, laws, overall aims. It is time to understand, that life controls forms but not vice versa, that the human being himself, his great soul that is like sunny rays, soul’s natural striving for light, beauty, and truth is the essence of life, that in a true independent life there is neither place for ideals nor for victims”. It is exactly this look that “the Belarusian idea” or, more precisely, “the Belarusian path” should acquire.

Contradictoriness of such a cogitative construct is obvious. Though Abdiralovich insists on the movement, the movement itself turns out to be simply an eternal returning to some initially existing path which the people once evaded. It is clear that in this case there is nothing to construct: the organism grows by itself like a plant from a bud; one just needs to create favorable conditions for growth. However, in reality this essentialism proves to be the most radical constructivism. This returning to the beginnings very often ends tragically. It is hardly necessary to remind of the results of a similar construction of national identities of many European peoples in the XX century.

I believe that another more adequate and corresponding to modern tendencies of social changes approach is offered by V. Akudovich⁶. The author speaks of the crisis of the idea of Belarus. He sees its reasons in the character of the setting of the problem itself, emphasizing the hopelessness of this undertaking due to the inaccuracy of the chosen system of coordinates. Akudovich opposes the idea of Belarus to the discourse of Belarus in the context of the distinguishing of modern and postmodern approaches to the Belarusian identity. Unlike the essentialist idea of Belarus the discourse of Belarus reveals the openness of the Belarusian identity and to some degree coincides with the idea of “the flowing form” of Abdiralovich. Let us quote Akudovich: “Belarus as the discourse of Belarus and Belarus as the idea of Belarus are two conceptually hostile positions, two resolutely incompatible visions of both the real and a-real world. The idea of Belarus is a usual Plato simulacrum which is not used to define something that really exists and which is meaningful only with the reference to a-reality and besides only in its logocentrism measurement... The Discourse of Belarus is a certain measurement of eternally moving existence

covering all social cultural phenomena... Unlike the idea of Belarus expressed in some sum of absorbed, systematized and statically fixed signs, the discourse of Belarus is not set beforehand by anything... Belarus as a discourse opposing to the idea of Belarus as such, at the same time does not deny everything that we embody in this idea, with what we support it and provide for it. It denies only the concept of the idea itself and the methodology of its functioning". In many respects ideas of V. Bulgakov are close to the given conceptual structure, in particular, when he analyzes the concept of the national revival⁷.

Following the ideas of Akudovich and Bulgakov it is possible to say that the understanding of the Belarusian identity and its borders requires today a new type of thinking. Certainly, this type of thinking should be included into the context of the European identity, but the latter should not be viewed as some unchangeable substance which needs only to be accepted. The European identity is a discourse formation in which various models of the European discourse exist in the regime of a dialogue. We shall agree with Bulgakov that in this context it is necessary to leave alone marginality and secondariness of thinking, inferiority complex, dependence on external sources of the thought. On the contrary one shall learn to enter into an equal rights dialogue with other types of thinking. There should be a very specific and strict analysis of the problem instead of simply rigid and irresponsible statements about "the death of the people". At once there appear questions, e.g., what "people" are we talking about? Is there such "a people"? Or is it only our construction which turned out to be at odds with reality and shall we start then to damn reality? Besides, it is important to consider the history of development of this or that nation.

The role of historical heritage in defining the differences in the ways of development of Ukraine and Belarus after the disintegration of the USSR is successfully shown in the work of M. Nordberg and T.Kuzio⁸. Authors see the sources of these distinctions in the degree of development of national consciousness caused by previous historical development of the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples with this degree being higher in Ukraine and lower in Belarus. The analysis offered by the authors, in many respects supplements the approach of Akudovich as it says how to construct a concrete national discourse instead of arguing about some abstract "Belarusian idea".

Let us emphasize that the center of national imagination like the imagination of any other identity, is concentrated on the border concept. The border as the confirmation of the difference between "I" and Another is an identity break, a meeting and a transition of "I" and Another. Borders are an event⁹. Thus, it is important to always take into account political and cultural measurements of the border which never manage to coincide though strive for it. Modernism sets the trend to construct political and cultural borders in the spirit of their actual concurrence. It resulted in the catastrophe of two world wars, ethnic purges and other similar events. As experience shows the most dangerous things begin when some culture, trying to establish its identity, is constantly concentrated on the setting of the border and, accordingly, its difference from others.

The classical plot describing the above named phenomenon is the known dilemma of “Russia” and “the West” and “the dispute” of Slavophiles and Westerners that has been going on in Russia for two centuries already. We shall note that the present Belarusian authorities draw this dispute into the borders of Belarusian culture trying almost comically to present themselves as an anti-western outpost protecting the values of “some Slavic civilization”. The same dispute in modern Russia together with the imperial consciousness blocks Russia’s society progress on the way of its self-sufficient development.

“The West” in the given construction is not these or those specific countries and societies, but exclusively “significant Another”; it is a myth fixing the border of its own identity. It may seem paradoxical but the border is made “from the outside” as “the West” is a semantic point, and “Russia” is a derivative phenomenon and is represented only in a negative form, in categories of non-belonging to “the West”. Actually, the same logic of Eurocentrism is generated though with the use of other signs. At the same time the given border seems to be double-sided as it protects Russia from the West getting into it and it also helps not to spend, not to lose, “not to spill out” everything that is Russian. The Belarusian authority that has imagined itself to be a certain imperial center follows the same logic. Accordingly, concentration on the border reveals incompleteness and complexes of the corresponding culture. From here follows the sense that is given in the process of the construction of Russian (and today of Belarusian) identity to wars; they have shown specifically to “others” our real nature and at the same time they have not simply protected, but also expanded our borders.

In other words, when analyzing this or that culture as a set of “practices of restricting”, we always should start with the concrete situation within the limits of which cultural constructs are generated. It is a situation of numerous voices really existing in this or that society, positioned according to the attitudes of power and authority. On the basis of this point of view J. Friedman makes a conclusion that culture is not something out there, in some space far from us, the space we aspire to seize, some text or a hidden code. It is a rather unstable product of sense production, numerous and socially placed acts assigning sense to the world, various interpretations both inside certain society, and between societies¹⁰. Therefore, we should reconstruct culture as a field of practices and discourses with which specific social actors are connected and which develop and change in their interaction. In each concrete case discourses and schemes (and, accordingly, specific borders) are the result of interaction and in this sense exert return influence on actors. From this point of view one can study that which is called “the European culture” and can be constructed as the Belarusian discourses of Europeism.

Correspondingly, it is necessary to start with the projective character of culture. A characteristic feature of culture is the presence in it of schemes of imagination, firstly, the imagination of borders. Schemes unite things that are really divided, and reduce to one item everything that is diverse. They show unity there where it is not present, and try to establish control over the divided trajectory. Similar schemes reach a certain degree of social persuasiveness, are acquired by many actors and become “true” due to real actions,

thus, gaining social power that is seldom challenged. But as similar schemes are not “real” then they are to be subjected to a check and be brought to reality, to “life”. Such attempts should be renewed again and again if they are to be successful. Though at the end they will never be fully successful as the border is set by the logics of identity that easily provokes the use of force when constructing borders.

The concept of the Borderland has a special value in this context. This term was originally used to describe the regions located along political, usually national, borders where it is typical to have a high level of economic, social and cultural exchange. Gradually it began to be used to describe mental, cultural or psychological space, first of all, USA (this approach is especially popular with the analysis of borders between the USA and Mexico, the USA and Canada), and then it was used in geopolitical discussions about the ethnic identity in Europe. The idea of the borderland represents an attempt to cope with the identities which do not correspond with the dominating discourses of ethnicity, race and nations, to understand contradictions which arise in the case of imposing a legal and political “big picture” on real life experience of the culture that crosses the borders¹¹. Let us look at the definition of the Borderland given by Bobkov: “The term “borderland” in a certain way characterizes the topic of spaces as the space adjoining the border, united and connected by the border, the space for which the border is an organizing principle, essence and the centre of attraction. The borderland lies on both sides of the border, and its topological status is paradoxical: the borderland acquires certain integrity through the fact of its own separateness, i.e. through the dynamic event of differentiation, meeting and transition of “I” and Another or the Unique and the Other. This dynamic event corresponds to what the European thinking refers to as the essence, center, principle, original cause, God”¹². However, we shall think whether it is expedient to use the term essence. Perhaps, it is better to speak about practices of essence construction. It is also clear that at the border we observe not a merge of cultures and identities but balancing between them, movement between cultures. So, probably, it is worthwhile to conceive the Belarusian culture and identity¹³.

According to H. Bhabha, the borderland today is not simply a geographical concept; it is more likely a way of perception of the situation of culture, location in this culture of “intermediate” spaces and construction of corresponding identities. “These spaces “between” become a foundation necessary to develop the strategy of selfhood - individual or collective, – which generate new features of identity, new zones of interaction and attempts to rethink the idea of society itself”¹⁴. Bhabha’s thesis needs to be comprehended very seriously when it comes to the interpretation of the Belarusian borderland in the context of construction of European identity. The center of such judgment is the search for the answer to the question of how strategies of representation and formation (of subjects) arise from various attempts of self-identification of communities in which the interchange of values, meanings and priorities of action is not always based on the principles of equality and cooperation, and at times, quite on the contrary it is based on antagonism, conflictness and even the uttermost misunderstanding?

Let us then return to the concept of Abdiralovich according to which life on the border, fluctuations between the West and the East plus absence of a precise choice make up the uniqueness of the Belarusian identity. However, it seems to us that the author simplifies the problem to a certain extent. In fact, neither “the West”, nor “the East” represent anything uniform in reality. They are always constructions determined by time and political problems, and one cannot interpret them apart from history. We shall refer to the ideas of Bhabha again as there cannot be any in advance pre-set cultural qualities rigidly fixed by tradition, but there is a process of continuous construction, especially in the situations of historical transformations. The following words of Bhabha refer directly to the situation of the Belarusian borderland: ““The right” to assign meanings (concerning relations between the periphery and the authorized authority) is not defined at all by the domination of tradition; each time it is articulated anew by means of the tradition power display in the conditions of uncertainty and discrepancy of the life of those “in minority”. The recognition of everything introduced by tradition is only a partial form of identification. The invention of traditions is carried out through the past re-structuring and entering into it of different time related cultural constructions. This process is complicated by the direct access to primary identity and the “inherited” tradition. Border collisions of cultural distinctions can both reach a consensus and enter a conflict. They are capable of bringing turmoil into our definitions of traditional and modern society, of altering the set borders between the individual and the public, between the high and the low, of challenging the traditional understanding of development and progress”¹⁵.

In connection with this we shall address the language of the identity border analysis developed, first of all, within the framework of postcolonial research. In particular, we shall talk about concepts of hybridity and hybrid identities. In many respects continuing S. Holl’s ideas, Bhabha claims that a hybrid strategy or practice opens up the space of coordination in which forces are unequal, but their articulation allows double interpretation. Coordination makes it possible for an intermediate activity to rise. This activity rejects binary representation of social antagonism. In other words, it means that such identity occupies “the third space” between the space of colonizers and the space of the colonized, i.e. it leads a border existence. It constantly crosses the border, not being anywhere specifically. Moreover, hybridity is the key to discussions of identity not only because it complicates and thus protects from narrow categorizations but also because it fixates variability and chance of identities, showing them as a consequence of specific chains of historical events and ideas. It seems that an adequate development of the European discourses of Belarus is possible only in this context.

The discourse of hybridity in this case intersects with a multicultural discourse. The multicultural in a modern cultural and political discourse became “a floating signifier” the mystery of which is hidden not so much inside it but in its discourse use needed to identify social processes in which differentiation and condensation occur, apparently, almost simultaneously. Transitivity of culture, say, as in the Belarusian situation, opens more ample opportunities for identity construction. Bhabha believes that attempts to build

closed cultures do not have any perspectives as they lead only to destruction and chaos. One shall talk about the variety of critical perusal of these or those cultural texts turning identity construction into a political process. According to Bhabha, the language of criticism is effective “because it overcomes the preset oppositions and opens up the space of transformation: speaking metaphorically, the space of hybridity where the construction of a political object as a new one takes place, it meets our political expectations and necessarily transforms the very form of the previous understanding of the political discourse”¹⁶. That is why the priority of coordination above denial allows to develop hybrid identity in a positive direction.

It is also important to consider the limits of application of such a language when analyzing the Belarusian identity in the European measurement. As I. Bobkov says, when referring to the problem of the Belarusian identity we discover the presence in the archive of the European thinking of two strategies: universalization of the unique (the Belarusian experience is considered to be a part of wider, patrimonial experience) and unquelingization of the universal (the Belarusian experience is an incommensurable and incomparable event). Political-cultural difference of consequences of both strategies is obvious. That is why we shall agree with Bobkov that, “in today’s conditions in order for the Belarusian culture to be integral and complete it shall be the culture of the borderland, the culture of internal differentiation, meetings and transition of different (multidirectional, disputed) cultural parts”¹⁷. In this plan liberation of Belarus from colonial consciousness and overcoming by it of its provinciality are of vital importance.

Consequently, various strategies of Belarus’s joining the horizons of the European identity are possible. In my opinion, the key strategy is the construction of the modern Belarusian identity as the cosmopolitan identity. The overlapping in Belarus of various cultural streams does not make it perspective to exclude any of them; rather it makes it fruitful to achieve mutual recognition in the form of the cosmopolis construction under the name of “Belarus” which can become an original model of the cosmopolis “Europe”. In this case we do not proclaim the exclusiveness or centrality of the Belarusian topos, we simply establish a real fact.

If earlier cosmopolitanism were viewed more negatively then today it is accepted much more favorably; this is due to radical social changes and the rise of new identification practices. Moreover, it is believed that specifically cosmopolitanism in the modern fragmented world can become the basis for the coordination of diverse identities as it hides the principle of primary equality of all people.

Cosmopolitanism as a certain ideology develops during the Age of Enlightenment relying also on the ancient and Renaissance heritage. The most precise definition in its classical form as political philosophy was given to the cosmopolitan idea by I. Kant. The definition was based not on its opposition to nationalism, but on the theories exaggerating the role of a national state. To this day the concept of I. Kant remains the most important philosophical source of modern normative theories of international relations, including the concepts of a global civil society and transnational public sphere. However,

when addressing today's assessment of cosmopolitanism, it is important to consider the period of rise of Kant's concept. "The perpetual world" of Kant precedes what Lord Acton called the epoch "of modern theories of nationality". Therefore, Kant concentrated on the philosophical substantiation of civil republicanism and federalism. The phenomenon and concept of the nation were still at the stage of formation and consequently the rights of the nation had no special value for Kant.

The new understanding of cosmopolitanism already resisting nationalism appears when the nation becomes tied to the territorial state. So, for Marx (the Manifest of the communist party) cosmopolitanism is the expression of capitalist operation on the world scale and bourgeoisie is inherently cosmopolitan. Cosmopolitanism (internationalism) is the result of real development of productive forces. According to Marx, nationality belongs to the initial stage of capitalist production, being its natural stage. Ideologically it is already obsolete during the epoch of cosmopolitan capitalism, but it still exists and its leaving should be accelerated by ideology criticism. At the same time cosmopolitanism of bourgeoisie is a necessary and positive condition of the world proletarian revolution and of everything that the proletariat should destroy. Unlike Kant, Marx takes into account the phenomenon of the nation, but also does not attach any special value to it, rather considering it to be an obstacle of cosmopolitan development. The aphorism "workers have no fatherland" refers to the inability of the bourgeois nations to govern the loyalty of its subordinated proletariat. Marx was more interested in the destruction of state machinery than its epiphenomenon, namely, the national form.

Many researchers emphasize the necessity to reconsider Kant's cosmopolitan ideas in modern conditions in the framework of formation of new cosmopolitanism formation. Cosmopolitan political philosophy justifies the opportunity and the desirability of restriction of the national sovereignty in the name of cosmopolitan validity. New cosmopolitanism rejects the idea that forms of solidarity are conceptually connected with the national state, and addresses the establishment and strengthening of postnational, transnational or global democracy. A similar approach can be found in sociology that rejects the concept of national society due to its lack of correspondence to the epoch of globalization with its global risks (U. Beck, J. Urry). On the whole, new cosmopolitanism turns out to be a synthesis of most different modern approaches in social and humanitarian sciences.

According to Beck, cosmopolitization, being a globalization product, represents "internal globalization, globalization from within the national-state societies. It significantly transforms daily consciousness and identities. Global interests become a part of daily local experience and "moral vital worlds" of people"¹⁸. Cosmopolitanism turns to be also the transnational dictionary of symbols, deep involving in local activity and local consciousness. Consequently, the national ceases to be the national as such and should be studied in a new way as the internalized¹⁹ global.

If we speak in general then modern cosmopolitanism in a new way assesses both key supports of self-understanding of modern societies, namely, the nation and classes, rejecting the claim of their particular attitudes to universal identity. It is emphasized, that both

attitudes follow the same logic and lead to violence towards each other. It also concerns the so-called socialist internationalism which simply declares separate national interests to be universal, proceeding from the principle of “class solidarity”. New cosmopolitanism poses itself a problem of overcoming both narrow particularism and abstract universalism.

In this connection it is important to understand the established by Beck connection between the world cosmopolitization and “the dialogical imagination” as the basis of mutual interpretation of cultures. In fact, national imagination is monologic. Cosmopolitanism offers alternative imagination or imagination of alternative ways of life and rationalities which include the otherness of Another. Consideration and discussion of inconsistent cultural experience move into the center of activity. According to Beck, methodological cosmopolitanism revolutionizes social science, its principles, methods and concept, offering instead of the principle “either – or” the principle “both this and that” (for example, “a cosmopolitan patriot”).

Beck connects cosmopolitanism with the theory of reflective modernization the key indicator of which is the pluralization of borders. This moment is fundamental for the understanding of cosmopolitan identity. In particular, we are talking about the pluralization of borders between the nations-states or “implosion of dualism of the national and the international”. Borders collide in the language of methodological nationalism and merge in the language of methodological cosmopolitanism. In other words, Beck emphasizes that borders are no longer determining factors, they can be chosen (and interpreted) and simultaneously be redrawn and legitimized anew.²⁰ It completely denies former practices of identity exclusion, not entered in the accepted borders. It is natural then that in connection with this Beck insists on the distinction to be made between cosmopolitization and cosmopolitanism. Beck believes that the latter is more likely to represent an artificial ideological construction while cosmopolitization is the structure of reference for the empirical research of globalization from within, or internalized globalization. Simultaneously cosmopolitization strengthens the meaning of ethical measurement of social life. It is also necessary to pay attention to how, according to Beck, cosmopolitanism eliminates the exclusiveness claims of European modernism.

The cosmopolitan prospect is connected, thus, with the imagination of alternative ways of life and rationalities, including the otherness of Another. According to U. Hannerz, “cosmopolitanism is the attitude to the variety itself, to the coexistence of cultures in an individual experience. Cosmopolitanism is, first of all, its orientation and aspiration having accepted another. It is an intellectual and esthetic openness to the divergent cultural experience, the search for shades rather than uniformity. Simultaneously, it can be a question of competence in a general and in a more specialized sense meaning the condition of readiness, the ability to accept a different culture on the basis of listening, watching, penetrating and understanding. It is a question of cultural competence, i.e. the skills of comprehension of a special system of senses and semantic forms”²¹. Beck calls it “cosmologic” or thinking and life in the language of inclusive contrasts. Such thinking within “the

moving borders” really makes us citizens of the world, showing, that any rigid definition of borders is more often unwillingness and/or inability to see the otherness. All the time identities find themselves at the crossing of different cultural and other fields, i.e. opened, discussed, inclusive. This is the sense of internal globalization leading to the arousing of serious ethical questions as the crisis of legitimation of the national ethics of exclusion is obvious. Former principles of construction of internal hierarchies of elements or conditions remain open to question.

In this connection it is interesting, especially in the context of the Belarusian identity, K. Appiah’s interpretation of the relation of cosmopolitanism with patriotism, nationalism, liberalism. His idea that cosmopolitanism does not abolish variety, but, on the contrary, welcomes it deserves special attention as it follows the principle of liberalism: “Liberal cosmopolitanism protected by me can be presented as follows: we appreciate a variety of forms of a social and cultural life of people; we do not want everybody to become a part of homogeneous global culture; we know, that it also means the existence of local differences (both inside of the states, and between them)”²². In this sense cosmopolitanism does not at all oppose the state or local communities. On the contrary, they allow to guarantee a cosmopolitan variety of identities if the state and communities are liberally organized.

Though A.Appadurai believes that today there have come hard times for patriotism, nevertheless it is still possible to find its new interpretations. Appiah, for example, uses the concept of “a cosmopolitan patriot”: “A cosmopolitan patriot can accept the possibility of the existence of the world in which everyone is an implanted cosmopolitan connected with his own house, with his cultural features, but who can still find pleasure in the existence of other differing places, being the houses of other differing people”²³. Habermas works with the concept of “constitutional patriotism” synthesizing cosmopolitan institutions with the new understanding of national identity.

In view of the aforesaid let us pay attention to the following thesis of Beck: going through a cosmopolitan crisis means that people worldwide call in question the collective future as it contradicts the nationally founded memory of the past. It changed the perspective of identity construction as a desirable future. People lack the memory of the global past, but at the same time there is the imagination of the collective future as cosmopolitan society. Beck notes that two types of imagination, namely, national and cosmopolitan, are focused on the past and on the future. However, the methodological nationalism starts with the consequences for the future of the general national past, the imagined past, while methodological cosmopolitanism starts with the consequences of the present for the global general future, the imagined future. The future, instead of the past “integrates” a cosmopolitan epoch²⁴. But for all that we face a very important contradiction between consciousness and action: global understanding of the general collective future does not include adequate forms of action as the latter are based only on the last, non-global experience. Continuing Beck’s idea we shall say that the cosmopolitan crisis in its especially acute form is expressed as the crisis of identity.

Hence, in a political context, one needs to move outside the limits of rigid political divisions. As for Belarus both the authoritarian power and the old opposition, especially its “national” wing, still remain within the limits of “methodological nationalism” and it is not important with what sign. Here lies the source of inconsistency and failure of their projects to construct identity. Intuitively a new Belarusian opposition which began to grow and to be organized “from below”, has expressed modern tendencies of politics by its address to the world, freedom, self-esteem of an individual, not limited by the language or national frameworks. It is in this quality that it became clear to the world and will become clearer to mass consciousness that is also intuitively cosmopolitan and open. It is not surprising that this mindset of the new opposition consciousness turned to be the force which, despite all obstacles created by the state mass-media, became a source of destruction of the brainwashed consciousness²⁵.

In general Appiah describes cosmopolitan identity in the following way: “In fact, I claim, that it is possible to be a cosmopolitan by welcoming a variety of human cultures; implanted - devoted to one (or several) local society which the individual considers to be his home; a liberal - convinced of the value of an individual; a patriot - welcoming institutions of the state (or states) in which the individual lives. Cosmopolitanism results from the same sources which also feed liberalism as it is the variety of forms of people’s lives that provides the dictionary for the language of an individual choice. Patriotism results from liberalism because the state persistently creates space within the limits of which we open opportunities for freedom. For the implanted cosmopolitan all of this is one whole”²⁶. At the same time it is essential to understand Appadurai’s idea that postnational movements and identities have not yet found ways out beyond the logics of the nation-state that often leads them to violent practices²⁷.

According to A. Appadurai, with the emergence of the symbolical worlds of the global cultural industries the sameness of the state, society and national identity is cancelled: the idea about possible lives cannot be understood exclusively in a national, ethnic or any other particular sense. Special attention should be concentrated on what is called today deritorialization which covers not only economic trends but also ethnic groups, social movements and political formations overcoming specific territorial borders and identities. Daily imagination of people is not connected not so exclusively with the given geopolitical space and its cultural identities. Even garbage men live in the garbage of world community and due to this garbage they are included into the circulation of symbols of the global cultural industry.

All the aforesaid means, that the concept of civil identity shall be put into the center of imagination of the Belarusian identity as the European and cosmopolitan identity. For the first time the connection of cosmopolitanism with citizenship was established by Kant who put forward the idea of guarantees of the world citizenship right for everybody. Civilization will be protected from barbarity only when the core legal relation will operate globally. But Beck says that here we deal with a paradox. It is believed that the guarantee of fundamental rights presumes the presence of the nation-state. But how then can one

guarantee cosmopolitan legal relation between the states and citizens of different countries? Various structures of identification start to compete. The way out is the formation through struggle and compromises of a cosmopolitan model: the center of the analysis should be occupied by an individual. Another requirement is to establish direct relations between individuals, interstate and nongovernmental organizations. "It is not an intercultural consensus on fundamental laws but the process of cooperation and arising interdependences that gives a key to the transnational guarantees of fundamental law. They are partially codified, partially non-codified procedures which are used to found, settle and build transnational relations. These relations are a dense multivariate fabric made of mutual interweaving and obligations expressing the idea of cosmopolitan democracy and making its realization possible"²⁸.

G. Delanty offers a model of civil cosmopolitanism. The substantiation of the idea of cosmopolitan public sphere as the result of interaction between transnational, national and local public spheres is significant. Civil cosmopolitanism is the policy of autonomy that protects civil society from new fragmentation.²⁹ In Delanty's opinion it is necessary by following Habermas to rethink the relation between cosmos and polis. If nationalism is the expression of the order of polis and postnationalism is the expression of cosmos of a higher order then how can we find a point of mediation? In connection with this Delanty does not accept extreme measures of communitarism and postnationalism. The way out from the contradiction is "civil cosmopolitanism" because if cosmopolitanism does not include the general recognition, then it is inefficient. Nationalism monopolizes the idea of solidarity. The purpose of cosmopolitanism is to reconcile community and globalization. Unlike Habermas, we find it necessary to emphasize the cultural measurement of cosmopolitanism³⁰.

The form of expression of such citizenship is the cosmopolitan public sphere. Without it legal and political forms of global society will not be implanted in the civil measurement as it is necessary to resist the homogenization caused by globalization. The public sphere is a more fundamental form of global community than political and legal spheres of civil society. It is the sphere of communications and cultural disputes. The cosmopolitan public sphere is not the necessity of the global public sphere as such though it can be one of its measurements; it is placed in national and subnational public spheres transformed as a result of interaction. In short, it is necessary to distinguish subnational, national and transnational public spheres from the point of view of expression in them of degrees of cosmopolitanism. When such civil cosmopolitan public spheres become obvious, it is possible to address a special question of legal and political forms of cosmopolitan civil society³¹.

Obviously, there are opponents of such views. Beck identifies three positions hostile to cosmopolitanism: nationalism, globalism and democratic authoritarianism. The third position is especially interesting to us³². Beck believes that even when the nation-state is getting weaker we should not underestimate the possibility of its maneuvering and

moving in the direction of authoritarianism while preserving the democratic facade as it corresponds to the elite model of democracy. This is the essence of democratic authoritarianism. For instance, if there is more violence among youth then why not toughen the punishment? Or why, for the sake of the so-called order and corporativity not to eliminate the opposition and not to transform elections into a “democratic” mockery show the way it is done in Belarus? Beck warns, however, that this tendency also strengthens the cosmopolitan movement needed to give rise to a new political project focused on freedom with the purpose of the formation of effective cosmopolitan world policy which is based on new dialectics of the global and the local and does not fit into the framework of the traditional national policy. Beck believes that such policy should rely upon a new political subject, namely, cosmopolitan parties, which in a transnational measurement could represent transnational interests, while operating on the national policy arena. Under what conditions can such parties gain power and real influence? Beck concludes that the answer can be found only in the space of political experimentation. It seems that one of political experimentation directions could become the Belarusian cosmopolitan discourse of Europeism.

Notes

- ¹ Baudrillard J. V Teni Tysyacheletija, ili Priostanovka Goda 2000. (<http://anthropologia.spbu.ra/ru/texts/baudrill/shmill.html>)
- ² Ibid.
- ³ See: Kazakevich A. Vyalikae Knyastva Litouskae jak shchealyapchnaja real'nast' // ARCHE. 2003. N 5. (<http://arche.home.by/index/html>)
- ⁴ See subchap.: Minenkov G.Ya. Ideja chelovechestva VI. Solovyova v kontekste globalizatsii //Rossija i Vselenskaja tserkov': V.S. Solovyov i problema religioznogo i kulturnogo edinenija chelovechestva. M.: Biblejsko-bogoslovsky institute sv. Apostola Andreja, 2004.
- ⁵ Abdziralovich I. Advechnym shlyham. Das'ledziny belaruskaga svetapoglyadu. Minsk, 1993.
- ⁶ Akudovich B. Razburyts' Paryzh //Fragmenty. 2000. N 31. (www.frahmenty.knihi.com)
- ⁷ See: Bulgakau V. Blizinya nulya: Pra filyazofiju i “filyazofiju” belaruskich dumanykau // ARCHE, 1999. #4. (<http://arche.home.by/index.html>)
- ⁸ See: Nordberg M., Kazoo T. Postroenie natsij i gosudarstv. Istoricheskoe nasledie i natsionalnye samosoznanija v Belorussii i Ukraine (Srvnitelny analiz) // Belorussija i Rossija: obshchestva i gosudarstva. M.: Prava cheloveka, 1998 (<http://www.yabloko.ru/Themes/Belarus/belarus-30.html>).
- ⁹ Bobkov I. Etika pograničija: transkulturnost' kak belorusskij opyt // Perekrjostki: zhurnal issledovanij vostochnoevropejskogo pograničija. 2005. # 3-4. S.129.
- ¹⁰ Friedman J. Cultural Identity and Global Process. London: Sage, 1994. S.75.
- ¹¹ See for more details: Shparaga O. Kak i zachem kontseptualizirovat' Belarus'? // Perekrjostki: zhurnal issledovanij vostochnoevropejskogo pograničija. 2004. # 1-2.
- ¹² Bobkov. Mentioned source. S.128.
- ¹³ See also: Shparaga. Mentioned source.

- ¹⁴ Bhabha H. Mestonahozhdenije kulture // Perekrjostki: zhurnal issledovanij vostochnoevropijskogo pogranichija. 2005. # 4-5. S.162.
- ¹⁵ Ibid. S.162-163.
- ¹⁶ Ibid. S.173.
- ¹⁷ Bobkov. Mentioned sources. S.136.
- ¹⁸ Beck U. the Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies // Theory, Culture & Society. 2002. Vol. 19 (1-2). P.17.
- ¹⁹ From Latin *intemus* – internal. The process of mastering by an individual or a group of people of social values, norms, views, aims, stereotypes which belong to those with whom he or they interact. As a result, structures of social activity external towards the given individual or group turn into their internal regulators of behavior. – Comment of the author.
- ²⁰ Ibid. S.19.
- ²¹ Hannerz U. Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture // Featherstone, M., Lash, S., and Robertson, R. (eds). *Global Modernities*, London: Sage, 1995. P.239.
- ²² Appiah K. A. *Cosmopolitan Patriots* // Cheah P. and Robbins B. (eds). *Cosmopolitanism: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998. P.94.
- ²³ Ibid. P.91.
- ²⁴ Beck U. *The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies* // Theory, Culture & Society. 2002. Vol. 19 (1-2). P.27.
- ²⁵ See for more details: Minenkov G. *K novoj oppozitsii*. 2006 (<http://belintellectuals.com/discussions/?id=120>); Minenkov G. “Otmorozki”, ili o tom, kak rozhdetsya grazhdanskaya identichnost’ // *Topos*. 2006. #13 (v pechati).
- ²⁶ Appiah. *Op. cit.* P.106-107.
- ²⁷ Appadurai A. *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996. P.166.
- ²⁸ Beck U. *Obschestvo riska. Na puti k drugomu modernu*. M.: OOO Eklips Media, 2000. P.166.
- ²⁹ See: Delanty G. *Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics*. Open University Press, 2000. P.6.
- ³⁰ See: Ibid. P.138-140.
- ³¹ See: Ibid. P.145.
- ³² See for more details: Beck. *Op. cit.* P.37-41.

CONSTRUCTING THE PAST: HISTORICAL RESOURCES OF MODERN NATIONAL-STATE IDEOLOGIES (UKRAINE AND MOLDOVA)

*“When there were no buttons and people were healthy, ate only
lard and potatoes and lived one hundred twenty years”*
Les’ Podervyansky, “Utopia”

*“By the huge lie of his life Baudolino proved that there can be no
historical lie because history is not what took place but what is nar-
rated and by this it creates the basis and the precedent for society”*
Elena Kostjukovich,
the comment to “Baudolino” by Umberto Eco

“Getting its history wrong is part of being nation”
Ernest Renan’s well-known thesis
in Eric Hobsbaum’s interpretation

The purpose of the article offered for your attention is the analysis of modern national-state ideologies of Ukraine and Moldova. I have chosen two texts as the object of research as they are significant for each of the Borderland countries. These texts are Leonid Kuchma’s “Ukraine is not Russia” and Vasile Stati’s “History of Moldova” [1, 2]. Both of them are the essence of a peculiar message, sent by authorities both to their own people and to the neighbors.

It seemed quite pertinent to use the method of two American sociologists Matthew Levinger and Paula Lytle [3] in the analysis of these two texts. In many respects sociologists used the idea of Craig Calhoun, believing that nationalism is a discourse formation presenting collective forms of rhetoric of various movements and political practices [4, p.7]. The central place in Levinger-Lytle concept is occupied by the thesis that all national movements develop in conformity with some general examples. Signals of the beginning

of national mobilization may include addresses (messages) of the national elite to the masses, representing the elite's idea of conformity of the nation status in the present, past and future with a certain ideal desirable model. These statements structure the experience of the nation and offer a program of actions, usually in the form of inversion of crisis reasons. Different peoples and different times have a miraculously similar structure and content of these actions.

“Virtually all rhetoric of national mobilization contains three juxtaposed elements:

1. **The glorious past.** The original nation once existed as a pure, unified and harmonious community.

2. **The degraded present.** The shattering of this corporate unity through some agency or traumatic series of events undermined the integrity of the national community. A key dimension of this rhetoric is the identification of the nation's decay sources.

3. **The Utopian future.** Through collective action, the nation will reverse the conditions that have caused its present degradation and recover its original harmonious essence.

These three elements are framed within a series of binary oppositions, contrasting the vision of an ideal past or future with the degraded present. The project of national rebirth represents an inversion of the existing disordered condition and a reconstitution of the ideal community” [3, p.178].

Matthew Levinger and Paula Lytle believe that such a model of narrative not only stimulates political actions, but also defines the reasons for national decline and orders specific actions necessary for its overcoming. The myth in the process of its construction articulates the sense, placing seemingly not connected events into a coordinated sequence or an ordered reality. The purpose of nationalistic rhetoric is to connect the space of the imagined with the space of actions, and, thus, to make the audience join collective actions. A triad like structure creates symbolical oppositions by means of a series of narratives about losses and findings. They emphasize the gap between an ideal condition and reality. The explosive energy of national mobilization is found specifically inside the mixture of binary oppositions (the past against the present and the present against the future). The nationalistic rhetoric not only structures requirements, but also defines the identity of actors. The fact of belonging to a national community itself presupposes participation of each specific individual in a collective struggle. Creation and/or preservation of group identity is the decisive element of national mobilization.

The diagnosis and the recipe

Besides a series of binary oppositions the past, the present and the future are connected by diagnostic and prognostic structures. The diagnosis of national degradation is defined by means of identification of external and internal agents which destroyed the community, and also of the actual list of the caused damage (loss of territory, linguistic or racial cleanliness, political division, moral decline).

The instructions of the actions necessary for national rebirth are expressed as the inversion of the diagnosis by means of a collective struggle. A distinctive feature of nationalistic rhetoric is that the diagnosis and the instructions are mirror reflections of each other. As the instructions are in essence the inversion of the diagnosis, any reference to former sufferings is an implicit appeal to modern actions.

* * *

Ukraine is not Russia

According to Kuchma, “**Eden**” is, first of all, Ukraine itself. “I have always clearly heard the word “eden” (“raj”) in the name “Ukraine”, besides it is the kind of Eden that safely shelters its inhabitants”. Indeed, “the view of a white walled hut under a four slope straw roof is, in my opinion, one of the finest sights in the world. Moreover, if there is a cherry garden near it...”

Eden is also Ukraine in the form of Getmanshchina. “Ukraine” was settled” as Getmanshchina. It was immeasurably more independent than the USSR. Getmanshchina, being a key component of history ... is the national Ukrainian power with clearly identified democratic features of the political system and social and economic relations.... The Ukrainian culture (then) was essentially better than the Russian culture... And even “at the end of the 18th century Ukraine still had the most educated population in the empire”. However, more beautiful was the idea. Leonid Danilovich understands it. “If what Bogdan Khmelnytsky had created managed to survive and become a Ukrainian miracle, a new word in the development of the European statehood, namely, a democratically arranged power relying on the class of free small farmers-Cossacks, i.e., actually armed farmers, on peasants-tenants and on free cities ... It is really too good to come true.”

“**After Eden**” was not too bad either. Leonid Danilovich “is not inclined to demonize the policy of the tsarist Russia towards Ukrainians, it is seemingly softer than the policy of France in Provence and Brittany.” “Ukraine cannot be called a colony of Russia,” L. Kuchma repeatedly emphasizes, “it is a part of the imperial mother country. It is not the lost time.” Because “a considerable portion of our modern territory ... is the grounds taken away by the Russian empire (hence, by Ukraine too) from the Turkish Ottoman Empire ...”

Though, certainly, the empire remains the empire. “Moscow drew away from us, especially during the post-war years, a number of fine talents.” “This enormous tax in the form of active people was not specially imposed on Ukraine but it was paid more regularly than any other.” But it is more likely to be a consequence of Ukrainian talents rather than an imperialist robbery: “Certainly, all parts of the empire “paid”, but, for some reason, I am convinced that the relative share of Ukraine exceeded the contribution of others. Ukrainians are born workers ... Ukrainians are ambitious, Ukrainians are artistic, Ukrainians are enterprising.”

The main victim of the empire is the Ukrainian language. In 1989 23 % of the population of Ukraine did not know the Ukrainian language, including 2 million Ukrainians. Before the independence “the Ukrainian language was close to a catastrophe condition”. Now it can be compared to a person weakened by some long illness. At present the Ukrainian language is still not in the best condition. Even now, when the main thing, independence, has been achieved, each next year is the overcoming of the walls.

The belief that the language is the main victim is no accident, though it seemed that there are many more other problems in Ukraine, and the empire could be presented with a much more sizeable bill. But the language is a symbol, and Levinger/Lytle state that the loss of the language is an indicator of more serious losses.

“**Heroes**” are, first of all, western Ukrainians. “European mentality of the Ukrainian people is more evident in Western Ukrainians, it is more specific ... there is “respect for a person”. “Western Ukrainians have it in their blood. They are polite. They are more considerate than us and softer.” They respect legality. Hence, they respect property. “Galicia nationalists” appear to be much more tolerant than “internationalists” of the East and the South. All this is the consequence of the European influence. Danylo of Halych was a king, one of the European kings. Western Ukraine “got into an operative range of Magdeburg law even before Kiev”.

But the main “advantage (of Western Ukraine) is in conscious Ukrainism ... (which) is a Divine gift”. Western Ukrainians are exclusively faithful to the language and have protected it from absorption.

Collective heroes are also Cossacks with their mad boldness and their proud independence. Here are the characters, here is the integrity!

Bogdan Khmelnytsky is the main Cossack and protagonist of Leonid Danilovich. L. Kuchma devotes about 10% of the book to him. Kuchma even reproaches such prophets of Ukrainism as M. Grushevsky, P. Kulish, and T. Shevchenko because they did not favor B. Khmelnytsky who presented “our independence to Moscow”. But to no effect. “If T. Shevchenko had known that the way chosen by the hetman, despite its duration and burdens, all the same would lead to an independent Ukraine, he might have found a warmer word for Borgan.”

L. Kuchma admires the erudition of Khmelnytsky who read Latin texts. He is the author of the Zborovsky peace treaty with Poland, “as a matter of fact, the first constitution of Ukraine. At that moment the whole Old World, as well as Russia, recognized the empire of Khmelnytsky as a separate state formation with its own territory on both banks of the Dnieper, with clear but not indeterminate borders, with its own army, court, religion, authorities and, it shall be mentioned specifically, with its own language.” As far as the union with Russia is concerned then “the hetman probably one thousand times considered this step” and “using some super human feeling Bogdan chose the only correct way”. The hetman decided to give Ukraine an opportunity to use Russia. ... “Not in vain Kostomarov has said the following words about Khmelnytsky: “What he did is not for decades of years but for whole centuries. In fact, this is beyond comprehension.” “Could he really expect that

when being a part of Russia Ukraine will join Volhynia and Podolia? That it will get to the Black and Azov seas, thus, having provided itself with a future economic base?"

So, "owing to Khmelnytsky, one of the main miracles of world history was the emergence in the 17th century ... of a new country which managed then to maintain its viability for centuries. ... Processes launched by Khmelnytsky led to the achievement of the goal contrary to everything. The most amazing thing is that through the hands of *Ukraine torturers* God gave Ukraine back its parts which seemed to be lost for centuries."

Constructing "new Bogdan" is not accidental. This is how one shall deal with some inevitable evil, namely, Russia. Apologia of the hetman is, in fact, the essence of apologia of policy of Leonid Danilovich.

Here is one more example: Anton Golovaty who managed to get Cossack autonomy in Kuban from Ekaterina. "Complete independence, like that during the times of Bogdan, was impossible. Without setting unreachable goals he achieved the maximum of what was achievable. He could have gone to conquer Petersburg and would have died a hero. But he acted differently. He is one of the embodiments of a Ukrainian. His obstinacy is absolutely consistently combined with flexibility, cunningness with mind, sense of duty with pragmatism, realism with purposefulness, a diplomatic talent with healthy cynicism (which can be called the knowledge of human nature), and a natural sense of humor with virtuosity."

Mazepa's apologia is not less remarkable. Sometimes L. Kuchma emphasizes, that he was one of the richest people in Europe. But what is wrong with that? "Wealth did not prevent Mazepa from being a big patriot of Ukraine." The reason of Mazepa's treachery "is not money, levity or career (he was about 70)." "Pain and fear for Ukraine's destiny moved him. The purpose was Ukraine's independence."

It is quite characteristic, that other heroes of Ukraine look very bleak against this background. Banal praise of T. Shevchenko ("the prophet who managed "to decode" the Divine plan about Ukraine, the Divine message about it"), Kotlyarevsky, Skovoroda. The same is said about Ukrainians – civilizers of Russia, but with a deeper implication. "Moskovia was transformed into Russia not by Peter's Germans but by Elizabeth's Ukrainians" ... there is a grain of truth in this. Ukrainians take part in the formation of Petersburg classicism. "Little Russia spirit" penetrates everything. "Without the Ukrainian participation," concludes L. Kuchma, "Russia would not have become what it has become, it would have been a different country, ... culture would have been different, ... even the Russian language would have formed differently." In general, this is our Ukrainian Russia and empire. It is remarkable, that among Ukrainian educators, such as L. Zizaniya, P. Berynda, M. Smotrisky there is also S. Polotsky, entered into this pleiad as "a graduate of Kiev-Mogilyany Academy"(!)

"**Enemies**" are, first of all, Russians, torturers as Leonid Danilovich calls them. A series of binary oppositions shows their "otherness" to Ukrainians who "were sick of self-confi-

dence of “Moskali” and a slick business manner. There even appeared the verb “moskalit’, i.e. to cheat”. “Among Russians much more often than among Ukrainians I met people who considered their job to be a burden and consequently did it poorly.” Russians do not treat law with a lot of respect. Ukrainians have more respect for order and legal authority; it is seen even in the Ukrainian village where the priest and the teacher (people placed by authority) were always respected more than in the Russian village.”

On the whole, Russians are worse than Ukrainians. “Wood quickly turns gray... and a Russian log house very soon stops looking cheerful... Even a prosperous Russian village looks poor. A Russian wooden village with its appearance does not inspire its inhabitants, does not set them to any economic inspiration, to ingenuity in life. Ukrainian colleagues lose their heart much less often as aesthetics does not allow it.”

Even the name “Ukraine” is better, L. Kuchma states, supporting his idea with the words of S. Sheluhin: “The national name of Ukraine says so much to a soul, conscience and heart much, while the name Rus’ does not arouse high and intimate feelings and attachment towards it as it was given by the rulers as a symbol of triumph over the conquered.”

In general, Russia is a Eurasian country, and in a certain sense it is more Asian than European.

Even Russians in the Denikin army were hostile to Ukraine, did not recognize its culture ... wished it destruction and disorder.” Last few years “such people ... are again in assortment.” Leonid Danilovich also provides proofs: “nationally thinking Russian people are obliged for the sake of the future Russian people not to recognize under any circumstances the rights to exist of the state of “Ukraine”, “the Ukrainian people” and “the Ukrainian language”. History knows neither the first, nor the second, nor the third - they are not present.” Here is one more citation: Russia absolutely does not need a strong Ukrainian president, strong Ukraine.” However, “they are all marginals” claims L. Kuchma. Russian nationalist passions inflame mainly in Ukraine. However, there are no other kinds of Russians mentioned in his book.

In general, enemies are everywhere. “Turkey ... for the past few years has been acting as the patroness and protector of interests of the Crimean Tatars and even the Orthodox Gagauz people ..., this cannot but excites us.” “In public circles ... (Poland) there are forces which dream of that day when Ukrainian cities ... will become Polish. They do not dream of it silently.” We haven’t settled scores with Poles yet, they are even worse than Russians. “No matter how difficult it was to be under the oppression of Moscow authorities, he (Mazepa) knew that the yoke of the Polish landlords would have been harder for him.” But it was mentioned in passing. “The topic of remaking ... the borders periodically emerges also in Hungary, exciting people all in vain.”

What to do? Firstly, “it is necessary to manage thriftily everything that we have collected (sic!) both from Russia and from the West.” It is interesting, that Leonid Danilovich

* (Russian – pejorative in the speech of Ukrainians)

gives **“instructions”** not only to Ukrainians. “Many people of Russian culture still should get rid in themselves of an imperial complex and to realize that the Russian people is equal among other equal peoples.” One shall not put forward territorial claims on “the grounds which have been taken away by the Russian empire (and, consequently, Ukraine) from the Turkish Ottoman Empire as a result of policy which today can be called imperial, the lands which were then populated by Russian inhabitants, namely, Ukrainians and Russians. This page of history is turned over and is not subject to revision just like the transformation of Egypt of pharaohs into an Arabian Egypt or a Greek Constantinople into a Turkish Istanbul” shall not be revised either.

On the whole, one shall forgive enemies. “We already cannot prosecute Ekaterina or Stalin. Besides, Stalin could also justify his actions... having declared that he is a great collector of the Ukrainian lands. The same would have been also confirmed by Ekaterina. Let historical insults remain historical. Once the Mongolian khan Batyj burnt down Kiev, thus making it the end of Kievan Rus’. But in my heart today there are no unfriendly feelings towards Mongolia. Modern Crimean Tatars do not carry any responsibility for their ancestors ...”

“Bright future” of Ukraine is in Europe. Besides Europeanness of western Ukrainians geography also supports this. “The territory of Ukraine is the biggest in Europe. The geographical center of Europe is in the Ukrainian territory, in Zakarpattia. I find this quite symbolic,” L.Kuchma says. “Ukraine is as if weaved from clearly different regions. In this respect Ukraine is similar to Poland. Spain is also similar. Any European country of a sufficient size ...“is, actually, similar.

Perhaps the most amazing is “the numerological” explanation of inevitability of Europeism victory. Leonid Danilovich pays special attention to “a surprising arithmetic regularity. From the christening of Russia up to the independence of Ukraine there has passed one thousand years. This period is divided into three equal pieces, with each of them denying the previous one. There are 337 years between the Treaty of Pereyaslav and the independence. Approximately “on the halfway” between the christening and the Treaty in 1321 when Gediminas conquered Kyivshchyna (Kiev oblast).

What do we see then? During the period from the christening up to Gedeminas Ukraine was developing in the vein of Eastern-Christian tradition. The following third shows western influence, a western-eastern synthesis. The last third means the return to the orthodox cultural circle.

But this last third has expired too. What new civilization cycle have we entered? ... At present the period of “Roman” prevalence has come, it is even better to say western.”

* * *

Moldova is not Romania

As Vasile Stati claims in his “History of Moldova” his work is an invitation to a quiet and fair meditation. In this context especially touching seems to be the table on p. 40: “Dynamics of the ethno-linguistic situation in Moldova. The 14th – the middle of the 15th centuries (sic!!!)” with the precision of up to 5 (!) people.

However, it is not by chance. Moldova is an exceptional country. “In the world there are not many countries which would start to write their history from the first decades of their existence. Moldova is one of such countries.” It is a genuine “Eden” and “if the gods from Greek legends had learned about these places, they for certain would have settled here, having abandoned their mountains.” Moldova is the land of plenty. The Moldavian language and the name “Moldova” sound so sweet. Besides, “the ethnicon of Moldavians (Moldoven) is one of the most ancient in the southeast of Central Europe. Anyway, it is more ancient than the names of other peoples, neighbors of Moldova.”

Moldova with its distinctive sincere character is the country in which wisdom dominates over will. It is the country of circumspect individuals which has produced great ingenious people.”

“Eden”, however, is always connected with specific “**heroes**”. Moldavian “Eden” is the state of Stephen the Great. The way to it was long. “Creation of an independent Moldavian State in 1359 was not only a consequence of the struggle ... for national liberation and preconditions of the political order: a continually growing will of the population to live freely and to work peacefully, in the country managed by voevodas.”

Stephen the Great is devoted 60 out of 420 pages of the text (about 15 %). At the same time, Vasile Stati gives him a capacious and clear characteristic, namely, “a perspicacious politician, a skilful administrator, a good business manager”.

First of all, he consecutively realizes the centralized authority. He “changed the staff of the centralized power, inviting devoted people, reliable patriots, and heroes from the middle layers of society.” Moldova’s structure of state economy ... was always favorably different from other neighboring countries, independently determining and creating its destiny. Stephen III took care of the army reorganization. He spread justice in accordance with the country’s law. He was a zealous owner. “Owing to his policy of society consolidation ... crafts developed intensively.” The history of Moldova, unlike that of Walachia,” emphasizes V. Stati, “has a rich historiography. Its basis was ... its most known son, namely, Stephen III the Great.” He built a lot of churches, etc.

“Stephen ... did not conduct any annexationist war,” says Vasile Stati, adding immediately, “The campaign in Pokutia (1490) was a specifically retaliatory expedition.” It was absolutely justified and was caused “by the duplicity of Polish and Hungarian kings ...” Stephen ... could not leave unpunished such hypocrisy ... “In the summer of 1490 he invaded Pokutia and captured the area ... “

V. Stati in detail describes the ruling methods of the great sovereign. “The lord (hos-podar) was extremely cruel when punishing those who tried to undermine his authority and the foundations of the country. 16.01.1471 was the day when by his order prominent boyars were beheaded: Isaya vornik, Negrile chashnik, and Alexa stolnik” who had a malicious intent against the lord and the state. The lord’s discontent with many boyars, important and unimportant, was revealed already in 1467: some boyars betrayed him on the battlefield (*the battle at Bay*), others openly opposed the ruler in the southwest of the country. After the victory at Bay for their treachery or inadequate fulfillment of the battle task Stephen executed 20 large boyars who were beheaded and 40 small boyars who were impaled. Even by the end of his life the ruler did not allow boyars to revise his decisions. At the beginning of June, 1504 Stephen III the Great appointed his younger son Bogdan to be his successor. Some boyars opposed this decision. By Stephen’s order they were beheaded. The times were severe. Moldova was under a constant threat.” V. Stati ascertains that, “it was necessary to constantly consolidate the centralized power to preserve independence.” The author does not hide the fact that Stephen the Great was “a person of a low height, irascible who quickly spilled innocent blood; during feasts he often killed without trial.” So what? “He was a human being with all features characteristic for people and for masters of those times: he had all human qualities.” It is an interesting human trait “to spill innocent blood”. But all the same, V. Stati emphasizes, “Stephen III due to his well-known military operations and sonorous victories, skilful diplomatic, political actions, cultural, spiritual acts really was and remains GREAT. Even when we shall remind that the Great Bоевоѡа like any political person had envious and malignant people around him. (He still has them even today. Modern envious people have stolen him from Moldova and have transformed him into “a Romanian”).

Which of the “heroes” can be compared with Stephen? Partly, “the ancestors of Moldavians, free Dacians who were not in Roman chains, they kept their language, traditions, a way of life, and then in the form of Eastern Karpattya Romanians peacefully coexisted with the Slavs in the 10-12 centuries.

All other rulers, especially in the intellectual sense look bleak and schematical in comparison with Stephen the Great, even Nikolau Milesku Spataru, the first Moldavian scientist, writer, diplomat who achieved world popularity, and Dimitre Kantemir, a scientist of the encyclopedic knowledge, the author of the fundamental work “Description of Moldova”. The only exception is “one of the first ethnologists of Europe, great Moldavian chronicler Miron Kostin who for centuries outstripped the theory of the XX century. Even from the point of view of the 3rd millennium his heritage deserves recognition... as he is the author of the first ethnologic treatise about Moldavians in the Moldavian language “About the tribe of Moldavians”. He is still the author ... of the only monograph about ethnic history, about the origin of Moldavians. Unsurpassed. Ignored. Consigned to oblivion.

** Vornik, chashnik, stolnik are palace servants to the ruler.

“After Eden/hero” Moldova turns into “a homeless country: there follows a long period when the Moldova throne was claimed by anyone who wanted, was occupied by the one who had money and was plundered by those who could”.

Even the intervention of Peter I into the rule by D. Kantemir does not save the situation. The fate of Moldavians who followed D. Kantemir to Russia was difficult and bitter. Some became outstanding figures of Russian culture and science, others achieved high military ranks. However, the majority dissipated among the Russian speaking world of the left bank of the Dnieper.

Nevertheless, despite the abundance of artful enemies, Moldavians are also guilty. “The historical drama of Moldova and Moldavians was that, in reality, nobody protested, nobody resisted trying to stop the division of Moldova.” The most important thing is that conquerors abduct national memory. “From 1812, 1862, 1918 the history of Moldova is written by conquerors, reflecting their point of view.”

After “Eden” there were also quite acceptable periods of existence.

There are two periods of peaceful development in the history of Moldova: 1812–1918 and 1945–1990.

“During the period of 1812–1918 in the conditions of the Russian empire Moldova, between the Rod and Dniester, using, initially, certain economic (tax) and even national-cultural privileges (up to the middle of the XIX century the Moldavian language was quazi-official), found its place and reconstructed the manufacture with the reference to the economic turnover of the empire. For a long peaceful period, assiduously cultivating fertile grounds, Moldavians and other nationalities which resided together with them, in the majority, lived quite prosperously, according to the standards of that time, especially in comparison with other provinces of Russia. National dignity of Moldavians was not humiliated. “Imperial censuses used the term Moldavians as the name of the majority population of Bessarabia; however, this term was the self-name of the population rather than the invention of Russians.” National-cultural needs were not suppressed. They were ignored.

During the period of 1812–1918 Moldavians between the Rod and the Dniester were never forbidden to call themselves Moldavians, to name their native language Moldavian, to use it freely. Russian provincial and local administration simply did not pay attention to national-cultural needs of Moldavians. The Moldavian language and culture did not develop.

Economic processes in “Bessarabia province” took place in the same legal framework, in the same conditions of market economy as in Russia. But the fertile ground and self-sacrificing work yielded their fruit which also reached the tables of the Moldavian peasants” ...

“The period of 1960-1990 correlated with the whole modern history of Moldova, can be considered a really blossoming period, despite pejorative nuances attached to this innocent adjective. During these years the Moldavian Republic strengthened and defined its place and value in the All-Union economic system (and world system), having reached

front positions in some branches. At the All-Union level the republic was best of all provided with the modern agricultural equipment and machinery. The network of motorways which had not been completely destroyed was constructed.”

The whole world saw the films *Poslednij mesyats osemi* (the script of Ion Druta director Vadim Derbenyov), *Lautari*, *Tabor ubodit v nebo* by Emil Loteanu; in many countries there were exhibitions of paintings of Eleonora Romanesku, Michael Greku, Michael Petrik, Valentina Rusu-Chobanu, of graphics of Ilya Bogdesko, Evgeny Meregi, George Vrabie, Aurel David, etc. It is difficult to meet a similar eruption of creative abilities, similar achievements in literature and art in such a short time in neighboring countries.”

Contrary to the ideological pressure, in the absence of a true democratic atmosphere, the years of 1960-1990 were a liberation period of the creative potential of the Moldavian people, a real “gold epoch”, full demonstration and strengthening of some scientific and art achievements, similar to masterpieces of the XV-XVI centuries in their value.”

“Miserable present” is simply awful. “All – from small to big - state, governmental, judicial, executive structures are filled with elements, which are politically (and, accordingly, economically) corrupted, disguised, and deeply rooted; they are hostile to the Moldavian statehood and sabotage all actions and decisions of the head of the state and of Parliament; structures are filled with corruption elements which openly neglect the historical basis, cultural and language values, the national dignity of the Moldavian people.” “All this is because “the Republic of Moldova is the only country on the planet whose citizens study the history of a different country.”

“Enemies”. “The Lord has foreordained that Moldavians from their very emergence constantly defended their hearths ... “. Certainly, there are a lot of enemies. They include Turks, Romans, double-faced Polish, as well as Hungarian kings, and even from time to time Russians named for some reason “moskali” when they came to Moldova in 1739. However, the main and unconditional enemies of Moldavians are certainly, Romanians in all historical hypostases (Muntyans, Ardelyans, Walaches, etc.). “Moldova, as it has already been quoted above, with its distinctive sincere character is the country in which wisdom dominates over will. It is the country of the circumspect that has produced great ingenious people. While being critical and creative, Moldavians gave the world Eminesku, whereas Muntyans (Walaches) gave Tudor Vladimiresku, the dissenter, and Mikhaj, the aggressor.

Even the ancient ballad “Miorita” (12-13 centuries) opposed a rich Moldavian to greedy envious strangers: an Unguryanin and a Vrancean. “Walaches are more cruel and dangerous than Turks. The anti-Moldavian front of Turkey, Walachia and Tatars during the epoch of Stephen the Great becomes a key factor leading to the devastation and division of Moldova. It was the same in the 15th, the 20th and in the 21st centuries. Even Eminesku, who fell under the influence of Romanians becomes “a xenophobe, not accepting others. In the fog of political dope, chauvinism, (he) is often led into the sin of historical deformation”.

Against this background the characteristics of Russians and Russia look more than favorable. “Besides the insults, rendered to the country of Moldova by taking away “Bessara-

bia” from its blood body, from Moldova, we are obliged to thank ... Russians for victories over Turkey.” Though Russian administration has infringed Moldavian rights and customs ... “But it has given this stability, absence of wars, construction of roads, etc. Eastern Moldova differed dramatically, was at a higher level than ... Western Moldova.”

“**Instructions**” of Vasile Stati are as boring and banal as the leading article of the newspaper “Pravda” (“The Truth”). “The political force that is in power now faces a difficult problem of creating a wide democratic multinational coalition which could fundamentally and consistently, using a strictly scientific basis, support the historical, political-legal base, national-cultural values of the Moldavian State. We shall closely listen to the wise advice of the national writer Ion Druta: “In order to manage the country, to place it on the same line with civilized countries it will be necessary to mobilize the whole moral and mental potential. This is the most important problem, a vital problem if you’d like. We have a unique historical chance, namely, constitutional majority in Parliament. We never had and will never have again constitutional majority in Parliament. Fortune has smiled us once; we shall not pass up the chance.”

“**Bright future**”, will possibly come with the victory of Moldovenism. “Moldovenism” **expresses the national feeling of Moldavians, the Moldavian spirit.** That which is Americanism for Americans, Franceism for the Frenchmen, Romism for Romes, Roumanism for Roumanians. Under all international acts on human rights **Moldavians like any other people, have a full right to publicly freely express – especially in their own country - the national feeling, i.e., Moldovenism.**” However, this requires a hero whose specimen has been described very thoroughly.

* * *

Here is the conclusion. After 13 years of independence recognized by hundreds of world states what has led to the generation of such messages, much more characteristic of the initial stages of national mobilization. I shall dare to explain this using the words of E. Gellner which, in my opinion, do not require any essential comments.

“The new states were smaller and hence weaker than the empires which they had replaced. But this diminution in size and strength was not compensated by a greater homogeneity and hence greater cohesion: not at all. They were as haunted by irredentist minorities as the dismantled empires, nose much-abused ‘prison houses of nations’; perhaps they in turn should have been called the provincial or county goals of minorities, the nouvelle minorities, so to speak, those who suddenly had minority status and hence irredentist sentiment thrust upon them, were often members of the previous culturally dominant ethnic or linguistic group, not habituated to such a lowly position, and hence more liable to resent it, and better equipped to resist it. They could find help and encouragement in their home state, which was dedicated to their own culture. They at any rate did not need

to reconstruct, revive or invent past national greatness: it was, only too painfully, a matter of living recollection.

So, to sum up, the new order set up in the name of the Nationalist principle had all the weaknesses of the system it replaced, plus some additional ones of its own. Its weaknesses were soon and rapidly demonstrated. With the consolidation of an ideocratic dictatorship in Russia, and the establishment of an overtly nationalistic one in Germany, the entire edifice crumbled with amazing speed. Polish military resistance was to be measured in weeks, Yugoslav (official) and Greek resistance in days, and the other new national states did not resist at all (with the most remarkable and successful exception of Finland)" [5, p. 118–119].

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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BORDERLAND LEGAL CONSCIENCE: THE UKRAINIAN VARIANT OF THE IDEA OF FEDERALISM

The East European Borderland is of great interest for carrying out historical and cultural, sociopolitical, ethno-psychological research. Within the borders of Europe it is quite difficult to find a similar zone where one can so distinctly trace the civilization break and diffusive interosculation of cultures and traditions¹.

This article is devoted to the study of the idea of federalism in the Ukrainian political legal tradition as a reflection of the specificity of the Borderland legal conscience. Historical conditions of the development of the Ukrainian nation, peculiarities of the understanding of the state nature and corresponding social practices led to the formation of the specific understanding of federalism idea that is being developed as a combination of two key principles of the Borderland legal conscience: a negative attitude to the state (to the structure limiting the freedom (liberty) of a person) and self-organization of the population when solving major questions of economic, military or religious nature. We can find a similar attitude to the problem of defining state problems in the all-European context, namely English liberalism of the XVII century. As a matter of fact, liberalism became the basis of modern political legal theory and state practice with the reception of liberal ideas as a natural law. Conditions of application of liberal ideas absolutely non-standard for Europe as well as their interpretation are quite remarkable, generating, in turn, legal forms needed to solve the national question and the issues dealing with the federal state system.

In the book “Korni identichnosti” by Zenon Kogut an evaluation of the nature of “Little Russia” identity as the product of connection of “many identities and loyalties” was presented². Convincing argumentation given by the author makes us agree with this estimation and accept it as the initial thesis of our reasoning. Vision of one’s

own statehood in the history of the Ukrainian political-legal idea formed with difficulties and pain. We shall recollect that legal acts considering the destiny of Ukraine from the XVII up to the beginning of the XX century do not view Ukraine as a state formation. Up to the Fourth Universal of the Central Rada we find only one definition of Ukraine: “the Ukrainian lands”, i.e., a specifically territorial meaning of the term. We shall assume that such a definition “land – power” is given by analogy with Germany (land). In this case it is quite difficult to interpret the plural form of the word “land” as “the Ukrainian lands” did not have such an experience of equivalent state existence as German lands.

However, as the formula “the Ukrainian lands” is quite often found in legal acts it requires an explanation, especially because the sense of this concept has changed. In the Middle Ages they were apanage principalities of the South and Southwest of Russia (Kiev, Chernihiv, Novhorod-Siversky and Halych-Volhynian principalities). In the early New time they included Southeast provinces of Rzechpospolita and the colonized territories of Dikoje Pole (the Wild Fields) (the Southern Dnieper area and Slobozhanshchyna). In the XVIII century these lands consisted of Getmanshchina, Zaporizhia, Slobozhanshchina, Polish Ukraine and Novorossiya, and in the XX century they were composed of the Russian provinces of the UNR (the Ukrainian People’s Republic), and in due course the Soviet Ukraine, the ZUNR (the West Ukrainian National Republic) and Zakarpattia Ukraine. Each of these lands has its own historical and cultural specificity, but not all of them possess even ten years’ experience of independent existence as a state territorial unit. Actually Western Ukrainian lands are almost completely deprived of such experience as independent or autonomous national territorial formations were absent there up to the XX century, and in the history of the whole XX century they existed for no more than five years. These territories can be tracked ethnographically, but practically it is impossible to associate them with any administrative territorial unit.

Historical destiny of Eastern Ukraine was more successful in this respect because there was the experience of Getmanshchina, the Zaporozhian Sich, Sloboda regiments which for more than a century existed in the structure of the Russian state as autonomous regions. The experience of the USSR had huge historical importance for state construction.

Our interest in the research of federalism idea in the history of the Ukrainian political legal thought was determined not so much by frequent modern political speculations concerning the opportunity of the federal organization of Ukraine but by the desire to conceive the specificity of the understanding of the nature of the state that was borne in the conditions of the Borderland.

The western political legal thought has been developing the idea of a federal state system since the times of the first bourgeois revolutions. Modern history treats the United States of America after the acceptance of the constitution of 1787, the Swiss federation of cantons which has acquired its modern condition since 1848 and Canada since 1867 as classical examples of federal practice.

Modern world tendencies of the development of interstate relations testify to changes in the opinions about the character of state construction and interstate relations. Accord-

ing to Ronald L. Uotts's definition, "the new paradigm should take us from the world of sovereign nations-states to the world of the limited state sovereignty and development of interstate relations of mainly federal character"³. The modern idea of federalism is based on essentially different views about the purposes of the federal structure which existed as early as the beginning of the XX century. The European Union can serve as a good example. In Ukraine the stage of the change of idea about the character of interstate relations which Europe is currently going through, will be a prospect for the years ahead.

It is necessary to distinguish between two different concepts of federalism: federalism which arises in a polyethnic state formation with the elements of rigid centralization of authority, based on the idea of isolation of the territory, and federalism which is generated by the necessity to protect general interests of small ethnopolitical social formations connected with the processes of integration into a uniform state of powers which were independent before.

The first version of federalism corresponds to the epoch of struggle for the expansion of rights and personal freedoms. The overall objective of such federalism is to preserve the uniqueness of each cultural-political community. This is "the federalism of the unique" genetically close to the idea of protection of individual rights and freedoms. It is the first step in the generalization of the idea of rights of a person connected with the strengthening of rights and freedoms of nations⁴ as a voicer of special, individual, unique mentality, way of life, cultural tradition, social structure, legal consciousness, etc.

The main idea of this particular kind of federalism is the protection of rights of minorities. Liberalism of the XIX century generated the formula of the organization of a state system which meets the requirements of provision of individual freedom: the basis for personal freedom is the autonomy of the national group. This principle operated equally in almost all countries of Europe in the XIX century. Even England in the second half of the XIX century faced the problem of discussion of Wales' cultural-political autonomy. Home rule for ethnic groups which might have dissolved in the uniform nation as the founder of the world colonial empire, became problem number one.

The acuteness of this problem in other great empires of Europe was intensified by the system of mutual relations of ruling and subordinate nations. In the second half of the XIX century Austria and Russia faced the ethnic question at the level of demands of the constitutional restriction of the monarch rights and the reform of the state system which provided for the federal organization of the state.

The second version of federalism arises from the opposite position. Processes of globalization of economic, cultural, political relations necessitated integration of small state formations into a federation in order to overcome isolation and expand opportunities for each member of society in the realization of their rights to use civilization achievements. Within the framework of this current one more tendency was been observed, namely, the removal of problems of greater sociopolitical associations which limit the rights of territorial communities. The way of solving the problem is to transfer a part of imperious powers to the level of local self-government. Federalization of this kind works if one uses

the principle of dispersion of greater social organisms. The right to regulate relations of regional character is delegated to local communities. Thus, problems of nations-states which are connected with the desire to be “a global consumer” and the desire not to lose local originality at the same time are eliminated.

In the Ukrainian national political legal tradition the idea of federalism has arisen as a result of consecutive development of the liberal idea which presupposes the creation of a new organization system of public relations guarantying the elimination of individual freedom restrictions.

The development specificity of the legal concept of liberalism by the Ukrainian political legal doctrine lies in the integration of two ideas, namely the idea of removal of human rights restrictions and the idea of national self-determination. As national self-determination in the context of liberal ideology acquired features of generalization of the idea of individual rights and the nation was viewed as the subject of political relations then it is possible to say that the liberal concept of the state system was seriously amended by representatives of the Ukrainian political legal idea of the last two centuries. The liberal requirement of constitutionalism was supplemented with the requirements to guarantee the rights and freedoms of each nation and to organize the state system using the principles of federalism.

The concept of federalism genetically stems from historical conditions of development of the Ukrainian statehood. In the Ukrainian political practice means of federal policy were widely used. Their purpose was to preserve national uniqueness. The Ukrainian state during the times of B. Hmel'nitsky and I. Vygovsky gives us an example of the search for the confederation model either within the framework of Rzeczpospolita or the Russian state.

The idea of the federal structure of Russia spread among members of nobiliary revolutionary societies at the beginning of the XIX century in the conditions of development of liberal ideology by the domestic political legal thought. In 1823 the Society of United Slavs was founded in the south of Russia. One of its goals was to create the federation of Slavic people. Nikita Muravyov's Constitution contains a clause about the federal structure of Russia.

The Ukrainian political legal tradition accepts the idea of the federal state system within the limits of the first version of federalism believing it to be the granting to the nations of the right to state-political autonomy within the framework of the reformed Russian empire as the federation of people. A similar idea about different ways of solving this problem took its roots in West-Ukrainian lands though the state base of federation was believed to be the Austria-Hungary Empire.

According to the definition given in the program document of the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius named “Books of Genesis of the Ukrainian people” the ideal of the state is the Slavic Federation which should encourage wide society democratization. Integration of Slavic people into a federation similar to that of the United States of

America allowed, on the one hand, to defend general state interests, and, on the other hand, to preserve state and ethnocultural independence.

Ukraine's exclusive position in the Slavic federation was determined by the presence of two Ukrainian states: Eastern and Western. It is remarkable, that the idea of Ukraine's councilor nature found its expression in a uniform federation of two states. Thus, the presence of two Ukraines is not a subject for discussion in the XIX century, but reality reflected in the project of the state system. We can assume, that the formation of this position in society documents was affected, on the one hand, by the precise idea of characteristics of Ukrainian national groups from both Ukrainian regions (which were formed under the influence of different cultural worlds of Slavic civilization – Orthodox and Greco-Catholic), and, on the other hand, by following the principle of liberal ideology and the desire to preserve the field of choice of cultural identity.

P.A. Kulish, proving the culture but not so much politics oriented nature of Ukrainism developed the theory of the Great Russian statehood according to which Russians had extremely high political abilities of founders of the state. This feature is not typical of Ukrainians and, consequently, their whole unhappy history testifies to it. Hence, P.A. Kulish concludes that it would be natural and even useful to remain within the structure of the Russian empire, using thus its force, safety and prestige. Nevertheless, with respect to culture Ukrainians act as an original mover of cultural processes for Russians. Accordingly, P.A. Kulish offered an idea of national symbiosis which could have a character of civilization compensatoriness. In fact, P.A. Kulish's concept follows the ideas of traditional European liberalism within the framework of T. Gobbs's theory. Citizens' renunciation of a part of rights was compensated for by protection and guarantee of existence. Ukrainians, leaving the political sphere for Russians, receive certain indemnification in the sphere of culture development. Thus, a multinational state allows to choose certain forms of compensation for concessions in the sphere of political equality.

O.D. Gradovsky's idea expressed in the work "Osnovy Russkogo Gosudarstvennogo Prava" is similar to that of P.A. Kulish. O.D. Gradovsky proves that the whole multitude of factors of the historical process can be outlined as the peculiarity of national features. State-legal institutions are derivatives of national cultural features in the broadest understanding⁵. O.D. Gradovsky believes that success of each state shows the result of certain cohabitation and state mutual development of peoples. "State is a historical phenomenon, i.e. subordinated to conditions of space and time. Practical expression of its state idea, i.e. each form of the state depends on these conditions... Society of the XIX century pays attention not so much to the form of the state, as to the goal of its activity and ways of its realization"⁶.

Realization of civil liberties is directly connected with the idea of national-cultural self-determination. It is possible to guarantee it in the conditions of peoples' federation. After obvious successes of reforms in Austria-Hungary M.P. Dragomanov in his works paid even more attention to the development of the topic of liberal federalism. His state ideal (just like the ideal of members of the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius) was the

creation of the Ukrainian state, a democratic republic in the structure of the Slavic federation with the exclusion of any restrictions of freedoms of speech, assemblies, conscience.

In due course extreme historical circumstances forced Ukrainian adherents of liberalism to leave behind the idea of the federal future of Slavs and to head for the construction of an independent Ukrainian state.

In M.P. Dragomanov's works one can see the influence of the Kiev legal doctrine of the second half of the XIX century. His vision of the federation of Slavic peoples became an ideal of politicians almost before the declaration of the Fourth Universal of the Central Rada. Members of such a state, namely, nations, are personified and acquire features of organizations. The nation becomes the subject of legal relations in the federation.

The people should have an independent political organization which could become the basis of the people's state life. This idea became the program of activity of liberals in the 90s of the XIX century. It is genetically connected with the development by the Kiev legal thought of the idea of the state as the subject of law. M.I. Palienko, M.M.Kovalevsky, L.J. Petrazhitsky, B.A.Kistjakivsky perceived the state as a legal person and state bodies as its representatives. They believed that state power is a phenomenon of collective-psychological character. In the opinion of representatives of this trend, the state always displays a certain legal organization of public relations.

M.I. Palienko insisted that the state is "a legal moral person". In his work "Suverenitet. Istoricheskoe razvitie idei suvereniteta i ejo pravovoe znachenie" he claims that a state carries attributes of the organization of sovereign unions. State power is based on psychological features of acceptance by individuals of the situation of submission and management. Mental features of those who create the union define its character. Thus, the state turns into a system of sovereign unions, a peculiar hybrid of civil society and federation.

In his letter to I. Franko M. Dragomanov wrote: "Principles of modern world civilization that mostly correspond to the progress are liberalism in its most consecutive form and federalism in affairs of the state". While supporting the federalist position, M.P. Dragomanov did not support isolation of Ukraine from Russia. But, being afraid of even a potential threat of limitation of human rights by a strong centralized state, he found it necessary to reorganize the Russian empire into a free confederation of independent regions (created not necessarily on the ethnic basis) in which the decisions were to be made, first of all, at the local level. In due course M.P. Dragomanov's ideas were adopted by Michael Pavlik, Ivan Franko, Bogdan Kistjakivsky.

The Ukrainian national movement changed drastically at the end of the XIX century when it became clear, that political apathy, kulturnichestvo (aspiration for enlightenment activity among intelligentsia) and neglect of social and economic sphere was pernicious for the national movement.

At the end of 1895 the Ukrainian radical party officially accepted the program of struggle for political independence of the Ukrainian people and as a first step put forward the demand to divide Galicia into Ukrainian and Polish parts. However, the idea of the fu-

ture of Ukraine as a part of any federation was a strong belief of the majority of adherents of the national movement both in the East and in the West of Ukraine.

Program provisions of the URP registered the demand to create a national autonomy: "In political affairs we want full freedom of the individual, word, assemblies, societies, press, autonomy of communities, districts, areas in affairs which concern only them... Domination in the internal policy of Austria of the real autonomy which could demonstrate the strength of the monarchy in the best cultural and national prosperity of provinces and nationalities"⁷⁷.

Representatives of the Ukrainian parties in the Russian State Duma had a similar position. Formed in the Ist Duma the Ukrainian community openly declared in "Ukrainsky Vestnik" ("Ukrainian Bulletin") its purpose, namely, the achievement of the autonomy of Ukraine. M.S. Grushevsky prepared special "Deklaratsija avtonomii Ukrainy" with main positions stated in the article "Nashi Trebovanija". Main demands of M.S. Grushevsky's "Declaration" included the federal structure of the state, national-territorial autonomy, convocation of the Ukrainian seym with legislative functions and the promulgation of law on national languages.

However, the solution of the ethnic question in the Ist and IInd Dumas was saddened by social and political problems. As N. Dolinsky said in his article, "deputies from Ukraine came to the Duma with the order to extract land and will". It was necessary to cultivate the ideas of autonomy on Ukrainian lands in broad masses. N. Dolinsky's idea finds its reflection in the materials of orders of rural assemblies of voters which were analyzed by V.I. Mihajlova. For example, only six out of 245 orders contain the demand for the autonomy of Ukraine. G. Gredeskul, a deputy of Kharkiv, marked that the adjournment of the ethnic question was made under the consent of all nationally focused groups and fractions as deputies considered it minor in relation towards other "needs of the Russian land".

In the opinion of G. Borkovsky stated in the work "Poraboshchjonnye narody tsarskoj Rossii: ih natsionalnoje osvobozhdenije i avtonomnye Ustremlenija", almost all parties of the Ist and IInd Dumas spoke against national oppression in Russia. The discussion of the ethnic question arose spontaneously and was connected with the Jewish problem. For instance, out of 20 speeches at the sessions of the Ist Duma which was directly concerned with the ethnic question, 10 were devoted to the problem of Jewish pogroms.

In "Ukrainsky Vestnik" representatives of Ukrainian intelligentsia constantly insisted on solving the ethnic question by granting autonomy to Ukraine within the borders of Russia. The dominating topic of autonomists was the granting to Russian society of wide democratic freedoms and the change of the state system into the constitutional federal system. From the very beginning of their political activity in Dumas representatives of Ukrainian lands declared continuity of the course towards democratic changes in Russia with the course towards autonomism of Ukraine.

After the formation of the Ukrainian fraction in the IInd Duma and the program registration of demands of Ukrainian deputies regarding the solution of the ethnic question principles and structure of the federal organization of Russia and rights of national-

territorial autonomies were worked out in detail. July 1, 1907 the newspaper "Tovarishch" ("The Comrade") published the address of fraction deputies in which the demand of "resolute and irrevocable reorganization of government in the sense of national and territorial autonomy with the granting of self-determination and self-government" was put forward. The decentralization and autonomy demands reflected not only ways out from the revolutionary crisis, but also showed the traditional Ukrainian idea about the form of existence of the nation in a multinational state. Conditions of the Borderland revealed all benefits of existence of Ukraine as an independent part of a big state, but not as an independent power. Independence seemed excessive if the liberal rights were to be guaranteed.

M.S. Grushevsky in his article "Natsionalnyj vopros i avtonomija" stated the position of the Ukrainian fraction concerning the issue of national self-determination: "One of the first main laws of the new order should establish as a general norm self-government of national territories everywhere where certain nationality is dominant on some continuous territory defined by national borders sufficient for the organization of the regional self-government. Another important law should define the rights of national elements making the minority of the population or occupying territories with mixed population which are not to be demarcated".⁸ Apparently, as it is seen from the given fragment of the article, M.S. Grushevsky perceived the presence of Ukraine in the structure of the Russian empire just as it was seen by the Cossack foreman representatives in the XVII-XVIII centuries: leave to us our rights and liberties (self-government), and the belonging to the Russian power will not burden us.

The problem of national rights of Ukrainians was considered within the framework of the bill which was offered by the Ukrainian fraction concerning the organization of the national school. Traditional demands of the Ukrainian liberals to develop national culture and education were turned into a bill submitted for consideration to the IInd Duma.

The IIIrd Duma considerably deviated from the course of decentralization of authority and the solution of the ethnic question. The brotherhood of Ukrainian postupovtsy (Progressivists) as the voicer of the national idea in the Duma tried to establish some cooperation with the cadet fraction. The attempt to raise again the issue of the national school in the bill of 37 deputies in 1908 was blocked by the right wing of the Duma.

In the IVth Duma Ukrainian liberals agreed with the party of cadets to lobby Ukrainian interests. So, owing to the support of cadets the Ukrainian delegation met with Minister of Education count Ignatyev. The national school idea acquired prospects of practical embodiment.

In December, 1916 the fraternity of Ukrainian progressivists (FUP) published the declaration "Nasha Positsija" ("Our position") in which they clearly expressed their demands of the federal structure of Russia, autonomy of Ukraine and the realization of the national school rights. However, the FUP in this declaration confirmed its attitude not only towards the idea of the federal structure but also towards the problem of existence of the Ukrainian nation within the structure of two different powers: "We, Ukrainian progressivists defend an independent state system of those powers with which we were connected by

historical destiny; we believe that a state is a free union of equal in rights and equivalent nations among which there should be neither oppressors, nor oppressed. So, we fought and we shall fight for the democratic autonomy of Ukraine guaranteed by the federation of free people... Achieving the chosen goal, we search for allies..., who will support our main demands - the independent-federal structure of the state organization on a democratic basis⁹. Thus, even before the disintegration of empires in the conditions of their most severe military opposition the political statement of the FUP bears a print of consciousness of the nation of “mezhdierzhavje” (interpower). For the Ukrainian political-legal idea it was easier to change the opinion about the nature of the state, than to develop the strategy of construction of an independent national Ukrainian state.

When studying the political statements of the Ukrainian figures at the beginning of the XX century one can feel strong influence of the ethical-sociological approach rooted in the legal science of the beginning of the century due to works of E.V. Spektorsky. In E.V. Spektorsky's theory of the state the idea of self-government as the idea of wide decentralization of society management seemed premature for Russian society, but to the full displayed the prospect of development of ideas about the formation of civil society and its role in the state of the future.

In E.V. Spektorsky's opinion, the state should be viewed as a formation based on morals. The existence of the social justice idea is connected exactly with moral nature. Ideas and beliefs of community become the basis for the functioning of the state. As a matter of fact, if we add the predicate “national” to the given formula of the state as a non-definite idea of community then it is possible to say that such a position can be seen as a theoretical-legal substantiation of the rise of the national state, and principles of federalism represent the process of decentralization of power, delegation of imperious functions to civil society, development of self-organization citizens.

E.V. Spektorsky touched upon the main problem of the liberal social order, namely, the necessity to restrict the state by society and to limit human rights by society and by the state. But ethical beliefs serve as the mechanism of compulsion in the given concept¹⁰.

V. V. Ivanovsky offered to expand the sphere of the ethical concept of the state and to start using the pluralistic system of the state system expressed in the definition of the state as a public union. In fact, the researcher continues the study of the problem borne by liberal ideology, dealing with the issues of civil society and its function of control over the government. The state is a public union which unites different social, cultural, economic unions of citizens that acts as a general coordinator of interallied relations.

V.V. Ivanovsky's ideas have something in common with the basic program requirements of the FUP. His concept is especially interesting because of its thesis about the loss of a territorial element of the state which has no basic value when one defines the state as a social union. Authority is inherent not only to a territorial union but to any union. Territorial independence is only the result of independence of authority which functions in each state union, i.e., it becomes a consequence instead of a condition of existence of the state union. It is possible to assume, that the formation of this position became the

product of understanding of the Ukrainian national experience for which a century of absence of independent territory came to an end with the prospect of finding territorial autonomy.

The concept of personal autonomy which was actively discussed in Austria as a variant of the solution of the ethnic question and creation of the federal structure of a new type also looks quite promising. It means that each citizen has the right to double identity, namely, the state identity in the territorial sphere and the national identity in the cultural sphere. All problems connected with the solution of questions in the cultural sphere, should be dealt with by national bodies created by members of national community irrespective of their residence, i.e. they should have a nation-wide character. The territorial community should solve the problem of local self-regulation.

Elements of the concept of personal autonomy found their reflection in many program positions of the Ukrainian parties at the end of the XIX – the beginning of the XX century. They were also included into the program of the Austrian social-democratic party in 1898. But national-cultural autonomy was carried out not in Austria-Hungary and not in national states which arose in its territory at the beginning of the XX century but in Ukraine. The third Universal declared national-personal autonomy, and together with the Fourth Universal a corresponding law was passed. Principles of personal autonomy became the basis of the solution of the ethnic question in the UPR and were reflected in the Constitution of the UPR in articles 6, 69-78.

According to the provisions of the UPR Constitution, each nation within the borders of the UPR has the right to national-personal autonomy, i.e., to the independent organization of the national life. The creation of the National Union which authority should extend over all its members, irrespective of their place of settlement in Ukraine was proclaimed.

Liberal values demand both individual freedom and a polycultural context which ensures an individual choice of a person. In Ukraine liberal ideas acquired culturological character. Political, social, economic rights of an individual were connected with the right to national identification. If in the XIX century Ukrainian nationalism professed this idea from the positions of culture of national minority in multinational states then in due time political reality showed that freedom of national self-determination and cultural-national identity equally concerns both national states and cultures of national majority. The most convincing documents in this case include the Provision and Charter of the state system, rights and liberties of the UPR and Laws of the temporary state system of Ukraine.

Article 69 of the Charter of the state system, rights and liberties of the UPR proclaims: “Each of the nations occupying Ukraine has the right within the borders of the UPR to national-personal autonomy, the right to the independent organization of the national life which is carried out through the bodies of the National Union which authority extends to all its members, irrespective of their place of settlement on the territory of the UPR. It is an inalienable right of the nations, and none of them can be deprived of this right, or limited in it”¹¹.

Taking into account these provisions of the UPR Constitution it is possible to say, that they are close in spirit to liberal ideas of personal autonomy. The Charter of the state system of the UPR defines the state as a public union. Nevertheless, the political practice of 1916-1918 showed certain evolution of views of adherents of federalism regarding the parity of rights of the state and rights of an individual to national-cultural self-determination.

From the idea of personal autonomy and cultural-territorial autonomy Ukrainian intellectuals moved to the idea of national sovereignty. V.V. Ivanovsky spoke about sovereignty as a feature of power which testifies to the maturity of a certain public union. Occurrence in national movement of demands of territorial autonomy testified to qualitative changes of national self-identification and rooting of the idea of the domination of rights of the civil union in the state. The national state practically turned into a liberal model of the social union: a set of individuals, social groups united by supreme power. However, public groups are formed not under the state influence but are a result of the process of activity of civil society.

The idea of autonomy and federalism is founded in the liberal idea of community as a subject of law. During the Enlightenment the nation acquired features of the subject of world policy and in the XIX century after a wave of national-liberation movement in Austria-Hungary and Russia it received features of the subject of law. M.M. Kovalevsky expressed similar views in his lectures on state theory.

According to M.M. Kovalevsky, formation of a state is a historical process which provides for the change of several forms of community: people – land – political formation – world federation. The base position of the state system in the given scheme is the overcoming of the contradiction between equality and freedom. Equality assumes rejection of the idea to live at the cost of conquering Another, thus, repeating the principle of historical social development insisted upon by adherents of social Darwinism. However, M.M. Kovalevsky offered the idea of solidarity as an original moral principle of self-regulation of a certain community or a union of communities.

Using M.M. Kovalevsky's concept as the basis, it is possible to claim that Ukraine during the times of revolutions of 1917 moved to the level "land - political formation". Territorial autonomy and then demands to create a sovereign state are a step of development of the "solidarity" idea, meaning "solidarity" with other nations in the right to self-determination, to the country's own form of political formation. "Solidarity", according to M.M. Kovalevsky, in the form of social institutes, public orders, and political dynamics of changes finds its bright echo in historical processes and political practice of 1917-18.

The concept of "solidarity" as an integral element of progress and the moving force of transformation of the state system was also discussed in the works of B.A. Kistjakivsky. State power in a constitutional state "is linked to the people", they make common cause in the achievement of the main purpose of social life, i.e., to guarantee full rights and personal freedoms. The constitutional state "is an example of solidarity of state power and the people".

People's representation in the constitutional state enables "to place the state on the strong ground of social unity" but this social unity should contain space for national community. B.A. Kistjakovsky believes that people's representation combined with the idea of national representation creates conditions for public solidarity. Thus, the idea of personal autonomy can serve as a variant of elimination of the national conflict and achievement of social solidarity.

Positions of M.P. Dragomanov, M.S. Grushevsky and B.A. Kistjakivsky concerning the ethnic question were very similar. However, there was a difference in the general dialectics of the parity of the universal and the national. This affected the solution of the question of national autonomy and federation as a state system which corresponds to the principle of a free choice by the citizen of any national community to belong to. In the conditions of gradual sociopolitical transformations, problems of the solution of the Ukrainian question were not separated from the general question regarding the reorganization of the state on the basis of equality of nationalities and regions. National-territorial autonomy was considered by the Ukrainian adherents of liberal ideology a natural step in liberalization of human rights to self-determination. Nevertheless, the liberal movement of Russia and Austria saw in this a feature of separatism. P.B. Struve openly criticized the position of progressivists on the pages of the newspaper "Russkaja Ideja" ("Russian Idea"). In his article "Obshcherusskaja kultura i ukrainsky partikulyarizm"¹² the Russian liberal analyzes the demands of Ukrainians viewing them as a threat to the unity of Russian society; he also studies the demands of cultural and educational character treating them as destructive tendencies which should be stopped. Peculiar understanding of "solidarity" by the right wing of Russian liberals put him into an open opposition to the national movement in Russia. Great Russian liberals saw in social changes at the beginning of the XX century a transition not to a liberal-democratic model of the state but a replacement of the order from centrist-bureaucratic to constitutional-centrist.

Elimination of the opposition which developed among adherents of liberal ideology due to their different attitude to the ethnic question, in the opinion of L. Yurkevich, was possible only under the condition of elimination of radicalism of both parties. He paid attention to the concept of "national pride" which is "free from the feeling of superiority over neighboring peoples". L. Yurkevich offered his own concept of social solidarity which consisted in the understanding of the role of the middle class as a moving force of social progress. The middle class specifically creates the basis for the rise of society culture common to all social classes. The middle class "stays away from class differentiation and is the closest to people"¹³; therefore, the middle class serves as the foundation of universal solidarity and can be used to overcome the opposition of "historical" and "non-historical nations". The idea of the middle class as a carrier of the organizing culture leads to the development of the concept of synthetic national culture that is free from contradictions of social character.

Consequently, the problem of the federal structure and national autonomy found its roots in the problem of different understanding of the bases for sociopolitical solidarity of Russian and Ukrainian liberals.

The former insisted on the formation of society culture within the limits of the all-Russian culture, neglecting the right to national self-determination, the latter preferred to form society culture within the limits of the national Ukrainian culture. The position of the latter to a greater degree satisfied the conditions of that time as the Ukrainian nation faced the problem of the joining of Western and Eastern lands.

We can state that the liberal approach to the problem of the federal state system and national autonomy was based on the vision of the principle connection between the freedom of an individual choice and the necessity to preserve the variety of choices of the self-identification model. Federal structure and national autonomy were accepted by liberals at the beginning of the XX century as a step towards the protection of rights of differentiated cultural-ethnic groups. Respect of the right of choice of a person, a group, “a social union” or a party was a major principle of the liberal model of the state. The essence of the major principle of public administration specified by B.A. Kistjakovsky is not the will that submits, but the will which subordinates¹⁴. B.A. Kistjakovsky brings to our attention the central thesis of the concept of public behavior with it being the content of any social phenomenon, a cumulative vector of subjective liberties, namely members of community. The phenomenon of state power acquires features of social-psychological character and to the full coincides with the views of M.K. Mihajlovsky, G.Tard, G. Zimmel’.

As it has already been mentioned, a certain structure, the system of public relations, legal order, etc. will always be viewed as an instrument of social transformations but not as the end in itself. This is a specific feature of liberalism as social-political ideology and political-legal doctrine. At the same time the idea of national autonomy and federalism is no other than a stage of removal of limitations of personal freedom. The idea of national autonomy in the structure of federation and then the idea of national sovereignty are steps needed to limit the power of the state and attempts to preserve liberty as the main value for the legal conscience of the Borderland.

Liberal values of modern civilization became the result of development of society clamped within the limits of “enlightened neighbors”, “state foundations”, and “legal system”. Theorists of liberalism of the XVII -XVIII centuries considered the condition of “war against everybody” and the stage of public contract to be speculative constructions, just like “ideal gas” in physics. None of them could even assume that they actually described real historical conditions which developed in Europe on the border of the Wild Fields and Rzeczpospolita. The Eastern European Borderland in the XVII-XVIII centuries became an arena for those processes of state development the possibility of which had been assumed only theoretically. The situation of “the neutral ground”, liberty as absence of any state regulation, spontaneous territorial-military unions is the social experience of the Borderland which for many years was not paid any attention to either by European or domestic historians of law.

Nevertheless, it would be naive to assume, that the presence of such social experience in not so remote historical past did not affect the formation of the legal conscience of the Ukrainian people. A peculiar feature of Little Russia identity is its complexity as a system of tolerances and loyalties. This system is the product of the Borderland experience. A Ukrainian was compelled to define himself through structures which he perceived as “alien”, but at the same time political, class or economic interests forced him to be loyal to “the other”.

For a person living in the Borderland the perception of the state is always accompanied by a complex dilemma of preservation of one’s own individuality and freedom as well as the desire to join the system of benefits of global civilization guaranteed by being a part of a big state association, whether it is the Russian empire or the modern European Union. In this particular case the only acceptable solution is to use the model of federation yielding some part of the rights in exchange for access to more ample opportunities.

The beginning of the article stated that federalism is the future of Ukraine. The prospect of joining the European Union is put forward as a program position of several Ukrainian political parties present in the Supreme Rada. Implementation of these provisions in reality entails a voluntary renunciation of some rights of a sovereign state. Any union is a product of tolerance and compromise. The entry into the European Union presupposes the change of the national legislation to make it conform to the norms of the Union, coordinating manufacture, trade and foreign policy with the general principles of the European community. Such concessions transform Ukraine into an equal partner, a member of the uniform economic and political space. Thus, it is the prospect of the second model of federalism which allows to use benefits of global civilization. However, it can also be interpreted as a display of civilization compensatoriness: the renunciation of a part of sovereignty is compensated by access to globality.

Even if the joining the European Union is postponed for any reason for a long time or becomes impossible, then the problem of federalism will not lose its urgency as the development of the system of local self-government is stipulated within the framework of the same second model of federalism. The right to solve problems of the regional character is transferred to local communities. The fundamental condition of this model is the precise regulation of administrative functions and powers of local self-government. At the same time local state services rendered by local self-government institutions, are looked at as a part of national services.

Finally we can ascertain that as a result of local self-government reform in Ukraine the territorial community will receive a rather high level of autonomy from central authority that will allow to bring its status as close as possible to the status of the subject of federation.

Why is the idea of federalism so persistent in the legal conscience of the Borderland peoples in general and of Ukrainians in particular?

The Borderland assumes openness to the world. To be in between is an opportunity to represent a lot simultaneously, to combine different qualities and in this variety to feel

one's own freedom and uniqueness. Formation of national consciousness of Ukrainians became the result of understanding of this particular position exclusiveness.^{Uniqueness} of the Borderland consists not only of the riches of the choice of models of the surrounding worlds, but also of the impossibility to refuse their synthesis¹⁵.

The idea of federalism in the legal conscience of the Borderland could not be connected only with national isolationism. In this case it is difficult to explain the phenomenon of simultaneous existence within the borders of Russia of ethnically uniform, but different in their structure and principles of relations with the central authority regions of Slobozhanshchina, Getmanshchina and Zaporizhia. The Ukrainian version of federalism, starting with the intergovernmental agreements of Getmanshchina in the XVII century and finishing with the Constitution of the UNR, was characterized by its struggle to restrict state interference in the business of territorial communities. This is how the idea of the Ukrainian autonomy in the structure of empires in the XIX – the beginning of the XX centuries is presented. Even today within the framework of the local self-government reform the main idea is still the expansion of rights of territorial communities.

The Borderland legal conscience is genetically connected with “the flight from the state” and preservation of liberty in the form of full or maximum possible restriction of state authority over an individual. Therefore, federalism was accepted by the Borderland as an effective form of power decentralization and as a guarantee of rights of territorial communities **while at the same time it was to protect the liberties of each community member.**

Notes

- ¹ Possibly, only the Balkans add variety to homogenous Europeanness.
- ² Kogut Z. Korinnya identichnosti. K.: Kritika, 2004. S.165.
- ³ Uotts Ronald L. Federativni sistemi. Kharkiv: Tsentr Osvitnih Initsiativ, 2002. S.25.
- ⁴ The idea of nation as a subject of law and the idea of state as the voicer of national interests. In fact, a modern notion of the national state and of the concept of sovereign nations-states was formed.
- ⁵ Gradovsky O.D. Sochinenija. SPb., 2001. S.69.
- ⁶ Ibid. S.31.
- ⁷ Ukrainsky politichny partyi kintsya XIX – pochatku XX stolittya. Programovi i dovidkovi materiali. K., 1993. S.44.
- ⁸ Grushevsky M.S. Natsionalny vopros i autonomija. // Ukrainsky vestnik. 1906, №1.
- ⁹ Gunchak T. Ukraina: persha palova XX stolittya. K.: Lybid', 1993. S.72.
- ¹⁰ Spektorsky E.V. Posobije k lektsyjam po entsyklopedii prava. Saratov, 1915.
- ¹¹ Yanevsky D.B. Malovidomi konstitutsyjny akty Ukrainy 1917-1920 pp. K.: Lybid', 1991.
- ¹² Struve P.B. Obscherusskaja kultura i ukrainsky partikulyarizm.// Russkaja mysl'. 1912, № 1.
- ¹³ Yurkevich L. Seredni klasi i natsionalne vidrozhennya // Dzvyn. 1913. № 2. S.109.

- ¹⁴ Kistjakovsky B.O. Sotsialnye nauki i pravo. Ocherki metodologii sotsialnyh nauk i obshchej teorii prava // Kistjakovsky B.O. Filosofia i sotsiologija prava. SPb, 1999. S.275.
- ¹⁵ Monument of Ukrainian law “Rights Used by the Little Russian people in Courts” (1743) is an exclusive example of the practical use of various legal norms taken from Magdeburg law, Lithuanian statutes, Polish legislation, Russian codes.

CULTURAL MARKERS OF UKRAINIAN PUBLIC SPACE: MIXTURE AND INSTABILITY. THE CITY OF LVIV CASE

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union Ukraine, one of the former Soviet republics became an independent country. Nationalist forces thought it was a happy completion of a century-old struggle of the Ukrainian nation. However, historical circumstances led to a great cultural diversity among the Ukrainian population. In 2004 (after the last enlarging of the European Union) Ukraine became a real *border country* located between Russia and Europe. Mykola Ryabchuk, a famous Ukrainian publicist and scholar, calls the contemporary cultural situation “two Ukraines”: the first one, situated on the right bank of the Dnieper river, is culturally and mentally oriented towards the West while the second one, on the left bank, is inclined more towards the East. The difference between the two parts could be less dramatic if it were not used by political forces in election campaigns. Officials often declare the creation of a political nation in Ukraine and speak of the necessity to form a new Ukrainian civic identity, but in fact there are no remarkable steps made in that direction. Thankfully, due to the development of democracy and civil society together with a constant political struggle between different elites from different regions there is not a single clear ideology in Ukraine, which could become unifying and totalitarian like in the Soviet Union. Rapid economic development concerns big cities and influenced a rather small part of Ukrainian society. Owing to these circumstances Ukraine’s public sphere remains unregulated. Obviously, private mass-media have their own politics, but there is a great variety of voices and opinions. In this paper I will not study in detail the media-part of the public sphere. It is much more interesting to observe a less regulated part of the Ukrainian daily life, namely, the public space of Ukrainian cities, filled up with a whole diversity of official symbols of previous and contemporary regimes, political

struggle, popular culture, religion, old traditions and new customs. It was of interest to me how official declarations and intellectual ideas become (or not) apparent in everyday public space.

Taking into account this particular goal I chose the example of the city of Lviv, a remarkable city in the Ukrainian context. Situated near the western border of Ukraine, Lviv is perceived as the capital of Western Ukraine, an influential center of nationalist Ukrainian movement during last few centuries and a reference point for the Ukrainian discussion of Central Europe. I tried to analyze two levels of public discourse in Lviv (official statements and intellectual writings; popular culture narratives) and find some similarities or contradictions between them.

The notion of urbanism was always problematic in the Ukrainian context. During the nineteenth century the biggest cities were influenced by dominant cultures of two empires – Russian in the East and Austro-Hungarian in the West. The Ukrainian population in the cities was the minority, more or less active in the fight for its rights. This situation changed during the Soviet times when industrialization brought a huge amount of working class people from the countryside to the cities. But Ukrainians were in the position of a repressed majority in the Soviet Ukraine until the declaration of Ukrainian independence in 1991. I shall not retell the whole history of the Ukrainian nation coming into being here. Instead I shall concentrate on particular *story/stories* about one city crucial for the Ukrainian national discourse.

Lviv was founded as a fort in the mid-13th century by Prince Danylo Halitski of Galicia. It was situated at the trade crossroads and quickly became the centre of trade and commerce for the region. In the 14th century Galicia and Lviv were occupied by Poland. There were several national groups coexisting and conflicting with each other – Poles, Germans, Armenians, Jews and Ukrainians. The national composition of the population and local authorities changed during the centuries. In 1772 Galicia became a part of the Hapsburg Austro-Hungarian Empire but still remained dominated by Poles. With the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire at the end of World War I, Lviv was proclaimed capital of the independent Republic of Western Ukraine. Lviv was also crucial for another national discourse – Polish, so Poles soon took control over the city until the Red Army got the control over it in September of 1939. Lviv was occupied by Germany from 1941 to 1944. In 1944 Lviv again went under the Soviet rule and remained a Soviet city until 1991. In independent Ukraine Lviv is the main centre of Ukrainian nationalism with the domination of the Ukrainian culture and language and clear pro-European orientation¹.

It is the first time in the city history when Ukrainians become representatives in Lviv. There is a bit of irony in the historical conditions that generated such a situation. The transformation of Lviv into a Soviet industrial centre after the Second World War entailed a certain increase of the population and changes in its combination. Previous city dwellers (most of them were killed during the war or removed by Communists soon after the war) were replaced by party officials, technicians and engineers from Russia and other Soviet republics and local working class people who came to work at Lviv's factories from

neighboring villages. The old historical downtown was surrounded with industrial areas and residential districts built behind them. The modern city map shows alternation of historical-industrial-residential urban zones so typical of a post-Soviet city.

Soviet past and Soviet heritage are crucial for the Ukrainian present much more than it has been articulated. The post-Soviet trauma led to the atmosphere of silence when it came to problems of management and transformation of Soviet heritage. During the Soviet times it was obvious that there was only one main ideology. As a set of beliefs based on the communist doctrine this ideology influenced life in the whole Soviet Union whether someone believed it or not. The Communist way of life wasn't composed just of official declarations and Party slogans. Power strategies of this regime demonstrate craftiness and resourcefulness of ideology reproducing itself at the micro level of a daily life. Let us look at a particular example. In 1939 the Soviet rule was established in the city of Lviv. Fortunately, the city was not destroyed much during World War II. Soviet government faced the problem of Lviv's transformation into an ordinary Soviet city from the city with a rich national heritage of Poles, Jews and Ukrainians.

Lviv was transformed without any major reconstruction of its historical center. The prominent narrative, which one can find in Soviet texts about Lviv, is an industrial discourse. There is one essential text quoted in any historical book or guidebook, namely, paragraph 32 from the law about a five-year plan (1946-1950) that prescribes to transform Lviv into a large industrial center of Ukraine. Taking into account the fact that Lviv never was an industrial center (the city used to be concerned with trade and administration) and there were no deposits of coal or other natural resources it was decided to build high technology plants (most of them collapsed together with the Soviet Union in the 1990s) there. It is obvious that economical reasons weren't the sole motive for these processes. New factories were prominent visual signs of Soviet power in Western Ukraine showing its successfulness. On the other hand, factories were structures that provided facilities for thousands of people meanwhile holding possibilities to control and influence the masses.

Another great Lviv narrative was the inheritance of historical development. Proper facts from the past (workers' revolts, demonstrations, socialist publications, etc) were discovered in books and honored (together with the soviet heroic pantheon) in the names of streets, monuments and museums, mostly situated in the city center. The story organization shows strategies used to transform the city. The construction of new districts or factories was as important as the organization of a proper discursive field. Tours around the city were organized in a special way for visitors to pay considerable attention to the Soviet heritage and Soviet present of the city. Factories, residential districts, new monuments were tourist must-see objects. In the case of non-Soviet heritage (especially churches) the emphasis was made on the ideologically correct current use of the buildings as archives, museums etc. Monuments, memorable boards, names of streets served as symbolic signs of the Soviet state. The constructed image of the city was single and clear. After the collapse of the Soviet Union it broke into pieces.

One can easily recognize a new main myth of Lviv as a Central European city by simply checking contemporary guidebooks. The image of the Soviet city was enthusiastically replaced to celebrate ancient heritage and false multiculturalism of the city. I called this kind of multiculturalism “false” because of its depending on history. The contemporary ethnic configuration of Lviv’s population (Ukrainians, Russians, small assimilated communities of Poles, Jews, and Armenians) was ignored and the historical configuration (Poles, Jews, Armenians, Ukrainians) was proclaimed to be important. The myth about multiculturalism together with the Austro-Hungarian nostalgia seems to be favorite with Lviv’s intellectuals. They are trying to spread it onto reality. From my point of view, Lviv’s intellectuals supported the multicultural city heritage because of the aggressive privatization and incorrect reconstruction of the historical downtown and also because of merely Ukrainization changes in the semiotics of the cityscape in the 1990s. This helpful attempt of protection of historical heritage had some encouraging results but also damaged the feelings of belonging and identity of thousands of people who used to live in post-Soviet residential districts. Special attention given to a certain (Austro-Hungarian) period of the city’s past resulted in the neglect of the existing social problems and cultural practices, for example, transformation of Soviet industrial areas into commercial and trade centers and specific culture of the so called sleeping districts.

The official image of Lviv is strongly influenced by the Ukrainian nationalist doctrine. At the beginning of the 1990s most streets were renamed; in some cases they received pre-Soviet names but mainly their new names were dedicated to Ukrainian national heroes and crucial events in Ukrainian history. New city administration followed the Soviet administration scheme: renaming streets, destroying Soviet monuments, installing new monuments and memorable tables, organizing celebrations. Semiotics of the city space was completely changed according to the main goal of presenting Lviv as a city of strong national identity. Lviv is one of the biggest Ukrainian-speaking cities in Ukraine. It is worth mentioning that Ukrainian presence in Lviv increased exactly during the Soviet times due to a considerable amount of working class people who moved into the city from neighboring villages. This ‘peasant’ population was blamed by intellectuals for the demolishing of ancient buildings, traditions and urban culture. National identity of these people was repressed during Soviet times. The Russian language (and culture) was not just a language of inter ethnic communications but also a sign of belonging to high, urban, prestige culture. The renaming of the streets and the stabilization of Ukrainian domination was a victory for Ukrainians in Lviv. That’s why all talks about multiculturalism are made fruitless by the strong nationalist doctrine.

It has been mentioned above that the new population of Lviv was mostly rural by origin. Inhabitants of new residential districts brought to the city some feelings of life in the country which found their expression in the organizing of small gardens around block buildings and constructing of churches or erecting of Virgin Mary statues in each small district (in the 1990s). However, they have no influence on the dominant city myth. Huge residential areas inhabited by the majority of Lviv’s population do not fit the city’s

image and have been proclaimed unimportant. Lviv is just the historical center of the city. At the same time the culture of sleeping districts possesses its own history, traditions and original identity.



A small church in Hotkevycha street, Syhiv




A typical Virgin Mary statue

Two particular Lviv's sleeping districts became famous everywhere in Ukraine thankfully to the singers who used to live there. The song "Levandovka" performed in the 1990s by Garik Krichevsky, a famous criminal-"chanson" singer praises the romanticized daily life of local pickers. The subculture of Levandovka young inhabitants described in this song can find its expression in criminal networks, small thefts and robberies, drugs trafficking and specific rules of conduct and appearance. However, in reality there is no serious criminal organization as criminality exists mostly at the level of some romantic narrative and rules for "really cool guys". Due to its low level of danger this subculture (typical of not just one Lviv's district but of similar areas in other cities too) becomes an object of interest and interpretation for younger intellectuals and writers. Levandovka's identity was humorously presented at the internet-site www.levandovka.lviv.ua. Representatives of this subculture, named "gopniki" become main characters of the novel "Pisma bratana" ("Brother's letters") written by psevdogopnik author Genya Galyas.

Another district, called Syhiv, was poetized in the rap-song by VovaZiLvova (Vova from Lviv) in 2006. The picture of the area described in this song differs from the previous one as VovaZiLvova sings about the district in which he grew up, walked with friends and played basketball. The mood of the song is similar to that of the mood of Syhiv Internet site (www.syhiv.nashlviv.com) called "For those who like it as it is".

Syhiv differs from other Lviv's districts. It was one of the last Soviet projects realized in Lviv. Its construction began in 1979. It was an ambitious project pretending to create not just a district but a city:

Anyone who was there a year ago would now get definitely lost. There were bushes then, and now there are floors of a future beautiful school. Not far from there like mushrooms after the rain appear apartment buildings. Some of them already have got residents. A little less than a year ago the first nine-floor block was inhabited. By this time hundreds of families have had house-warming parties in the Syhiv residential district. 10 – 15 years will pass and here, on these neglected grounds there will be a new city – as big as Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk or Lutsk – inhabited by 200 thousand people².



The title page of Syhiv site

The project was glorious. Numerous articles about it were published in local newspapers, informing about the new so called micro districts, schools and shops. It was an ordinary story about Soviet achievements. In 1987 Syhiv was mentioned in the guidebook's story about Lviv (on the guidebook's cover as well as in the article about Soviet architecture³).



V.Vujcuk, R.Lypka. An Encounter with Lvov. – Lviv, 1987.

It wasn't a lovely place to live in the 1980s because of transportation problems and a poor consumer infrastructure. But now Syhiv has an excellent infrastructure (shops, supermarkets, movie theaters, cafes, beauty salons, etc.) and efficient transport connections

with other parts of the city. Famous market “Shuvar” which finances the local newspaper “Syhiv Info” is also located in the area.

Syhiv possesses a strong local identity. It can be distinguished from other post-Soviet residential areas because of its separate location and big size. Syhiv wasn't built as a couple of streets; from the very beginning it was a well-planned separate district. Since 2001 it has been an administrative district of the city of Lviv inhabited by 145 932 citizens⁴.

Analysis of the Internet sites content about Syhiv shows two specific groups of people with opposite opinions about it: one group loves Syhiv, enjoys its space and calls it “the native place” while the other hates it and calls it boxes of matches. There are few slang names of Syhiv: “Psyhiv” (allusion to two meanings: “psy” (dogs) and “psyhy” (mad people); ghetto, nigger's district (offensive ones); and famous comparison with New York (I have heard it many times from Syhiv (and non-Syhiv) dwellers; this proud remark can be found in newspapers⁵).

In fact one can spend all his life in Syhiv without ever going anywhere else. Once I made a small inquiry among Syhiv inhabitants asking them if they were Syhiv or Lviv residents. I was surprised that most people answered that, first of all, they are Syhiv residents. Obviously, this small inquiry couldn't be taken into consideration as a sociological research but the result is still quite remarkable. There is also some confrontation between Syhiv and Levandovka young inhabitants. Both districts are excluded from the official myth about the ancient city and communicate with each other in their own alternative reality. At the same time the historical center seems to be alien and hostile to them. Clearly, there are no exact borders between the outskirts and the center. A lot of people go to their working places and educational institutions in the center or other districts of the city, but their feelings of belonging and identity are formed by their everyday life and local subcultures as well as by the mythological city discourse. This local experience shall not be ignored. The city can be seen in different ways and all personal images have a right to exist.

Usually the beauty of Lviv is evaluated after looking at its different buildings:

More soul and creation are put into one old building than into the whole Soviet micro rayon (micro district). Can you imagine modeling at the front porch of a block building? And these two holes in each granite footstep (for carpets, by the way), and copper door handles, and wrought banisters? And stained-glass windows? No, because what can a proletarian need such architectural extravagances for?⁶

This is a traditional opinion that explains the dislike by people of block districts and their anxious attitude towards the historical center. But if one starts to think on a larger scale of urban modules one can see that Syhiv is beautiful, that silhouettes of block buildings have their own rhythmic and dynamics of space, that there is a lot of free space, a lovely forest and a wide sky.



Photo of Syhiv taken from the Internet⁷.

Syhiv develops rapidly. A few supermarkets were constructed there during the last few years. This perspective district is waiting for big investments. An international contest for the best conception of the Syhiv public center was announced by city officials in May, 2007. Yuri Kryvoruchko, the chief of Lviv's architecture department, expects that famous European architecture schools will take part in this contest⁸.

Commercial potentialities are not the only attraction of Syhiv. A girl from Dnepropetrovsk left a peculiar remark about the resemblance between Syhiv and her own district at the Lviv Internet forum⁹. Soviet residential districts are alike all around Ukraine and sub-cultures of these districts have certain similarities. This feeling of similarity and commonality can be used to cover dramatic differences between Ukrainian regions. Another great narrative which can be somehow connected with Syhiv is Central Europe.



Of course, at first sight, there is nothing in common between Milan Kundera's ideas about countries, which used to think that they are in the West, but one morning realized that they are in the East. Syhiv is not a part of the discussion about Central Europe, because this discussion concerns the heritage of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, traditions of peaceful coexisting of different ethnic groups, multiculturalism and the ancient history of the region. The Central European myth is central for tourist rebranding of the region and is the base used to manage the cultural heritage of historical downtowns. But the

problems of post-Soviet (post-socialist) residential and industrial areas are also common for all Central European cities. These areas are thought unimportant in relation to histori-

cal downtowns and their problems often remain unrecognized by city officials (Syhiv in Lviv, Nowa Huta in Krakow, and Novy Belgrade in Belgrade etc.).

Central European and multiculturalism talks exist at the level of the official and intellectual narrative¹⁰. It is interesting to trace how this ideology is perceived by Lviv dwellers through the popular culture. Popular signs of Lviv's streets, namely, graffiti and inscriptions, tell a different story about the contemporary culture of the old city. Graffiti are spread everywhere, both in the city center and in sleeping districts. Attitude to them differs depending on the cultural formation which caused their rise. During the times of close attention to and concern in certain historical heritage inscriptions in Polish and Jewish become objects of great interest. These inscriptions appeared as signs of previous times, showing through the old stucco. Usually these are names of goods that were sold in small shops and some advertisements. The most famous example is a contemporary luxury shoe store 'Godasse' which used renovated inscriptions in its exterior design. Owners of shops, restaurants, and caf  s try to use these signs of antiquity for commercial reasons. It shall be mentioned that there are no present-day inscriptions in Polish or Jewish in Lviv. The presence of these particular ethnic groups is more tangible in the media discourse where one using the example of *Godasse shoe store* can discuss disadvantages or incorrect use of Jewish or Polish historical heritage. There is a controversial issue concerning the idea of Lviv being a 'Polish city' in Polish and local media but no protest graffiti like 'Lviv for Poles' can be found on city walls.



Tags

The English-language inscriptions connected with rap and graffiti subcultures dominate everywhere. The variety of slogans, graffiti and other inscriptions, which cover old historical walls as well as blocks like a queer carpet, demonstrates an original marginal cultural phenomenon. Graffiti-culture turned by younger generations into an artistically valued phenomenon demonstrates how familiar and comfortable their creators are with their own city. They used city walls for their personal expression which remains much

more meaningful for them than for outsiders. Graffiti-artists rarely appeal to any values beyond their own subculture. The use of Cyrillic letters or Ukrainian words in tags and graffiti can serve as good supporting examples. But even in such cases the artists do not appeal to any political issues although this kind of inscription is also popular in Lviv's streets.




A rich variety of nationalist political slogans and statements can be found in Lviv. Usually they are directed against or support some politicians and political forces (a lot of such inscriptions appeared during the Orange Revolution in 2004). City walls have traces even of some folk traditions, for instance, there are inscriptions like 'Andrija-2003' dedicated to the ancient tradition of St. Andrew's day celebration that was transformed in modern

urban culture. Some inscriptions reflect modern urban rituals and customs, namely, inscriptions like "Oxana, I love you" on the pavement under Oxana's windows or "Graduation 1999" on the walls of some educational institution or near it.

A separate group of inscriptions can be connected with the problems of the official myth making and false multiculturalism imposed on the city. These are xenophobia inscriptions of all kinds calling for death of different social groups such as "Death to Russians", "Death to Jews" (in both cases the slang names of these ethnic groups were used), "Death to punks", "Death to gopniki", etc. Anti-Russian inscriptions confront anti-Ukrainian ones. There are two centers for such wall fights, namely, the Russian Cultural Center and the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalist office. False multiculturalism, which pays no attention to the real configuration of Lviv population, leads to local chauvinism and xenophobia.

Community services usually pay little attention to inscriptions. They can be completely or partially removed or changed by other city dwellers. For instance, the inscription "Death to Jews" was partly covered, however, while the word "Jews" was painted over the word "Death" was left.

The picture shows gallows with David's star inside; later David's star was replaced by swastika.



There are also funny examples such as the inscription “Dyakovych gomik” (“Dyakovych is gay”) widespread in Lviv (in fact no one knows who is Dyakovych). In some of the offensive inscriptions one letter was changed by someone from “g” to “r”, turning the inscription into “Dyakovych romik” (this means that Dyakovych’s first name is “Roman”).

Popular signs on city walls are more about xenophobia and a strong nationalist mood rather than about the celebration of multiculturalism and feeling of belonging to Central Europe. Multiplicity of phenomena shows that there are no clear and permanent



contradictions between *two* oppositions. Interrelations between ideologies and alternative narratives are in conflict with each other but they exist rather in parallel realities. Even in case with gallows it looks like a game, not like a war.

During the Soviet times the interrelation between ideologies (for example, Communism and religion) was at the level of repression. In public space it was revealed in the non-religious use of religious buildings and the confrontation of visual signs of ideologies situated close to each other. For example, a big religious complex on the bank of the Dnieper river in Kyiv, “Pecherska Lavra” could not be simply destroyed as it is a historical heritage of great importance. A huge statue of Mother-land (Rodina-mat’) was erected near Lavra in 1981. It was much taller than the church. The message is clear: a taller Soviet monument declared the triumph of communist ideology. There are some similar tendencies in the Ukrainian public space, namely to impose national ideology using names of streets, monuments and celebrations. I have even heard a story that in the 1990s a part of the sword of Rodina-mat’ was removed to make the Soviet monument shorter than Lavra’s bell tower. If it really happened, then it was an attempt of new political forces to use religion or, possibly, religion used the state to confirm its own importance?

A lot of cultural signs and markers exist in public space simultaneously. They are signs of subcultures, ethnic groups, religious confessions, etc with nobody prohibiting them. It is obvious that Soviet heritage was completely excluded from the image of Lviv. That was made not just due to some ideological reasons as such silence was used to sell and transform post-Soviet industrial areas situated almost in the city center into commercial centers without any thorough control of the community. But Soviet heritage is still quite influential in other (Central or Eastern) cities. Lenin’s monuments were not removed and Lenin’s streets were not renamed in Donetsk or Dnepropetrovsk. Semiotics of the cityscape presupposes a certain kind of historical memory. It is important to know how local

people, especially the youth, perceive these messages, and how they can adjust it to the culture of other Ukrainian regions.



Rodina-mat' and Lavra

(photo taken from <http://www.ljplus.ru/img/d/a/dalaz/Kiev04.jpg>)

Ukrainian public space and culture can differ inside not only one city but also inside the whole country. Most studies of Ukrainian culture are influenced by different ideological purposes, for instance, to construct some national identity, to find a basis for a political nation or to divide Ukraine into regions with incompatible cultures. Ukraine as a borderland experiences influence of different cultural formations and political forces. This country is under the influence of the European Union, global mass culture and consumerism, Russian politics, Eastern and Western Christian churches. It also has its post-Soviet specificity and historical memory about a long way to national independence. There are original traditions and rites of ethnic Ukrainian culture transformed by modern life challenges. Contemporary Ukrainian culture is an unstable mixture of political ideologies, cultural narratives and subcultural representations, which can be changed in a moment. The absence of the main doctrine has resulted in cultural diversity and transformation processes often inspired by local people. Lviv case shows how narratives can differ from one another: an official doctrine from intellectual writings, a tourist myth from the point of view of local dwellers, etc.

When observing Ukrainian public space one can enjoy an interactive multiplicity of official ideologies and alternative narratives, which form specific Ukrainian identity. Of course, all these examples which I have described above are just some comments concerning certain phenomena. But some phenomena couldn't be seen anywhere else except the public space and every day culture. They are spheres that often remain without any attention. It is worthwhile mentioning that due to a low level of attention the public space is still public, serving as a place of meetings and communications with Another. Ukrainian

public space isn't divided into sterile zones of the middle class and ghettos for marginals. It still contains a great mixture of contexts and democratic potential for the freedom of speech for everyone.

Notes

- 1 Brief history of Lviv in English can be found at http://www.history.ucsb.edu/projects/holocaust/Resources/history_of_lviv.htm. A perfect study of Lviv's multiculturalism was done by Yaroslav Hrytsak: Lviv: A Multicultural History through the Centuries, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Volume XXIV (1/4), 2000, Lviv: A City in the Crosscurrents of Culture.
- 2 Lvovskaya pravda, August 9, 1981. Translation of the article's author.
- 3 V.Vujcyk, R.Lypka. An Encounter with Lvov. – Lviv, 1987.
- 4 Information from the Verhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) official web-site <http://gska2.rada.gov.ua:7777/pls/z7502/A005?rdat1=10.10.2006&rf7571=21690>
- 5 http://visnyk.iatp.org.ua/dev/cat_article;308
- 6 <http://posmixator.livejournal.com/170359.html>
- 7 http://www.leopolis.lviv.net/ukr/evening/evening_3.htm
- 8 <http://www8.city-adm.lviv.ua/info/vgz.nsf/Comments/FC832CA2346D1D97C22572D-B0053A0DC>
- 9 <http://misto.ridne.net/viewthread.php?tid=3182>
- 10 29 volume of «І» magazine can be considered as an example <http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n29texts/N29-lviv.htm>, the same topic was discovered in Krytyka, 7-8 (57-58)/2002, <http://krytyka.kiev.ua/showissue.php?id=86>.

LITVINISM, WEST-RUSSISM AND THE BELARUSIAN IDEA. THE XIXth – THE BEGINNING OF THE XXth CENTURY

One of priority directions of historiography of the Republic of Belarus is the study of the evolution of Belarusian movement and the formation of national idea. Efforts of Belarusian researchers at the turn of the XXth–XXI st century were quite fruitful. Works of Aleksey Kavko, Jury Turonok, Mikhas' Bich, Stanislav Rudovich, Oleg Latyshonok, Evgeny Mironovich, Paul Tereshkovich, Sergey Tokt' have considerably deepened the knowledge of the process of the Belarusian national-cultural Revival in the widest understanding of this concept. But attempts to construct a conceptual scheme of the Belarusian national movement development and the working out of the Belarusian national idea during the XIXth – the beginning of the XXth centuries deserve special attention.

Firstly, we shall remind of the scheme offered by Aleksey Kavko in the encyclopedic article *Belaruskі natsyjanalna-vyzvalenchy rub*¹ (1993). The author has identified two main stages of the Belarusian movement, namely, “the initial subconscious movement “in itself”, realized basically within the limits of the Polish national-liberation process (1794–1863)”, and the movement “for itself” with the understanding of actually Belarusian national interests and aspiration to its own statehood (1864–1918). Unfortunately, this concept did not become the subject of discussion.

The book of Polish researcher Ryshard Radzik *Międzyczlorowości etniczna a uspylnota narodowa. Białorusini na tle przemian narodowych w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej XIX stulecia* (Lublin, 2000) became an important step in the study of the problem. However, it did not lead to any heated discussion though it shall be worthwhile to mention the review by Evgeny Mironovich who paid attention to the absence in the author's list of the Belarusian Revival initiators of representatives of the local orthodox elite². It is also necessary

to mention the book by Igor Marzaljuk *Ljudzi dauniaj Belarusi: etnakanfesijnnya i satsyjakulturnyja stereatipy (X–XVII st.)* (Magileu, 2003). The author does not believe that the nation is the product of the European modernization epoch. According to I. Marzaljuk, “the concept of the nation united by “blood and ground”, common language and culture possessing historical traditions of actually “Russian “statehood” starts to form in the XVIth century in the environment of Rusin intellectual elite³. Igor Marzaljuk considers belonging to a confession the major factor of ethnic self-identification. In his opinion, acceptance of Catholicism meant breaking away from the old Belarusian ethnos and full (“mental and language”) Polonization or Lithuanization⁴. However, this confessional restriction does not allow to understand the subsequent (XIX century) participation of representatives of Catholic gentry in the process of the Belarusian idea formation⁵.

My own research of the political activity of Lithuanian and Belarusian Poles in the last fifty years of history of the Russian empire, the desire to understand the place and role of “the Polish question” in Belarusian history has forced me to analyze the ethnocultural situation on Belarusian lands during the whole of the XIXth century. Accordingly, a certain scheme of development of the Belarusian idea, presented in the monograph *Pamizb kraiovastsju i natsyjanalnaj idejaj ...* has been developed⁶. Several concepts have been used including “**the Litvin tradition**” introduced into the field of science by Svetlana Kul’-Sel’verstova⁷, “**the West-Russian tradition**” and “**the Belarusian cultural accumulation**”. The latter meant those **events of the cultural life which encouraged penetration of the elite of the Belarusian language into culture and formed independent historical consciousness**. At that stage certain cultural base for the development of the national movement for the cultural and political emancipation was being created.

I shall remind you of the major moments of the offered scheme and shall try to inform about those variants of the Belarusian national idea which were developed at the beginning of the XXth century.

In the first half of the XIXth century the Belarusian cultural accumulation occurred within the limits of **Litvin traditions**. Litvinism was based on the historical and cultural traditions of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and on a certain tendency of democratization which expressed itself in its interest in national culture, on the realization of its ethnocultural difference both from Russians and from Poles from ethnic Poland. Litvinism was a part of Rzechpospolita patriotism though at the same time it had a high degree of autonomy. If one is to look at the confessional beliefs then the majority of representatives of this tradition belonged to the Catholic Church, and by their class status they belonged to the gentry. Literary and publicist essays written within the limits of this tradition were created mainly in the Polish, Lithuanian and Belarusian languages. The written Belarusian language used the Latin alphabet. Vilno was the center of Litvin traditions.

Vilno university professors in the first third of the XIXth century became the founders of the Belarusian cultural accumulation. Works of M. Bobrovsky, I. Danilovich, J. Jaroshevich, I. Lobjko contributed to the formation of independent Litvin historical memory.

Fraternities of filomats and filarets were set up partially under their influence. Traditions of this historiography were continued by Tyshkevich brothers, T. Narbut and A. Kirkor. In literature Adam Mickiewicz is considered to be one of the brightest representatives of Litvin traditions. We shall also mention the creative work of J. Barshchevsky, J. Chechot, A. Rypinsky, L. Kondratovich (Vladislav Syrokomlya) and V. Dunin-Martsinkevich. This list is incomplete without Vikentij Konstantin (Kastus') Kalinovsky (1838 – 1864). His texts analysis allows to state that we deal with the display of Litvinism, at least, in the political sphere.

Simultaneously anti-Polish policy of the Russian authorities encouraged the formation **of the West-Russian cultural tradition** which also promoted the process of the Belarusian cultural accumulation. Characteristic features of this tradition include the understanding of Belarus's uniqueness as "Western Russia", the appeal to historical traditions of the Polotsk princedom, high appreciation of the role of the Orthodox Church in the history of "West-Russian lands", anti-Polishness and anti-Catholicism. By their confessional belief the majority of representatives of the West-Russian tradition belonged to the Uniat church and after 1839 became the believers of the Orthodox Church. Many belonged to Orthodox clergy, held state or military posts or were somehow connected with the Russian magnates. Literary and publicist essays were written both in Russian and in Belarusian. The Belarusian language mostly called "the West-Russian dialect" used the Cyrillic alphabet. The West-Russian tradition developed mainly in Gomel and Mogilyov regions in the first half of the XIXth century. A. Tsvikevich called its representatives "Belarusophiles" in Russian culture⁷⁸. They include Archbishop Stanislav Bogush-Sestrantsevich, the author of the historical work *O Zapadnoj Rossii* (Mogilyov, 1793) and of the first hypothetical Belarusian grammar book⁹, archeograph Ivan Grigorovich, historians Michael Bez-Kornilovich and Osip Turchinovich, ethnographer and philologist Paul Shpilevsky, the author of the written in Cyrillics book *Kratkaja grammatika belorusskogo narechij* (1846), etc.

Events of the first half of the 60s of the XIXth century rendered strong influence on further evolution of the process of the Belarusian cultural accumulation. Abolition of serfdom (1861) and revolt in 1863 considerably accelerated the process of certain society democratization. Manifest on February 19th, 1861 severely affected its class structure. The revolt led to the political activization of social lower classes irrespective of what party they supported. It also accelerated the process of liquidation of serfdom. In the spring of 1863 the authorities, being afraid of the revolt expansion allowed the peasants of Belarusian-Lithuanian territories to redeem the land and purposefully allocated a state credit. However, this peculiar society modernization occurred in the conditions of Russification policy. Actually, the only opportunity for legal public work was the participation in this policy. Some part of Belarusian lower classes took an advantage of it while the majority of the local gentry made a different choice.

After the revolt's rout there came a fast reorientation of politically Polonized Litvins. Earlier when there was an opportunity for legal social-cultural work for the sake of Be-

larus and Lithuania, a certain type of public workers (Adam Kirkor, Eustachy Tyszkiewicz, etc.) was formed. After the revolt legal opportunities for such work disappeared. The majority of representatives of local Polonized elite directed their efforts toward Poland and its cultural needs. The Litvin tradition was also weakened by full Russification of the official education system and the interdiction to use the Latin alphabet for publications in the Polish, Lithuanian and Belarusian (1859) languages.

Meanwhile Russian authorities actively played “the Belarusian card”. Governmental statistics and maps alongside with the names “Great Russians” and “Little Russians” used the term “Byelorussians” („Belarusians”)¹⁰. The use of the term “Byelorussia” was extended. In 1869 authorities allowed to print ethnographic collections in the Belarusian language using “grazhdanka” (the Cyrillic alphabet). In the 60s – 70s of the XIXth century the so called “theory of West-Russism” was developed with the active participation of official circles. According to it, Belarus was a cultural and state part of Russia, and Belarusians were a branch of the Russian ethnos. Historian M. Kojalovich in his works proved that Ukraine and Belarus historically are an integral part of Russia both territorially and ethnically. Ethnographic features of Belarusian lands were predetermined by the Polish influence and were to be liquidated. This particular feature made the theory essentially different from the West-Russian cultural tradition.

West-Russism was to be strengthened by numerous scientific studies of the national culture of Belarusians widely spread in the 60s – 70s of the XIXth century due to the support of the government. Scientists (I. Nosovich, M. Dmitriev, J. Krachkovsky, A. Sementovsky, etc.) really aspired to it. However, in reality their research only confirmed the existence of an independent Belarus ethnos.

Raskazy na belorusskom narechii (1863) merits special attention. Oleg Latyshonok, the author of the full publication of “*Raskazy*” in the modern Belarusian press and comments to the book believes that it was the first attempt “to set out the national Belarusian idea in the textbook which had to pass the Russian censorship”¹¹. Historian emphasized that the Polotsk state is treated as independent of the Kiev Rus’, that the author¹² practically does not mention the Moscow state, and that the text proclaims the independence of the Belarusian people (“... we ourselves are a very special people: Byelorussians”¹³). Besides it was the first historical sketch written in the Belarusian language. Probably, *Raskazy* was also one of the first documents that witnessed to the gradual registration **of the Belarusian cultural tradition**. The process of the Belarusian cultural accumulation that was happening within the limits of the Litvin and West-Russian cultural traditions laid the foundation for the Belarusian cultural tradition which in a certain sense was a combination of Litvinism and the West-Russian tradition.

The birth of the Belarusian cultural tradition was accompanied by its attempt to break into “the political territory”. At the end of the 70s – the beginning of the 80s of the XIXth centuries Belarus narodniks (populists) for the first time introduced their theoretical substantiation of the existence of Belarusians as “a separate branch of a Slavonic tribe”. Key parameters of Belarusianness consisted of climate, geography, economy, ethnography and

the Belarusian language which was believed to be the purest Slavonic dialect. Narodniks claimed that the Belarusian people feels its organic cultural unity and distinguishes its interests from Polish and Great Russian interests¹⁴.

The authors of publications in the legal newspaper "Minsky Listok" ("The Minsk Leaf") which was the center of the grouping of Belarusian moderate liberals also defended the idea of Belarusians' independence. This newspaper published articles devoted to the Belarusian ethnography, archeology, language and history. For instance, M. Dovnar-Zapolsky in a series of articles "Belorusskoe Proshloe" (1888) proved the existence of the Belarusian nation emphasizing the uniqueness of the Belarusian history and language. The Belarusian language was frequently used in literary publications¹⁵. M. Dovnar-Zapolsky later also marked "the national spirit"¹⁶ of numerous publications of "Vitebskie Vedomosti" ("The Vitebsk Bulletin") (the 80s–90s of the XIXth century).

The formation of the Belarusian cultural tradition was greatly influenced by the literary activity of Francishak Bahushevish (1840 – 1900). In the foreword to the collection *Dudka Belaruskaya* (Krakow, 1891) the poet proclaimed the existence of the independent and high-grade Belarusian language, outlined the territory of its distribution, and warned, that the loss of the native language will lead to the disappearance of the Belarusian ethnos. The poet proudly spoke about the past of Belarus when it together with Lithuania fought against crusaders' invasions, and after the formation of Gedymin empire Belarus found itself in the middle of Lithuania like "a grain in a nut"¹⁷. For the first time this foreword named all ethnic Belarusian lands "Belarus". There are all reasons to consider Belarusians narodniks and F. Bahushevich "pioneers" of the Belarusian national-cultural Revival¹⁸. The latter can rightfully be named one of those "philological instigators" whose role in national processes was highly estimated by B. Anderson¹⁹.

Characteristic features of the Belarusian tradition include original religious indifference of its representatives which bypassed the problem of the confessional split of the Belarusian ethnos and addressed all Belarusians irrespective of their religious beliefs. Representatives of the Belarusian tradition belonged both to the Catholic gentry-peasant and to Orthodox intellectual-peasant environment. Texts were written mainly in the Belarusian language both in the Cyrillic ("grazhdanka") and Latin alphabets. Vilno was the first center of this tradition but already at the beginning of the XXth century it was joined by Minsk.

The Belarusian national idea²⁰ was being developed as early as the XXth century. Several variants of this idea existed at the beginning of the century. A significant role in it was played by first Belarusian political organizations, namely the Belarusian Revolutionary Party founded by Vaclav Ivanovsky and the Belarusian Revolutionary Hramada. However, Jury Turonak expressed an opinion that both these organizations were more like an intellectual club rather than a political organization²¹. The formation of the first Belarusian political party was encouraged by the revolution of 1905–1907. The name of this party was the Belarusian Socialist Hramada. It was a socialist party of the left-narodnik type. At the second congress (January 1906) it proclaimed itself the party of "the working poor of the Belarusian land without the distinction of nationalities". The narodnik appeal "The

working poor of all countries, get united!” was approved as a party motto²². The Belarusian Socialist Hramada (BSH) offered the first variant of the Belarusian national idea which was published in the newspaper “Nasha Dolya” (“Our Lot”). In the program article of the first issue²³ of the newspaper (9/1/1906) the editors promised to fight for social and national freedom, for education in the Belarusian language, for the Revival of Belarus treated according to the principles of socialist ideology. Questions of class struggle played the prime role. “Nasha Dolya” showed the essence of the Belarusian national idea it being the social liberation of the Belarusian poor from the Russian tsarism and landowners. The national component of the Belarusian idea itself was viewed as a means of social mobilization of the Belarusian peasantry for political struggle. In fact, an attempt to formulate **a socialist variant of the national idea** was made. As is well-known, the newspaper did not exist for long. It was prohibited in December 1906.

Even before its closing the editorial staff split up. Some employees (including Lutskevich brothers) moved to more liberal positions, hoping to use the political changes brought by the revolution. They also initiated the publication of a new weekly journal “Nasha Niva” (“Our Field”) which for 9 years (1906–1915) was the center of the Belarusian national life.

The “Nasha Niva” variant of the Belarusian national idea dealt mainly with the destiny of the Belarusian language and education in the Belarusian language²⁴. “Nasha Niva” propagandized the idea of teaching Religion (catechization) in the mother tongue²⁵ and its use in Roman-Catholic church and Orthodox Church as the language for additional religious services²⁶.

The newspaper aspired to enhance the social prestige of the Belarusian language, reminding readers that in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania this language possessed the status of the state language and was used to write laws²⁷. Its authors propagandized the idea of the mother tongue sanctity for each Belarusian and called to respect and protect it expressing optimism and belief in the success of the Belarusian idea. “Nasha Niva” regularly informed about new Belarusian books and, first of all, about textbooks written in the mother tongue. Pages of the newspaper helped to form lexical and grammar norms of the new Belarusian literary language. It is no wonder that Zakhar Shybeko in *Narys gistoryi Belarusi... called it “a linguistic academy”*²⁸.

One of the newspaper’s permanent authors was Mechislav Bobrovich (pseudonym *Lyavon Gmyrak*) who gave the following definition of the nation: “the Nation is made of the people who speak one language and feel related to each other; recognize their mother tongue and culture”²⁹.

“Nasha Niva” gave a lot of attention to such an important component of national consciousness as historical memory. Ideologists of the Belarusian movement understood, that the realization by the Belarusian people (first of all, the elite) and its neighbors of the independent place of Belarusians in history to some degree guarantees that the nation will become the subject of a modern political and national life. In 1910 the newspaper published Vaclav Lastovsky’s *Karotkaja gistoryja Belarusi* which was the first attempt to

comprehend the past of the Belarusian land and its people from **the Belarusian point of view**. The author tried to show actual Belarusian contribution to history and, for example, characterized Polonization as self-identification with Poland. For the first time in historiography Belarusians were treated as the main people of the area defining its historical destiny.

It is possible to assert then, that “Nasha Niva” actively spread **an ethnic-language variant of national ideology**, the central place in which belonged to the preservation and development of the mother tongue and expansion of its use in education, religion and political life.

At the same time the characteristic feature of publications in “Nasha Niva” was criticism of all kinds of chauvinism, including Belarusian chauvinism. For instance, the newspaper proclaimed that only a mentally deranged or blinded by false patriotism person can hate Poles because they are Poles or Russians because they are Russians³⁰.

A high level of tolerance of the “Nasha Niva” environment was, probably, caused by the fact that there appeared one more variant of national ideology spread among the Belarusian elite. Its rise was connected with the political activity of Lithuanian and Belarusian Poles. It was them who helped to develop the basis of the so-called “krajowa ideologija” (“local area ideology” or “Regionalism”) during the revolution period of 1905–1907. Its founders (Michal Romer, Roman Skirmunt, Constance Skirmunt and Boleslav Jalovetsky) represented that part of the local Polish public which preserved the traditions of the state and cultural independence of the former GDL lands. They felt themselves citizens of the Great Duchy of Lithuania rather than Poland declaring the GDL their native land. The idea of a state or civil nation formed the basis of the “Regionalism” concept. According to Krajowcy (“Regionalism” concept supporters), everyone who felt himself the citizen of the local area, belonged to the regional nation (often it was called “the nation of Litvins”). Krajowcy believed that ethnic and cultural distinctions did not play such a big role. In a certain sense this Regionalism continued the tradition of Litvinism. Regional ideology consisted of two wings with the democratic one headed by Michal Romer (1880–1945), and the conservative-liberal wing formed mainly by Roman Skirmunt (1868–1939).

Due to contacts between democratic Polish Krajowcy (representatives of Regional ideology) and figures of the Belarusian movement Belarusian politicians began to popularize the regional idea. The first name that comes to mind in connection with this is the name of Lutskevich brothers. They initiated the carrying out of an unusual Belarusian publishing project, namely, the publication of a daily newspaper in Russian and a weekly journal in Polish³¹. In 1912 “Vechernyaja Gazeta” (“The Evening Newspaper”) soon accompanied by “Kurier Krajowy” (“Regional Courier”) began to be published in Vilno. Publishers and editors of these liberally-democratic editions consisted of Belarusians, including Lutskevich brothers. But the origin of new Vilno newspapers was a secret kept from the wide public.

The term “grazhdanin kraja” (“citizen of the local area”), a key element in the state (civil) nation concept was frequently mentioned by “Kurier” and “Vechernyaja Gazeta”.

Authors of publications proved, that all questions vital for the area should be solved in view of interests of all ethnoses of Belarus and Lithuania³²; they condemned Great Russian and Great Polish chauvinism³³, declared the necessity to fight chauvinism among Belarusians and Lithuanians³⁴, etc. A. Lutskevich urged all “citizens of the area” to work for the welfare of the area and for the welfare of the oppressed people. The above mentioned Belarusian newspapers were ideological competitors of “Nasha Niva”. They propagandized the democratic direction of Regional ideology or **the democratic variant of ideology of the “state” type nation**.

However, the regional position of “Vechernyaja Gazeta” and “Kurier Krajowy” can hardly be considered a separate variant of the Belarusian national idea. Available sources analysis allows to speak about **the exclusively pragmatical** use of regional ideology by Belarusians which allowed to considerably expand the social and ethnocultural base of ideology propaganda of the Belarusian Revival. This ideology created excellent opportunities for the establishment of relations with representatives of other national movements. In fact, the regional idea was a way to strengthen the positions of Belarusians in a national-cultural and political life. For instance, the absence of prospects of further development of the Polish movement in the Belarus-Lithuania area was used to explain the propaganda of the necessity to establish mutual understanding between Poles and Belarusians³⁵. Heads of the Belarusian movement were convinced that Lithuanian and Belarusian Poles are exclusive successors of Polonized Lithuanians and Belarusians. Accordingly, the conclusion was that the Polish public should work only for the sake of development of consciousness and culture of Belarusians and Lithuanians. “Belarusian deviation” of regional ideology of Anton Lutskevich and other figures of the “Nasha Niva” environment is quite obvious.

However, the conservative-liberal direction of regional ideology became an ideological basis for the development of **a conservative variant** of the Belarusian national idea. Roman Skirmunt, one of the main ideologists of this regional direction, played a great role in it. He differed from the majority of conservative Krajowcy because of his expressive liberalism in political issues and because of his aspiration to publicly distance himself from Polishness as a national-political category.

Already in 1907 Roman Skirmunt initiated the creation of the interethnic Regional union as a conservative-liberal party the structure of which should include an independent Belarusian political organization (alongside with Polish and Lithuanian ones). Yet such a party was not founded as the majority of land owners who were from Lithuanian and Belarusian Poles and who supported the initiative of R. Skirmunt, perceived regional ideology only as a means to protect their own property in the conditions of fast radicalization of social relations and aggravation of national relations.

Still, R. Skirmunt’s regional ideas and post-revolutionary liberalization of the “Nasha Niva” environment representatives alongside with their sympathies for regional ideology encouraged the establishment of contacts between them. Historical literature contains some data proving that during the interrevolutionary period through the mediation of princess Magdalena Radzivill there were meetings and negotiations between R. Skirmunt,

on the one hand, and Lutskevich brothers, V. Ivanovsky and A. Vlasov, on the other³⁶. Certain mutual understanding was reached and it allowed to provide for, at least, financial support of cultural initiatives of the former BSH members.

Roman Skirmunt did not give up his attempts to create the Belarusian conservative or conservative-liberal party. V. Gadlevsky said that in the spring of 1917 he tried to organize “the Belarusian Landowners’ Party” and to involve representatives of former magnate clans in the work to be done for the welfare of Belarus³⁷. In February 1918 he almost reached his goal having founded in Minsk the Belarusian People’s Representation. It was a political party in opposition to the Hramada National secretariat. However, the situation was tragic because R. Skirmunt could not find mass support of his political position in Belarus. As Evsey Kancher noted in 1918 lower classes did not want to follow Skirmunt and among the propertied classes there were very few organized people who considered themselves Belarusians³⁸.

In 1913 the development of one more variant of the Belarusian national idea began. It was named “**clerical-patriotic**” by Anton Lutskevich³⁹. In the program article of the first issue of the newspaper “Belarus” the editors declared, that “they would always stand on Christian-Catholic ground, protecting the cause of Christianity and Belarussianness”, respecting other nationalities and religious beliefs⁴⁰.

This variant of the national idea was quite peculiar as it united national culture, education and Christian belief. The newspaper popularized the development of national consciousness among Belarusians-Catholics, encouraged Catholic clergy to use the Belarusian language in religious services, and was aimed at social harmony and an evolutionary way of society development. This is what newspaper editor Boleslav Pachobka wrote in one of his articles: “The true Belarusian is the one who says: I am Belarusian, I love my fatherland and mother tongue and I work as much I can for the sake of it”⁴¹. In another article he justified the necessity to introduce the Belarusian language into the Catholic Church and to use literature published in the Belarusian language in the carrying out of religious services⁴². The editors called upon Belarusians to become active in their historic creativity, defended the idea of the Belarusian national unity of Orthodoxes and Catholics, and fought with Russification and Polonization of Belarusians⁴³.

The publication of “Belarus” was an attempt **to connect Christian Democratic ideology with the Belarusian national movement and the ethnic-language variant of the Belarusian national idea.**

In conclusion it is necessary to note, that the Belarusian national idea was developed on the basis of the Belarusian cultural tradition. Both “Litvins” and “Western Russians” contributed to its creation. The Belarusian national-cultural Revival at the beginning of the XXth century developed a characteristic typical of the majority of nations in Central and Eastern Europe. National ideology was dominated by the ethnic-language variant which was consistently popularized and defended by “Nasha Niva”. However, the aspiration of Belarusians to leave the borders of this is quite remarkable. Under the powerful influence of Polish and Russian cultures Belarusian politicians actively used opportunities

of the state (civil) variant of national ideology (democratic and conservative-liberal directions of regional ideology) for social and national cultural mobilization of the population. Politicians also searched for opportunities to unite the Belarusian idea with socialist and conservative ideological concepts. However, these attempts proved to be ineffective. There was no state that could unite all the ethnoses of the local area into the Belarusian nation of the state type. The majority of Catholic and Orthodox clergy got involved in the Russian-Polish struggle for the so-called “Northwestern territory” and “Eastern Polish remote territories”, and the proletariat and bourgeoisie realizing their own Belarusian identity, practically did not exist. In those conditions the ethnic-language variant of the Belarusian movement national ideology did not have any alternative.

*Translated from Belarusian
by Frants Korzun*

Notes

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- ² Białoruskie zeszyty historyczne. 2002. 17. S. 294.
- ³ Marzaljuk I. Ljudzi dauniaj Belarusi: etnakanfesijnaja i satsyjakulturnaja stereatypy (X–XVII st.). Magileu, 2003. S. 285.
- ⁴ Ibid. S. 286.
- ⁵ The book by Marzaljuk was thoroughly analyzed in the review by Gennady Saganovich. See Saganovich Pryvid natsyi u imgle stereatypa // Belaruski gistorychny aglyad. Volume 10. Sshytki 1-2 (18-19). snezhan' 2003. S. 281–318.
- ⁶ Smalianchuk A. Da pytannya ab roli palitychnaj ideologii i razvittsi belaruskaga natsyjanalnaga ruhu 19 – pachatku 20 st. // Gistorychny almanac. 1999. volume 2. S. 3-19; Ibid. Pamizh krajovastsju i natsyjanalnaj idejaj. Polski ruh na belaruskich i litouskich zemlyah. 1864-1917 g. Grodna, 2001, 320 s.; Ibid. Pamizh krajovastsju i natsyjanalnaj idejaj. Polski ruh na belaruskich i litouskich zemlyah. 1864 ljuty 1917 g. Vyd. 2, daprat.. Sankt-Petsyarburg, 2004, 402 s.
- ⁷ Kul'-Syal'verstava S. Asablivastsi farmavannaja belaruskaj natsyjanalnaj kultury u kantsy XVIII – pershyja dzesyatsigoddzi XIX st.: pamizh polskaj i litsvinskaj tradytsyjami // Polska-belaruskaja mounyja, litaraturnyja, gistorychnyja i kulturnyja suvyazi / Pad red. M. Kandratsjuka. II. Materyjaly VII mizhnarodnaj navukovaj kanferentsyi “Shlyah da uzaemnasti”. Belastok. 16-18.07.1999. Belastok, 2000.
- ⁸ Tsvikevich «Western-Russism». Narysy z gistoryi gramadzkej mysli na Belarusi XIX i pachatku XX v. Minsk, 1993. S. 54.
- ⁹ Hauratovich I. Bogush-Sestrantsevich Stanislau Ivanavich. (3.9.1731-1.12.1826) // Myslitseli i asvetniki. Entsyklapedychny davednik. Minsk, 1995. S. 185.
- ¹⁰ Tokt' S. Natsyjatvorchyja pratsesy na Garadzshchynje 19 – pachatku 20 st. // Gistorychny almanac. 2001. Tom 6. S. 166.
- ¹¹ Latyshonak A. Gutarka “tsarkounaga starasty Yanki” z “Yas'kam gaspadaram z-pad Vilni” // Dzeyaslou. 9 (2). 2004. S. 199.

- ¹² O.Latyshonok assumes that teacher and writer Ignat Kulakovskiy is a possible author of Raskazy (1800–1870).
- ¹³ Latyshonak A. Gutarka “tsarkounaga starasty Yanki” ... S. 211.
- ¹⁴ See, e.g., Radzik R. Petsjarburgski_ “Goman” jak pachynalnik belaruskaj natsyjanalnaj idej u XIX st. // Natsyjanalnyja pytanni. Materyjaly III Mizhnarodnaga kangresa belaruskaja “Belaruskaja kultura u dyjalogu tsyvilizatsyji”. Minsk, 2001. S. 76–86.
- ¹⁵ Dounar-Zapolsky M. Gistoryja Belarusi. Minsk, 1994. S. 396–397.
- ¹⁶ Ibid. S. 398.
- ¹⁷ Bahushevich F. Tvory / Ukl. Ya. Yanushkevich. Minsk, 1998. S. 22.
- ¹⁸ By the way, a certain crisis in the 80s of the XIXth century was already marked by A. Lutskevich in the article devoted to the Belarusian national movement and written for the Ukrainian press in 1910 (1911?): “ ... During the whole XIX century we see attempts to revive the Belarusian written language; but only those of them which took place in the 80s, are in direct connection with the modern work done for the revival of the Belarusian people now, and all previous ones are pure ethnography. It is also true that the first hot appeal to preserve all that is native, to love “the fatherland – Belarus”, the “simple language” was made by poet-populist F. Bahushevich in the 80s” (Anton Lutskevich pra belaruskaje Adradzhenne pachatku XX st. // Gistarychny almanac. 1998. 1. S. 67).
- ¹⁹ Anderson B. Voobrazhaemye soobshchestva. Razmyshlenija ob istokah i rasprostranienii natsyonalizma. Moskva, 2001. P. 106.
- ²⁰ The concept “the Belarusian national idea” is treated as “the idea of existence of specifically Belarusian nation” following the ideas of O. Latyshonok (Latyshonak A. Belaruskaja natsyjanalnaja ideja// Svitsyaz’. 1994. 2. S. 30).
- ²¹ Turonek J. Waclaw Iwanowski i odrodzenie Białorusi. Warszawa, 1992. S. 25–34.
- ²² Bich M. Belaruskaje Adradzhenne XIX – pachatku XX st. Gistarychnyja asablivasti i uzaemaadnosiny z inshymi narodami. Minsk, 1993. S. 17.
- ²³ Anton Lutskevich in the already mentioned article wrote: “The day of the first issue publication was like a celebration of the Belarusian idea” (Anton Lutskevich pra belaruskaje Adradzhenne pachatku XX st. S. 68).
- ²⁴ See, e.g.: Nasha Niva. – 1906. - 1, 7.
- ²⁵ Nasha Niva. 1914. 7.
- ²⁶ Nasha Niva. 1908. 17; 1914. 20.
- ²⁷ Nasha Niva. 1908. 20.
- ²⁸ Shybeka Z. Narys gistoryi Belarusi. 1795-2002. Minsk, 2003. S. 160.
- ²⁹ Lyavon Gmyrak. Tvory / Uklad. U. Konan. Minsk, 1992. S. 133.
- ³⁰ Nasha Niva. 1911. 5.
- ³¹ Smaljančuk A. Pamizh krajovastju i natsyjanalnaj idejaj.Polsky ruh na belaruskich i litovskich zemlyah. 1864 –luty 1917. Vyd. 2, daprats. Sankt-Petsyrburg, 2004. S. 267, 269 dy insh..
- ³² Kurier Krajowy. 1912. Nr 19; Vechernyaja gazeta. 1913. 337.
- ³³ Kurier Krajowy. 1913. Nr 127; Vechernyaja gazeta. 1913. 360.
- ³⁴ Vechernyaja gazeta. 1914. 468.
- ³⁵ Kurier Krajowy. 1913. Nr 98.
- ³⁶ Łatyszonek O., Zięba A. Radziwi owa z Zawiszów // Polski słownik biograficzny. T. 30. S. 398–399.
- ³⁷ Gadleuski V. Z belaruskaga palitychnaga zhyt'tya Mensku 1917-1918 // Spadchyna. 1997. 5. S. 22.

- ³⁸ Tsit. po Rudovich S. “ ... Belaruski dzejach z vyalikh panou” //Gistarychny almanac. 1999. Tom 2. S. 51.
- ³⁹ Anton Lutskevich пра беларускае Адраджэнне пачатку XX st. S. 72.
- ⁴⁰ Bielarus. 1913. 1.
- ⁴¹ Ibidem. 1914. Nr 7.
- ⁴² Ibidem. 1914. Nr 13; 1915. Nr 23–24; Nr 29–30.
- ⁴³ Ibidem. 1914. 7; 13.

BUFFER FORMS: TO EUROPE THROUGH DENIAL OF EUROPE

For Belarus, as well as for the majority of the former USSR countries, “the European choice” or “the European prospect” remains disputable; it has never been a subject for revision and reconsideration, namely, political analysis. Unlike some of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (further CEE), e.g. the Czech Republic and Poland, “the European choice” or “the European prospect” has never taken the form of a political program, it was usually referred to as “a utopian horizon” and was unclearly thought of as a united form of liberal democracy. Some people considered it the time (according to Z. Bauman) of global capitalism, while others called it a “universal” package of values or a catalogue of intellectual discourses, some other groups of people believed it to be simply “a quality of life”, or a set of realities that was not a subject of choice and integration at a cultural, historical and geographical level.

It is incorrect to believe that Belarusian society is divided according to people’s attitude towards “Europe” (to the Euro-Atlantic world, widely referred to as the West), though the character of this attitude surely varies. At the same time, a representative of any social group would choose the following two notions: “we are a part of Europe” and we are referred to as “sub-Europeans”. In addition, representatives of the ruling class believe in two contradictory statements that are parts of one main strategy: a) on the one hand, we have protected you from horrors of the western society; b) on the other hand, we will soon live just like western people do. “Sub-Europe”, striving to become a recognized part of Europe (“world community”), is an image of Belarus that “theoretical Belarusian classes” have in mind.

Such form of self-identification, though controversial at first, is typical of almost all of the countries of the former USSR, including Caucasian and Central Asian countries (with the exception of

the Baltic States and Turkmenistan that have chosen their priorities at once). In all these cases, Europe is thought of as a final destination. It is worth mentioning that all the CIS-members have democratic constitutions that correspond to the European standards, and are not likely to deny international obligations, accepted during the moment of the introduction into the European institutions (the OSCE, the Council of Europe, etc.). It is quite indicative, that ideological textbooks of “Europe’s last dictatorship” - though principles of democracy in a European way do not even presuppose the existence of any ideological textbooks – are loyal [1]. However, the necessity of specific alterations and cultural deviations on the way to democratic transition has been declared in the textbooks. This is done in order to legalize, at least temporarily, “the Belarusian model”. Transitology appears to be a convenient doctrine, justifying to a certain extent “the expediency” of delays on the way to market reforms and democratic transformations up to their complete denial. The CIS countries are supposed to enter the European family first, and then “mature” within the limits of the post-Soviet world, and finally reach the standard of sovereignty.

Thus, there exists some kind of a prospect in a prospect, a context in a context – post-Sovietikum in big Europe (from Vancouver up to Vladivostok), - within the borders of which “the Belarusian model” looks not only extraordinary or seems to be a deviation (if to consider it for example, along with the countries of CEE), but it is more of a rule [2]. At least this circumstance compels us to imagine the position of Belarus in reality before building up “the European prospect” in the imagined world.

Post-Sovietikum does not only present an abstract notion built on the ruins of an imperial complex, or the space where some inertial forces operate. It is more likely to present a set of spaces - structures and fields “correlated” with them (to be more precise, grounds), - that are characterized by their own process logic and noted for their complex mutual relations with each other. Let us call these structures buffer forms, as long as post-Sovietikum, besides all other characteristics, is the so-called collective screen that acts as a medium for interrelations between “global” processes or “challenges”, as they are more often referred to, and “glocal answers”. Our task is to study the logic of development isomorphic for these buffer forms. It will let us specify “the Belarusian case”, i.e. simply understand that it cannot be explained either from its own or European perspective.

1. The CIS as a Platform on the Way to Legitimate Sovereignties

If “the post-Soviet space” had been something like a vessel without any bulkheads, it would have sunk by the end of the 90s, by the moment of “final” registration of sovereignties. However, the post-Soviet ark is arranged in a more sophisticated way, which lets it survive despite the flooding of separate compartments. Essentially this circumstance, namely, the existence of various integration structures with mutually exclusive and correlated functions, has long been a subject of weak-sighted (as it is possible to ascertain) criticism and self-criticism.

1.1. Legalization / Legitimization of Sections

Relations between post-Soviet states and the external world can be better described with the help of the term “blackmail state”. In reality, all integration activities, even not very substantial ones ranging from agreements on gas to registration of various organizations, have been accompanied with endless “tenders”, haven’t they?

The term “blackmailing state” was first introduced by American political scientist K. Darden in relation to the so-called “hybrid” regimes on the territory of the former USSR. According to Darden, legitimate blackmail is the basic means of the ruling power reproduction in the post-Soviet states. The system itself is based upon three “functional” basics: 1) the mechanism of corruption “encouragement”; 2) the mechanism of watching inherited from the USSR and used for “condensation” of any sort of compromising evidences (KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, various security services, as well as new oprichnina in the form of “tax inspection”) and, finally 3) free manipulation with laws that has become, in this respect, exclusively mild for “those who benefit from it” (politically and economically loyal) and extremely rigid for “Another” (oppositionists and other turncoats).

The given model looks convincing enough though, to our mind, it lacks one of the substantial grounds, namely, institutions of the “external” legitimate system, represented by various unions, the CIS in particular, that nowadays is the main guarantor (*sui generis*) of “identity” of the will of dominating minority and the will of the majority. It is harder to agree with the statement of Darden, according to which the given system is steady enough and won’t be a subject to essential corrosion in future [3]. In fact the stability of this system is determined not only by its specific character (let us say, by the potential of its internal “stability”), but also to what extent its specific character can be hidden. In this respect, Georgia, Ukraine and, probably, Moldova are the “weak” components of the described system. Finally, these components contribute to the fact that the hidden sides appear to be open for public consideration.

Starting with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), these are specific institutions that are “to structure” a series of “vacant” spaces divided between each other by the newly independent states (NIS). It’s worth mentioning that according to the Agreement on creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (of December 8th, 1991), several things were to be preserved as they used to be before, mainly common defense and humanitarian space, common armed forces, absence of customs borders and many other provisions that no longer exist.

Of course, it does not mean that post-Soviet states do not cooperate in different spheres any longer. However, exchanges of any kind (from trade agreements to humanitarian ones) are carried out mainly according to the “beam” (Russia – the NIS) or to a “regional” principle (state-to-state relations such as Belarus - Ukraine, Kazakhstan - Kirghizia). The situation becomes even more complicated due to relations on the basis of intergovernmental and interdepartmental contacts and agreements as well as various “fractional” unions “with the shift of the centre of gravity” (the United State of Russia

and Belarus, the Common economic space, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Community). Any relations or agreements between states are very hard to put into practice “on the balance” of the CIS due to a simple reason: members of the CIS are not supposed to follow unilateral obligatory norms and regulations even in case of long-term agreements. That is the basic difference between the CIS and the EU according to which the Commonwealth was created as it was stated by the EU’s architects. The complete dissolution of the CIS is sure not to damage railway communications or lead to delays in coal and hydrocarbons deliveries. A series of reports on visa-free movement of citizens or a mutual recognition of diplomas, as a matter of fact, does not require the approval of the CIS officials. Meanwhile, the absence of the “real” feedback from the CIS does not necessarily mean that it has been a completely dysfunctional institution that has existed (and been financed) for no purpose. Let us say, there is a very important function (a group of functions) realized only and exclusively due to the existence of the Commonwealth.

Comparing legality and legitimacy, a certain hidden sense of the Commonwealth becomes more or less vivid. “Legal” must be stipulated in Law, i.e. the decision must be ratified, if it claims to be universal; while “legitimate” is ratified partially and doesn’t depend on whether it was registered in the form of a general law or not. At the same time, we can agree with Pierre Bourdieu who, contrary to Max Weber, insisted on the fact that the recognition of legitimacy is not simply cogitation as long as “it is rooted in the direct coordination of the incorporated structures that have become unconscious” [4].

The Act of denunciation of the treaty in 1922 about the formation of the USSR can be recognized as legal because, on the one hand, it remains to be “the act of cogitation” and, on the other hand, it is the Law itself (hasty ratified by all states of the former USSR). But it was not legitimate, as it was not coordinated with “the incorporated structures that have become unconscious”: citizens of the USSR got used to be citizens of the USSR, and could not imagine themselves being citizens of other countries. It is also possible to recollect that the decision about the USSR “self-dissolution” was accepted contrary to the final resume of the referenda, according to which the overwhelming majority of citizens voted in favor of the USSR (Soviet republics-members of the USSR). Though, almost all of the republics proclaimed declarations on state sovereignty.

However, the real back side of the Act of denunciation of the treaty about the formation of the USSR was the Act of the CIS declaration. In fact, it was the only act including two synchronous actions, and if so it is possible to say that legal illegitimacy of the first one was supported by illegal legitimacy of the other one. Thus, the symbolical capital of the USSR was inherited by the CIS. Initially, it performed its particular compensatory function. The function was determined by the necessity to preserve the “mediating” center, without which all symbolical and physical exchanges were impossible; and, secondly, by the necessity to compensate the lack of the NIS members sovereignty. As far as other capitals are concerned - economic, cultural and so forth (the so-called “heritage of the USSR”),

they were a subject to an immediate sharing through “divorce offices” though, however, this image is quite misleading.

Some participants of the “Viskulevskaya interlude” were likely to think in the beginning that the symbolical (nominative) function of the CIS in the future, when new elites turn completely into the state ones, and the NIS become real subjects of international law, will be also a subject to “redistribution”. Otherwise, it will be a subject to substitution accompanied by the dissolution of the Commonwealth. Anyway, it is indicative, that the initial name “the Union of the Independent States” was replaced by the “Commonwealth”. It is difficult to say, what stage the projects were at when it came to different attributes of sovereignty (national currencies, embassies, flags, anthems and etc.). However, there were all reasons to believe that direct participants perceived the process of deposition of the imperial center as the crucial one, “without any analogues in history”.

Meanwhile, the logic of this process is not something “out of the common”... The analysis of the Mongol Empire decline, initiated by Musafar Alam, can serve as a perfect scenario of the Empire complex dissemination. “Under the conditions of political and military adventurism revelry, - the author marks, - the imperial authority was accompanied with, and it led to its decline. None of the adventurers were powerful enough to dethrone the emperor and to force others to obey. All of them struggled separately to make their own fortunes, and threatened positions and achievements of each other. Some of them, however, managed to dominate over the others. When their achievements were given institutional recognition, a center was required to legalize them” [5]. M. Alam demonstrates that the decline of the imperial power combined with the simultaneous strengthening of province autonomy leads to the following result: local authorities continue to be viewed through “a certain pretence of the imperial center”, which is given the legitimate function.

In strict sense, the CIS has a similar model: nominal and morphological (the constitution, parliament, national currency, territory, population and so forth) attributes of sovereignty are not sufficient. They are required if the state wants to be recognized by the, so to say, “external” side. The president of a Republic, John Austin reminds, is the one who considers himself/herself the president of the republic, though contrary to a madman considering himself a Napoleon, this person must have substantial grounds to think so. Thus, the CIS realized the symbolical function of compensation/indemnification both when it reminded all the NIS-citizens about the “family of the people”, and when the gaps in national sovereignties were filled. If, for example, the former secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, becomes the head of the state in case of the party self-dissolution, then he or she consequently inherits party capitals; only a legitimate external center can give a certain image of legality to such a deal. This center, actually, serves as the ground, mentioned by Austin: that is how one of the agents of one elite (Yeltsin, Shevardnadze, etc.) turns into the leader of new elite in such a mysterious way. In this case, the elite is guaranteed a certain share of the “property” that used to be common.

At least, it follows from the aforesaid that the CIS has never been an “integrative” structure. In this respect, it has always been something opposite to such institutions as CSTO and CES), as long as it imposed direct restrictions on various forms of centralization and unification. The CIS treaty is a kind of an agreement about the division of influence spheres and possession zones. It determined a particular correlation of forces between direct competitors.

Let us say that the CIS was quite successful at dealing with the problem of “filling up” the sovereignties – especially if compared to a similar process of disintegration in Yugoslavia. There is a number of unresolved problems connected with the mutual claims of the countries of the Commonwealth (the problem of the Black Sea fleet, unclear situation over the Belarusian-Ukrainian border and etc.), the majority of which are qualified nowadays as “intergovernmental”. At the same time, having established a certain “external” limit of integration which is the result of a mutual division of political forces, recognized as national, the CIS does not establish the limits of disintegration and autonomism “deep into”. The CIS, so to say, leaves these problems at the discretion of the CIS participants. (It is enough to say that the central crutch of the empire – the CPSU – was pulled out simultaneously at all levels.)

A series of parliamentary crises through which many of the new states went through in the 90s was the proof of the fact that we do not simply have to do with a coincidence, but with a certain structural logic of “sovereignties”/ “disintegrations” of something that, in strict sense, has never been a single unit such as “nation”, “society” or “state”. At a certain moment a “strong” presidential power was the dominant one in most of post-Soviet states. In most of the cases, it was built upon the ruins, left after the fights between Councils of Ministers and Soviets, or between parliaments and presidents, whose mission was an intermediary presence “above the fight”.

1.2. Platform of “Inheritance”

“Strong” presidential power has serious advantages compared to other kinds of authority, but it is likely to turn into a virtual center similar to the CIS if there are no real counterparts. We should mention Nagorno-Karabakh, the Chechen Republic, problems of mutual relations between the center and the regions. Perhaps, the best example of autonomism process (i.e. struggle for authority between local elites and their combined effort against the center) was Jury Luzhkov’s demand for federal bodies to pay a rent for “his”, i.e. Luzhkov’s buildings and constructions meaning the Kremlin and a number of other similar constructions.

This struggle, as a rule, resulted in favor of the “center” that had most of the resources to win. The outcome of such a struggle quite often demanded, as the last argument, the recognition of the achievements by the associates of the CIS-club. As a rule, on the one hand, not all the members of this club required such an argument, and on the other hand,

not all of them observed certain gentlemen agreements. Turkmenbashi, for example, as soon as he named himself “The Leader of Turkmen”, did not require any external legitimation any longer. He was building the Eastern satrapy and was more likely to perceive any external legitimation as a threat.

The logic of the CIS preservation demanded some transformation of its main function - “legalization of divorce”. Such a prospective became relevant as soon as post-Soviet leaders were faced with a problem of “inheritance” (i.e. the preservation of the acquired capitals): either in the form of elimination of “successors” or in the form of direct prolongation of presidential powers. Mainly Minsk - in a situation of an aggravated conflict with the Consulting-Observing Group of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (COG OSCE) on the eve of the presidential elections in 2001 [6] – was the one to introduce a slight “technical” innovation. However, it had been thought over as a full-fledge function of the CIS. The “crisis of the CIS” was sure to be talked over for the first time, when some of those who signed the Alma-Ati declaration (on December 21st, 1991) – Karimov, Nazarbayev and Akayev - performed their duties for two average presidential terms but failed to find themselves a successor. Generally speaking, almost all post-Soviet leaders had some problems with the institutes of the OSCE, representatives of which could not understand that elections on the territory of the Commonwealth are unbelievably “fair”, very “transparent” and absolutely “voluntary”. Why was Lukashenko the first to ring the bell? The reason is that he faced these, if one may say so, double standards already in the autumn of 1996. He decided to introduce some changes into the Constitution, into the part which contained the description of his responsibilities. The Belarusian referendum was not recognized by the OSCE, but it was approved by the CIS. It was the main reason for the creation of the institute of CIS observers.

This idea was formulated in Minsk on June 1st, 2001 when the summit of the CIS leaders took place (three months prior to the presidential elections in Belarus); the idea was approved unanimously. The CIS de facto was reorganized: the institution was guaranteed the monopoly of legitimate nomination as (let us cite the definition introduced by Bourdieu) an “official - explicit and public - blessing of a legitimate vision of the social world” [7]. This authority is of great power. It is only the CIS members and the “external” institutions, which have the sole right to determine what is right and what is wrong.

In any case, none of the authorized bodies of the CIS did not dare to declare openly up to 2001 that there was “the eastern democracy” in addition to the “western” one. The chairperson of the Central Election Commission of Russia, being also the head of the temporary mission of the CIS observers, A. Veshnyakov, promised to work out a specific “convention on standards of free and democratic elections on the territory of the CIS” though spies began to spy in the, so to say, regime of permanent credit (which means: positive decisions in the morning, standards - in the evening). The mechanism started to work: presidential, parliamentary elections and the referendum in Belarus, elections in Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and even the presidential elections in the Chechen Republic were recognized as “legitimate”. The ultimatum of 2004, according to which an

immediate “reform” was required, was the climax of the whole situation. It was sent to the OSCE leaders for the consideration of the CIS leaders [8].

Meanwhile, “the second” formation of the Commonwealth is done partially under the cover of misunderstandings. They are triggered by the fact that problematic and ambiguous structures of a post-Soviet, secular and national state can be described using special terminology, mainly law terms that tend to be universal but not “specific” (for example, Belarus). These terms give a different basis and predetermine the way such misunderstandings will be coped with.

If perceived in an adequate way, these misunderstandings let us realize that “unexpected” revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, and then in Kirghizia haven’t come out of a sudden. When it comes to Moldova, we do not talk about the revolution; we understand that it is the adaptation of the system that has learnt from the Orange crisis. The target chosen by Voronin and his counterparts in order to make a pre-election attack is itself indicative. They are representatives of the temporary mission of the nongovernmental elections monitoring organization (CIS/EMO) that recognized Victor Yanukovich’s victory at presidential elections in the autumn of 2004 in Ukraine as legal.

Finally, Mr. Saakashvili, Yushchenko and Voronin do not owe anything to the CIS any longer as the legality and legitimacy of their authority do not rely on the orthopedic center of legitimacy such as the Kremlin or the Commonwealth. Both the legality and legitimacy are partially correlated with the recognition of a much bigger community than the CIS (though let us remind that the CIS countries are also a part of this community). Thus, “color revolutions” serve as a limit, after which, actually, “the European choice” is made up.

Thus, favorite “transit” arguments of the Commonwealth cease to operate within the Commonwealth. Everyone used to say that “we are not mature enough”, that we have “a special space”, etc.; now it is declared that there is no “quorum”. Why was the Commonwealth so beneficial? The matter is that it was a superstructure (or the basis) “for everyone” and “for the sake of everyone”: the power of unanimity means much more than any individual and casual will of the people. Though now Mr. Lukashenko declares that the West has claims on him because of his friendship with Russia. Then why isn’t Ukraine criticized because of its friendship with Russia? Finally, the matter is that recent events in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, to a certain extent, shed light on the basic, though also unwritten, mission of the CIS. The success of the symbolical (ideological) manufacture of the CIS in the form of “observations” and “nominations” was mostly determined by the fact that its main function remained unnoticed (due to a very simple reason: something is more efficient without the control of consciousness).

The fundamental paradox of the CIS could be formulated as follows: being a guarding “screen” against democracy, the CIS – according to the declared purposes – contributes to the democratization of entering states. The states which are sufficiently emancipated and have achieved their goals formulated directly in the well-known Agreement on creation of the CIS [9], disaffiliate with the Commonwealth. The basic logic of the Commonwealth

means that all members act strictly in accordance with the law they once swore to, even if it was not done on purpose.

2. Platform for Defense, or Life and Death of Military Unions

In 1945 well-known Hegelian, Alexander Kojève, wrote an analytical note addressed to the French government. He proves that sovereign policy cannot be realized in some of the states during the nuclear epoch [10]. Our future, according to Kojève, belongs to big quasigovernmental unions. Such, so to say, a negative resume under sociopolitical beliefs of “early modern” (that states-nations are the greatest “recent” forms of social order; that industrial societies will make the war an anachronism and etc) is supported actually by a group of positive projects. 6 years after the creation of the NATO (April, 4 1949) the Warsaw pact was signed (May, 14th 1955), and 37 years and 1 day later the Contract about collective security (May, 15 1992) was concluded.

2.1 “Middle-Stage Modern”: Global Suspicion

The “fact” of the “the Yalta’s world” decline, if taken seriously, makes us think, however, about the basic presumption of the world which is accepted as sine qua non of the modern world. The Yalta conference held in 1945 “brought” the epoch of “The Thirty Years’ War” to an end (that is how sometimes the period between the beginning of the First and the end of the Second world wars is called). According to the signed agreement, the process of partial denial of sovereignty by some of the states in favor of stable (not “occasional”) military-political unions was legalized. Existence of two military-political blocks – the NATO and the Warsaw pact (WP) – was the first stage of the formation of such associations (let us use the name “middle-stage modern”).

The logic of Yalta is, first of all, the logic of division, setting of new borders inside Europe (Oder-Neisse) divided into blocks. This model of division is offered also to the non-European world (world’s periphery), which becomes the successor of Europe and its internal conflicts. Each block has a superstate as its center and is structured in the form of the hierarchy of sovereignties controlled by a more rigid one in case of the WP, and a less rigid one in case of the NATO. Coexistence of nations within military-political blocks allows not only to neutralize the potential aggression of particular states, but also to minimize any possibility of attacks from an external aggressor: the attack on any member of the alliance is considered to be an attack on the alliance. That is the positive side of coexistence in alliances, while the negative one is that any regional conflict leading to a global conflict of both systems - capitalist and socialist, - triggers an arms race and two-sided distrust and fear.

“Lessening” is sure to be the key word to characterize the transition between forms of organization of “middle-stage modern” and alliances and misalliances of “late” or “high

modern". The process of lessening is just one of the dimensions characterizing the remaking of the system of interblock confrontation into something different. Both the USSR and the USA were affected by this process. Though, the loss of hegemony within the WP meant abrogation of the corresponding project for the USSR and loss of legitimacy of the USSR's foreign policy. All the features mentioned above were the signs of the future collapse. Let us note, without focusing our attention on the reasons for collapse and its peculiarities that one of false beliefs dominates in Minsk and Moscow, i.e. the abrogation of the Yalta system demands a step backwards to the policy of national sovereignty. Meanwhile, the crisis of the Yalta world does not cancel the process of cutting sovereignties out and the movement from the national-state formations to large (regional par excellence) unions.

2.2. "High modern": Rhizome

The Tashkent Collective Security Treaty (CST) was signed in May, 1992. Ten years later the CSTO was created on the basis of the CST's regulatory and legal framework. The CSTO was planned in order to continue the policy of cutting/indemnifying sovereignties in measures of security. In this respect, the CSTO is similar to well-known alliances, though its founders like to emphasize that the organization is not a remake of the WP or a copy of the NATO. In fact, the NATO itself is not a replica of its previous version, because this organization's purposes have been reconsidered in compliance with the changes of the system of international relations and kinds of threats.

As far as the CSTO is concerned, we also deal with a new arrangement of accents in the threat list. One of the regulations included into the CSTO Charter should be considered as the basic one, i.e. coordination and combined efforts against terrorism and other nonconventional safety threats are among the main goals and activity spheres of the organization. Confrontation with other military unions or states is not stipulated in the constituent documents of the CSTO, the organization is viewed as a regional fragment of the developing world system of security. In a narrower sense, the CSTO goals are to build a system of collective security measures on the post-Soviet territories and to foster the military-political integration of the member states for complex measures against threats. Although it is stressed in the CST that its members "will not enter military unions or join any group of states" (Article 1 of the treaty), cooperation with the latter is supposed to take place (Article 8 of the treaty, Article 4 of the Charter) [11].

Some of the members (Minsk, in particular) are likely to perceive the CSTO as a means of potential protection against massive killings similar to those in Yugoslavia or Iraq. Such "perspectives" induce commentators to classify the CSTO as "the second edition of the Warsaw pact", though being of a comical type, especially if one decides to talk about the efficiency of the organization.

We can briefly describe the WP's informal program, which, actually, allowed us to see the organization in operation. Dethronement or collapse of Dubček's regime (1968)

is one of the examples. The USSR made other members of the WP participate in “the establishment of order” in Czechoslovakia. The keeping of Europe under the Soviet rule and preventive measures against social revolt are the unwritten “side” of the contract. Similar unspoken goals are attributed to the CSTO. Meanwhile, none of the CSTO members (including Russia) has ever received any collective military help, which proves that the organization does not care about the problem of collective security. Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan have dissolved the treaty for this specific reason.

When it comes to efficiency, the CSTO corresponds to the standards of other international unions such as the US, CIS, EurAsEC, and CES. These “standards” are structurally predetermined by a substantial gap between declarative goals and “trick games” of their members. It is easy to see the way hopes and fears of members are projected onto the CSTO “screen”.

As far as Russia is concerned, for example, the CSTO is one of the means to preserve its influence in the neighboring territories and to “buffer” these spaces, i.e. to transform them into a buffer between the Russian Federation and the other world (today the term “a safety pillow” is used). Russia is the main financial donator for many organizations (with a 50% share); and for the same reason it is not much concerned about problems of other states. Besides, it even contributes to certain aggravation or freezing of these problems. The Buffer is the buffer.

The Belarusian party thinks that the CSTO was created in order to support the military-political component of the CST taking into account “the processes during which certain forces undertake attempts in order to destroy the system of the world order”. When analyzing Lukashenko’s arguments with their vague references to “certain forces”, we can easily recognize the rhetorical accents of the “middle-stage modern” epoch which primary concern is the confrontation between “the systems”. From the “external” point of view, an attempt which Belarus undertakes in order to present itself as the last stronghold on the way to the NATO’s advancement, certainly, looks quite intricate. The Russian Federation all around is surrounded by the NATO bases, and only an absolutely clear mind may get an idea that the NATO will break through the Belarusian “corridor” (an obsessive shadow of the past war).

The third indicative example is Kazakhstan (and other countries of Central Asia). In our opinion, the attitude of Kazakhstan towards security is the most advanced and adequate perception of specific features of the epoch of “the high modern”. Kazakhstan is a member of the CSTO, OSCE and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), it actively cooperates with the NATO, the USA and Russia in the sphere of military affairs; in other words, it is trying to create a multilevel system of security. One of the advantages of this approach is, first of all, the avoidance of modal scripts of other global oppositions (obsession with “middle-stage modern”) and, secondly, the minimization of the threat to transform the country’s territory into an arena of external forces opposition (a special case of the RB). Finally, Kazakhstan is most likely to articulate the strategy of “the selective choice” of security structures depending on their specialization. The CSTO activity, in

particular, as they believe in Astana, should be mainly devoted to the problems of drugs trafficking and terrorism.

Kazakhstan has all reasons to prevail, and, consequently, the CSTO will turn into a regional system of security within time, sufficiently integrated into the world system. Already now there are American and Russian bases on the territory of Kirghizia and other states in Central Asia. It is a significant symptom of the “high modern” epoch. There is no scandal in such a “neighborhood”: mutual imposition of security systems, their decentralized structure (rhizome passes it best) fosters lessening and minimization of mutual distrust and fear. Let us say, that contrary to all “figs in pockets”, the CSTO is most likely, sooner or later, to achieve its declarative goals; that was a lesson of the Warsaw pact.

Post factum, we ascertain that the historical mission of the Warsaw pact has been realized, i.e. it has paradoxically coincided with its declarative goal, which is “the creation of the all-European security system”. Today, 50 years after the WP signing, this (multilayered) system was actually created, namely, all the European countries from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals Mountains are the members of the OSCE, the overwhelming majority of which are members of the NATO or cooperate with the alliance. The CSTO orientation is still questionable. It is not clear yet, though the concept of “post-Soviet space” taken from the CSTO’s documents is indicative. First of all, it means that the genome of “common history” (originated in the USSR) no longer guarantees partner relations in the military-political sphere. To put differently, it has been secretly admitted that some of the former Commonwealth states can be considered opponents of the member-countries of the treaty. Nevertheless, there is no adequate word to replace the term “post-Soviet space”; it means that everything is not clear when it comes to the unifying principle as well as to the image of the enemy, the best example of which is still the NATO, the basic partner of the CSTO.

3. Economic Platform

Similar to the CSTO, the EurAsEc is noted for the well-known vices typical of an integrated union of such kind (though this time it is a “trade and economic” union and not a “military-political” one). Just like the CSTO, this organization is viewed in terms of its own “potential threat” in the form of the World Trade Organization (WTO), entrance into which is on the agenda. Russia, Belarus and some other countries of the EurAsEC are members of the WTO. For this reason they are trying to benefit from privileges, preferences, a guaranteed favorable market, etc.

As long as the WTO is responsible for the unification norms (customs legislation, tax codes, banking systems, etc.), the EurAsEC has the right to deal with “the specification” (as well as the CES, “alterations” in which have stopped for a while because of a “pure instrumental” approach of Ukraine), i.e. to define amounts for customs charges, to introduce restrictive measures for goods produced by member-countries (up to the declaration of a

trade war), and (which is very important) to arrange direct presidential deliveries of consignment goods and many other useful initiatives above the “back side of the market”.

Contrary to the common opinion, inefficiency of this structure (if we consider this “inefficiency” from the narrow economic point of view) is not the result of its structural distinctions. It stems from similarities of social and economic structures, built according to a simple principle; the share of each in the public welfare depends on the person’s position in political hierarchy. Thus, the competition of national economies is transformed into the competition of national elites which accept these or those economic interests (national ones) for their own.

Similar to all other post-Soviet integrated “points of growth”, the EurasEC has never been an economic union, in its strict sense, but a political platform to express the will of the union. We use the platforms of EurAsEC and the CES to talk about the will for economic integration and the platform of the CSTO to talk about the will for collective security space, all the other platforms (by means of various euphemisms) are used to talk about the threat of loss of authority and privileges connected with it.

Contrary to other similar associations (for example, the United State, CES or the CIS), the EurAsEC is the subject of international law (the organization is registered in the United Nations), and this circumstance relieves and stresses a well-known motive, according to which collective subjects are appreciated more than the individual ones. However, the last motive is more speculative than leading. In case of post-Soviet countries the principle “maximum-minimum”, inherited from the games theory, does not work in most situations. For instance, each of the EurAsEC members is trying to enter the WTO quicker than others breaking off a vicious circle of public and private arrangements. In this case, the realization of such arrangements is paradoxically dependent not on the contracting parties but on the WTO.

4. “United State”

We can assert that the quantity of unions of the post-Sovietikum is proportionate to a state’s failure to conduct its own high-grade sovereign policy, on the one hand, and the necessity to escape somehow from a complete political isolation, on the other hand. Belarus, as it is known, is a member of all post-Soviet alliances. It is an additional peculiarity that makes “European prospective” more obscure and postpones it for an indefinite term.

The “United State” (US) is, perhaps, the most mysterious state in the world, because the form of its existence is tacitly recognized but cannot be described within any terms, i.e. it is not registered anywhere as a subject of international law (in the UNO, in particular). Belarus and Russia act as independent states (not on behalf of the US) when making most of the decisions concerning the United State. All the three key projects of this state – the Constitution, a common gas transmission system and a common currency – exist only on

paper, though it is better to say that even documentation on these projects lacks details. At the same time, the US exists in the form of a pure ideological and media phenomenon, a place for meetings of presidents of both countries who, from time to time, adhere to and try to relieve debates over one of the three problems - the Constitution, the currency and the gas transmission enterprise. Every time each one of these problem projects is used as a means of blackmail, which lets to keep the situation under “controllable pressure”; the lessening of the tense situation is perceived as a “step towards each other”.

Sergey Lavrov declares that “democratic principles cannot be developed from the outside”. In terms of the existing US this statement can stand for the fact that democratization can be done “from the inside”. As a matter of fact, the agreement signed in 1999 approves such democratization: “The United State is a secular, democratic and legal state that accepts political and ideological variety, a multi-party system” (Article 5). “Complete compliance with the principle of universal respect and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the rules of International law” is declared as one of the primary goals of the US (Article 2) 12. In these terms, the fulfillment of corresponding obligations by both of the parties should not be treated as the imposing of democracy “from the outside”. Thus, there is only one way to realize all the agreements connected with the US, which is to make its participants full-fledged members of the Euro-Atlantic community.

5. Instead of Epilogue

We tend to describe everything that happens within the borders of the post-Soviet territory (that, let us remind, was the “successor” of the Soviet territories; today it actually consists of 6 countries, i.e. Armenia, Belarus, Kirghizia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan); as the process of disintegration by means of integration. If so, it means that, on the one hand, each integration process leaves fewer participants, each time eliminating “outcasts” and those who “failed to survive”, and on the other hand, it inherits the functions of organizations-predecessors (which sometimes are the same organizations, but of an “old type”). But it would be just half the truth.

Its second part then is that the participants who left the game are, first of all, those who have already become emancipated enough to start their own national project, choose their own perspectives making in such a way “the European choice”. In this case we also have to deal with the process of emancipation by means of integration. Various united projects let national sovereignties become mature enough to be perceived as they are. In practical terms, the positive side of this partner and united (integrated) interaction is that such a process of becoming mature is quite painless. On the one hand, it does not lead to serious regional conflicts, and, on the other hand, the number of the “lost souls” is minimized (it comes down to “countries which are outside of any unions”, namely Korea, Cuba, Turkmenistan). Provided all the peculiarities of the situation are taken into account.

Notes

1. See, for example: Y.S. Yaskevich. *Osnovy ideologii Belaruskogo gosudarstva*. Minsk: TetraSystems, 2004.
2. Actually, to avoid general references to geographical and cultural-historical affinity, it is hard to find contextual links between Belarus and Europe in general, and CEE, in particular. It is quite indicative that Belarusian elites — both in their “positive” and “protest” part - do not have a recognized concept of mutual relations with their close neighbors. Belarus recognizes only the “CIS countries” and the “other world”. Introduction of the Central European Initiative with the help of the ex-minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivan Antonovich, can be considered the only significant attempt to change something in this situation. It is worth mentioning that there is no regional criterion for the CEE countries: there is only the EU (within which there is, for example, the Visegrad group) on the one hand and the “post-Soviet countries” on the other hand.
3. Darden A. Blackmail as a tool of state domination: Ukraine under Kuchma // *East European Constitutional Review*. Vol. 10, #2-3 (Spring Summer 2001) / http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol10_num2_3/focus/darden.html
4. See: Pierre Bourdieu. *Duh gosudarstva: Genesis i struktura burokraticheskogo polya // Poetika i politika*. Almanah Rossijsko-frantsuzskogo tsentra sotsiologii i filosofii Instituta sotsiologii RAN. M.: Institut eksperimentalnoj sotsiologii; SPb.: Aletejja, 1999. P. 125–166.
5. Alam M. *The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India, Awadh and the Penjab. 1708–1748*. Oxford-Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986. P. 17.
6. On December 31, 2001 the four-year term of office of Hans-Georg Vik, the first head of the COG OSCE, came to an end. Jebergard Hajken, former German ambassador in Ukraine, was recommended by the OSCE to take the office. Minsk did not accept his candidacy and demanded to review the mandate of the mission. Since January 1st, 2002 Mishel Rivole has performed the duties of the COG head. His visa expired on the 15th of April. Belarusian authorities refused to prolong it, and on the 1st of June Andrew Carpenter was actually expelled. The peak in the war against the COG OSCE was the secret hearing of the situation with the mission in the House of Representatives on the 22nd of May. Leonid Erin, the head of KGB of Belarus delivered his speech. On the 28th of May the Center of information and public relations of KGB of Belarus distributed a press release with the keynotes of the speech. KGB again accused the COG OSCE of intervention into internal affairs of the country. Leonid Erin declared that the COG OSCE since it started its operation on the territory of Belarus in 1997 has been under full control of the USA.
7. Pierre Bourdieu. *Sotsiologija politiki*. M.: Socio-Logos, 1993. P. 72.
8. Ultimatum addressed towards the OSCE, is inspired by the idea of distinction between the aspects of «real» security (prevention of illegal migration threats, terrorism and so forth) and «secondary» humanitarian disputes. Essence of this ultimatum might be rather vague for Europeans, who do not quite understand how security issues can be regarded separate from problems of a humanitarian cycle or, more widely, problems of democracy which are thought of as one of the basic grounds for a secure world (or more or less secure).
9. ”We, the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation, Ukraine as the USSR’s states-founders <...> striving to build democratic states on the principles of law <...> confirming our adherence to the goals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, the Helsinki final act and other documents of the Conference on Security and Coop-

- eration in Europe, promising to observe the conventional international norms on human and national rights, have agreed as follows... » (the Agreement on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. A preamble / <http://cis.mmsk.by/main.aspx?uid=176>)
10. See: Pogorelsky A. Vostochnoevropejskaya mehta // Politichesky zhurnal. №21 (61). 6/14/2005 / <http://www.politjournal.ru/index.php?action=Articles&dirid=67&tek=3667&issue=106>
 11. Package of documents for the project of law of the RC “About Ratification of the Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization” / <http://www.mizinov.net/articles/3232>
 12. Agreement on the creation of the United State / <http://www.rg.ru/oficial/doc/sng/dg.htm>

COLLISION OF IDENTITIES IN THE BORDER ZONE: POSTCOLONIAL SYNDROME

United Europe is in search of its new identity. However, its construction turned to be more complex than the coining of euro. Sometimes European countries find it difficult to develop common positions on key problems of today's world. However, they have a uniform base that allows Europe to feel its geocultural unity remaining the place for old democracies in which the concept of law and civil freedom is immutable.

Philosophical concept of personal freedom fundamental for European culture historically became an organic necessity and together with it such became the right to freedom of entire countries and nations. It is no accident that at the international competition on the new Europe motto held in 2000, one of the “candidates” was an Italian expression: «In libertate coniuncti» – «United by freedom».

In 1991 Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova looked at Europe enthusiastically while Europe enthusiastically looked at new sovereign states. Fifteen years have passed but we all still cannot pass the examination for identity with the united Europe. Perhaps, simply because we built and strengthened the sovereignty on the basis of specifically national identity (in its ethnic and political context) and did not manage to effectively build operating mechanisms of civil society is that very basis needed for the understanding of and acceptance in Europe.

Meanwhile, national identity does not exclude stratification of other, supranational or post national (in terms of the Englishman Anthony Smith) identities. It is possible to feel oneself a Ukrainian, a Slav and a European at the same time. One can also mix in the narrow “regional” identity of a Huzul or a Kiever and “wide”, global sensation of “the citizen of the world”. But such a high-quality spiritual blend provides for equality and capability of all elements as well as the feeling of self-value and self-esteem that is equally important.

The presence and “collision” on this territory of a plenty of identities which have arisen historically from all possible projects of expansion and “culturization” of the given space can serve as a good reason to speak about the phenomenon of the Border zone.

Last but not the only project of colonization of the Border zone appeared to come to an end not so long ago together with the disintegration of the USSR.

The USSR was an empire in which interethnic mutual relations experienced certain deformation caused by totalitarianism. Xenophobic hatred and intolerance towards “others” spread not only to “class enemies” (external and internal), but also to “nationalists” composed of everyone who in this or that way tried to keep his/his own identity opposing the Soviet-Russian-communist unification.

As it has already been mentioned communist ideology inherently cultivates xenophobia and stereotypes. Xenophobia (literally it means a fear of that which is strange, distrustfulness and, accordingly, hostility towards strange and unfamiliar) is only a private display of a much more simple basic instinct, namely the instinct of self-preservation. On the other hand, like any other “blind” instinct, xenophobia can knowingly be used in all kinds of ideological manipulations and frequently even as the basic component of the whole xenophobic “projects” including, for instance, Bolshevism, (hatred to “class enemies”), Nazism (hatred to other ethnoses), religious fundamentalism (hatred to heterodoxes, members of different religious denominations, heretics), etc. Hatred to “an other” was communism’s main source of social energy.

In his article “Ot “Malorossii” k “Indoevropu”: ukrainskie avtostereotypy” (“From “Little Russia” to “Indoeurope”: Ukrainian Autostereotypes”) the author – Mykola Ryabchuk – describes the mechanism of colonization of Ukraine first by the Russian empire and then by the USSR. The approach allows to see certain universality in such a mechanism and also to expand the “cover zone” of the given project within the limits of the modern context of the Border zone.

“Ukraine like any other colony was under a huge influence of the mother country with the consequences (and the purpose) of this influence being the imposing on the “natives” of a negative self-image and negative self-representation. Actually there occurred some kind of stereotype inversion: under the pressure from colonizers the colonized ethnos was compelled to accept and to acquire as its own a foreign system of stereotypes. The system was not only alien by also hostile and humiliating. Colonizers’ opinion about the colonized as “barbarians”, “sub-humans”, carriers of “chaos” is imposed on the colonized by different methods. The colonized gradually accept this opinion as their own with this point of view turning into an extremely negative and destructive autostereotype. Thus, the colonized people is not only compelled to carry the shady part of the dominating culture but also to operate within its borders.

The most widespread projection from the Russian side included a number of images such “singing and dancing provincial Little Russia (Malorossija)”, “a cunning Little Russian” (somewhat simple-minded, uneducated, but nimble, roguish and of different

denomination) and “Ukrainian” (“hohol” similar in its meaning to the nickname “nigger” in the USA).

This stereotype was formed by Russian colonizers for many centuries and with certain corrective amendments was inherited and developed by Bolshevik ideologists. According to this stereotype, the Ukrainian people is understood as a result of “an external intrigue” (Polish-German-Austrian-Hungarian-Jewish) whereas Russians being almost the only ones and, at least, present successors of Kievan Rus’, “the great people” (“God bearers” during imperial times, “a stronghold of world revolution “ during the Soviet days), i.e. the people with a special historical mission to unite around itself all Slavs (“Slavophilism”), Europeans and Asians (“Evrazijstvo”), and, actually, even the whole world (Bolshevik “world revolution”). [1]

Within the framework of this ideologeme Ukrainians were taught accordingly interpreted history (both Ukrainian and Russian and more exactly it was Russian history with some elements of the Ukrainian one), the present was explained (colonial dependence as a happy “brotherhood”) and the future was outlined (more specifically, it was the absence of future, disappearance, i.e. the “merging” as the highest blessing for a chimerical “sub-nation”). Soviet translators, who knew the translation principles of the names of the countries into the English language, intentionally translated the name of this territory using the article because with the article it sounds like the name of a part of the country to English-speaking citizens. [2]

“On a daily non-reflective level this stereotype functioned in the form of ingenuous formulas used by the inhabitants: “what is the difference – Russians or Ukrainians, it is in fact the same” or “it is all the same to me what language to speak – Russian or Ukrainian”.

The mechanism of intellectual enthrallment (“intellectual submission”, in terms of academician Vernadsky, “mental colonialism” in terms of Edward Said) had a rather refined and unobvious character for the majority. The Ukrainian language in the USSR (unlike in a more ingenuous imperial Russia) was not formally forbidden, however, the perfect system of educational, propaganda and administrative actions successfully marginalized the functioning of this language limiting opportunities of display of national identity to the maximum, and minimized the process of national consciousness”. [1]

The consequence of such skilful and purposeful policy became an impressive phenomenon of “national unconsciousness” (Oksana Zabuzhko’s term) of a 50-million European ethnos which enters into the XXI century with the national consciousness of feudal times. “Today in most cases a significant part of the Ukrainian population identifies itself as “locals” (“We are not Russians and are not Ukrainians, we are people living in Odessa, Donbas and Kiev”. Such an answer can be heard quite frequently in different regions of Ukraine). [1]

According to all characteristics this is the psychology of a particularly medieval ethnos.

Overcoming an extremely negative autostereotype, imparted to millions of the Russianized Ukrainians by the colonial authority, does not look as easy and fast as it seemed to many during the first days of independence.

Several years ago Ukrainian culturologist Alexander Gritsenko made a rather interesting attempt to transfer classical Freudian components of a mental person (“id”, “ego” and “super-ego”) to the collective consciousness of an ethnos. In his interpretation “id” was understood as “an early, primarily parent, unconscious element which spontaneous impulses are defined not by conscious “patriotism” but by an “inner” aspiration to “one’s own, native”.

In itself the presence of the Ukrainian «id» does not yet turn a person into a Ukrainian or a “Little Russian”, but only into a “local”, implanted in the Ukrainian ground. Perhaps, many noticed that even Non-Ukrainians brought up in Ukraine, very frequently only superficially familiar with the “real” Ukrainian language and culture, nevertheless subconsciously consider specifically Ukrainian national songs, exclusively Ukrainian landscapes, at last Ukrainian vareniks and lard to be their own.

Then follows the Russified “ego”, a shell of the Russian language formation, a consequence of powerful influence of Russian culture, not only officially imposed, but truly extremely rich and diverse... As one can see, mutual relations “a Ukrainian id” and “a Russified ego” keep entirely within the classical Freudian scheme: “ego” should extinguish all subconscious or partially understood aspirations of “id” to “native, Ukrainian” if only not to draw serious troubles upon its own carrier... It was specifically the activity of “the Russified ego” that rescued lives of many Ukrainians... If someone did not manage to survive than one can blame a rather influential “consciously Ukrainian super-ego”.

Virtually, Ukrainians themselves now generate that same hatred which their colonizers imposed on them and themselves support those stereotypes which the colonial authority left to them as their inheritance. One of the greatest achievements of colonial administration in Ukraine was the transfer to Eastern Ukraine population of its own hatred to Western Ukrainians being the most resistant in their Ukrainian identity and unreceptive to inoculations of a negative autostereotype. It seems that today Eastern Ukrainians, apparently, have no greater enemy than “Western Ukrainians”, followers of Bandera and “Galichane” (those living in Galicia; Ukrainian division “Galichina”) which “aspire to appropriate the whole of Ukraine”.

In the context of the latter it seems pertinent to give a quotation from the interview of well-known in Russia geopolitician A. Dugin before the third round of presidential elections in Ukraine: “Yushchenko’s Western Suburb is a typical sanitary cordon. Uniform Ukraine under a moderately pro-Eurasian president could become very perspective geopolitical space with a multitude of various opportunities. This could ensure its special geopolitical status in regards to Eurasia and Europe and the Near East through the Black Sea. Some part of the divided Ukraine will become a part of the Eurasian Community, partly it will become a compulsory and uninviting makeweight of Europe shoved to it by Americans in order to set everybody to quarrelling with everybody, i.e. clearly a sanitary

cordons ... Yanukovich has no chances to become the president of the whole Ukraine. Now he has only an Eastern Ukrainian game with Eastern Ukraine to become the protectorate of Russia ... “[3]. As they say, no comments.

Unlike high-grade integral culture that functions like a uniform organism with a developed system of internal (and external) interrelations, with a developed mechanism of selection, classification, transfer and analysis of information, colonial culture is not at all a dialogical system, it is more like a set of monologic elements that are rather weakly and/or in no way connected among themselves. Therefore, at the level of the whole colonial culture demonstrates considerable inertia and propensity to stagnation, and at the level of segments it shows deregulation and tendency to “go off scale”. Ethnocultural “ghettoes”, as a rule, inadequately react to information: they exaggerate the insignificant and underestimate and/or do not notice the essential.

On the basis of the above stated (as exemplified by Ukraine) it is possible to track the presence of the mechanism of “political” colonization of the Border zone with formation, at least, of several types of identities:

1) “Ukrainians” as members of Ukrainian political nation which has already passed or passes through “nationalism epoch”; they not necessarily should be ethnic Ukrainians and do not even have to be Ukrainian-speaking but they treat the Ukrainian language and culture with respect and recognize their Ukrainian identity;

2) “Russians” as members of Russian political nation, they not necessarily should be ethnic Russians and do not even have to be Russian-speaking, after all, they do not always treat the Ukrainian language and culture scornfully, the main thing is that they identify themselves with Russia and Russian nation (or its imperial substitute “the Soviet people”);

3) “Little Russians” (“hohly”) as an ethnic substratum which did not turn into a modern nation - not Russian, not Ukrainian, not Donetsk-Communard but is in the condition of “locals” (people living in Odessa, Kiev and Donbas) that is being in the state of a medieval ethnic mass that has not gone yet through “the epoch of nationalism” stuck on a feudal, up to-modern and up to-national stage of development.

Besides “political” colonization it is possible to find other reasons for the formation of various types of identities in the Border zone. These are various confessional projects which can be used if one is to compare Belarus and Ukraine. This comparison is likely to reveal significant differences (if we choose to talk about Slavic cultures close in their typological relation).

So, for example, only a great eschatological idea gives the existence of people a certain lofty universal sense. As Andrei Okara states in his article “Belarus v otsutstvije tretiej alternativy” (“Belarus in the absence of a third alternative”), “antielitism is the circumstance because of which the Byzantine theme being extremely esoteric and eschatological is not yet capable of becoming especially significant for Belarus consciousness” [4].

In due time, in XIV–XV centuries, Byzantine emperors and patriarchies, expecting the inevitable end of empire, were choosing the retreat way for Constantinople between

Muscovy and Lithuanian Rus' as a direction for *translatio imperia*. Moscow was chosen, first of all, because of the absence of a Catholic alternative there: the Tatar enslavers of Muscovy frightened Byzantines less than the Latin "civilizers" of Lithuanian Rus'. It was exactly then when the Great Duchy of Lithuania descended from the Byzantine orbit, and the Byzantine theme, henceforth, was never actual for Belarus consciousness. Even modern Belarus Pan-Slavism and Moscow-oriented thinking do not appeal to the image of historical Byzantium, to Byzantine values, to the model «Byzantium-after-Byzantium».

Antielitism or absence of high-grade national elite of a priestly type is emphasized by all researchers as the national feature of Belarusians which has predetermined many psychological peculiarities and zigzags of this people's national history.

"Belarus national identity formed quite late, already within the framework of the USSR with this being the reason for modern Belarus to be almost the most "Soviet" of all the republics of the former USSR. Earlier Belarusians considered themselves to be sub-Poles, sub-Russians, in other words, "natives", that is locals. "Locals" are ethnic Belarusians without the "consolidating" idea, with low national consciousness; if earlier they were uneducated Belarus peasants, then recently they became denationalized and urbanized inhabitants of cities". [4]

Belarus identity developed exclusively as a peasant one or as a derivative of peasant identity. Belarusians were called both with pride and with contempt "the peasant's people".

Peasant thinking is non-eschatological being oriented at a calendar year, cyclicism and repeatability. This is the basis for antielitism in Belarus culture the structure of which allows to classify this culture as an "incomplete" culture.

Antielitism specifically explains the lack of the global Belarus national idea proclaiming universal uniqueness of Belarusians and their place in the mystical history of mankind. Belarus never felt itself "the center of the world", "the Medial ground", but always only "the first line" whether it was in the structure of the Great Principality of Lithuania or the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (*Rzeczpospolita*) as the first border of the West in the eastern direction, whether it was in the structure of the Russian empire, the USSR, the CIS or the Russia-Belarus union as "a defensive echelon", "big space". Belarus is "a corridor", "a transit", "a bridge" between civilizations, "a suburb", the country located on "the strategic crossroads", on "the cultural border zone"; it is, after all, "the assembly shop" of the Soviet industry. Significant for Belarus literature, cinema and public consciousness themes of the Great Patriotic war, the Brest fortress and guerrilla resistance, and in last decades also Chernobyl plots develop the archetype of Belarus as "the first line".

"Ukraineness" unlike "Little Russianness", represents alternative identity opposing to Russian Moscow or Petersburg oriented thinking a different (and not so necessarily hostile) Kiev oriented thinking vision of historical perspective, a different Slavic version of Apocalypse. Besides its West oriented course (integration into "the civilized world community") and pro-Moscow course (from the Enlightened "Little Russianness" and down to full assimilation of Ukrainians) Ukraine also has "a third alternative" that is the realization

of its own metahistorical uniqueness, accepting Kiev as a sacral center of the post-Byzantine cultural space as a possible future geopolitical leader of Eastern Europe. [4]

Why then is it so important to understand one's own identity? Because it is the basis for space development, precise definition of its borders and future growth. Identity is a condition for inclusion of the Border zone into modern integration processes. It would be desirable to hope that polyphony and variety of culturological components making the content of the phenomenon under the name "the Border zone" will become a base for dialogue and cooperation.

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